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Abstract
This thesis presents an empirical investigation of individual and team contests
using both lab experiments and field data. The thesis is comprised of five chap-
ters. Chapter 1 introduces the overarching theme of this thesis and the common
methodological tool, which is a novel real effort task used in the lab experiments.
Chapter 2 discusses this real effort task in more detail and shows its usefulness in
studying behavioural responses to incentives by presenting a series of experiments,
including individual production with piece-rate incentives, team production, gift
exchange, and tournament, using the task. All of the results are closely in line
with theoretical predictions and, where applicable, the stylised facts from experi-
ments using purely induced values. Chapter 3 experimentally examines the role of
interpersonal comparisons in an individual contest. The experiment follows Gill
and Prowse (2012) and is designed to investigate the source of disappointment
aversion, that is, whether it is purely an asocial concept, akin to loss aversion, or
fuelled by interpersonal comparisons. The new evidence however rejects predic-
tions of the disappointment aversion model, both when interpersonal comparisons
are possible and when they are not. Chapter 4 empirically examines strategic be-
haviour of contestants in a dynamic “best-of-three” team contest. I find evidence
of “strategic neutrality” in both field data from high-stakes professional squash
team tournaments and lab data from an experiment: the outcomes of previous
battles do not affect the current battle. The lab data however reveal that the neu-
trality prediction does not perfectly hold at the level of individual efforts. Chapter
5 concludes the thesis by summarising all findings in previous chapters, discussing
the limitations, and pointing to directions for future research.
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1 Introduction
This thesis is a contribution to the empirical understanding of behaviour in con-
tests. A contest is a situation in which each party can influence the outcome of
a competing process over some valuable resources by certain actions such as lob-
bying politicians, bribing officials, and investing in weapons.1 Contests have been
widely used to study economic phenomena such as elections, oligopolistic market
competitions, promotions within organisations, sabotage in the workplace, and
sports.2 Chapter 2 introduces an experimental tool—a novel “real effort” task—
that is used in the contest experiments throughout all chapters, and one section in
Chapter 2 examines a static contest using the task. Both Chapter 3 and Chapter
4 are devoted to dynamic contests, which assume a central role in real life compe-
tition but have thus far received relatively lesser attention than static contests. In
these two latter chapters, I take specific contests as given and investigate strategic
as well as psychological incentives underlying contestants’ behaviour.
Chapter 2, which is written jointly with my supervisors Simon Ga¨chter and
Martin Sefton, is a contribution to experimental methodology on using “real effort”
tasks in the lab. We develop a novel “real effort” task, called the ball-catching
1Several edited volumes are devoted to this field, including Buchanan et al. (1980), Lockard
and Tullock (2001), and more recently Congleton et al. (2008). Hirshleifer (1989, 1991) gives
one of the earliest accounts of specific technologies employed in contest.
2Interested readers are referred to a series of excellent surveys of both contest theory and
empirical evidence, including Nitzan (1994), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007), Corcho´n (2007),
Konrad (2009), and Dechenaux et al. (2015).
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task, which has the potential to be used in many experimental contexts including
contests.
Compared to the traditional induced value method (Smith, 1982), real effort
tasks are enjoying increasing popularity among experimental economists primarily
because the usage of such tasks adds more realism to otherwise highly abstract
experimental environments in the lab. For example, when studying contests in
the lab, we would expect that the technology of conflict involves activities that
require not just deliberative thinking but emotions. Simply letting participants
choose a number to represent investment or effort in contests might eliminate
those emotions that are otherwise present in real life interactions. However, exist-
ing real effort tasks share a common limitation: in using existing real effort tasks
(e.g., number-adding tasks, counting-zero tasks, and slider-positioning tasks), re-
searchers sacrifice considerable control over the cost of effort function.
The ball-catching task reflects our effort to re-establish a level of control over
the cost of effort function in a task with tangible activities. In the ball-catching
task, a subject has a fixed amount of time to catch balls that fall randomly from
the top of the screen by using mouse clicks to move a tray at the bottom of the
screen. Control over the cost of effort is achieved by attaching pecuniary costs
to mouse clicks that move the tray. The most important property of the ball-
catching task is that in using this task researchers are now capable of making
both comparative static and point predictions of effort similar to when using the
induced value method.
In Chapter 2 we evaluate the usefulness and explore the versatility of the ball-
catching task in three studies. In Study 1, we examine individual performance
on the ball-catching task under piece-rate incentives. Subjects incur a cost for
each mouse click and receive a prize for each ball caught. We first show that
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clicking behaviour corresponds closely to comparative static predictions derived
from piece-rate incentive theory. We then estimate the relationship between clicks
and catches and use this to predict how the number of clicks will vary as the costs of
clicking and the benefits of catching are manipulated. We find that average efforts,
as measured by the number of mouse clicks, are close to the predicted number of
clicks. In Study 2, we demonstrate how the task can be implemented in three
classical experiments, namely, team production, gift exchange, and a tournament.
The results in all three experiments reproduce the stylised findings from previous
experiments that used purely induced value methods. In Study 3, we introduce
an online version of the ball-catching task and conduct the same experiment as in
Study 1 but using Amazon Mechanical Turk workers as participants. Comparative
statics results are replicated but behaviour is noisier than in the lab, suggesting
that the ball-catching task requires careful calibration for it to work well outside
of the physical lab. Together, the three studies demonstrate that the ball-catching
task is a potentially powerful tool for (theory testing) experiments in “real effort”
environments.
Chapter 3, another joint work with Simon and Martin, examines a two-stage
sequential contest and presents an experiment using the ball-catching task. In this
contest, a pair of first and second movers sequentially exert their efforts and each
player’s chance of winning a prize is a stochastic function of both efforts. This
chapter follows Gill and Prowse (2012) who examined dynamic effects between
the two movers and showed in a model and tested in an experiment that second
mover’s effort is affected by first mover’s effort because of psychological incentives
stemming from second mover’s disappointment aversion. We argue that inter-
personal comparisons might influence the psychological process of disappointment
aversion, which despite being a purely asocial concept in the literature may have
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social origins in a contest. Consequently, we design a new treatment to isolate
interpersonal comparisons from Gill and Prowse’s social environment to investi-
gate the source of disappointment aversion, that is, whether it is purely an asocial
concept, akin to loss aversion, or fuelled by interpersonal comparisons.
As a first step, we conduct a series of careful replications of Gill and Prowse’s
experiment using their slider task. While we replicate many aspects of their data,
we find that behaviour is unresponsive to incentives. We therefore turn to the
ball-catching task in which behaviour is responsive to incentives and find both a
statistically and economically significant dynamic effect that can be attributed to
reference-dependent behaviour; however its direction is contrary to the prediction
of the disappointment aversion model, both when interpersonal comparisons are
possible and when they are not. In light of the new evidence, we develop an alter-
native model of reference-dependent preferences, which treats first mover effort as
an exogenous reference point, that could accommodate our experimental findings.
Chapter 4 investigates a dynamic team contest, called the best-of-three team
contest, which consists of three pairwise “battles” in a sequential order. In each
pairwise battle, one player from each team competes against each other. The team
which wins at least two battles is awarded the prize. Theory predicts that the
outcomes of the second and third battles are independent of the realised outcome
of the first battle (Fu et al., 2015). This prediction, called “strategic neutrality,”
can be rationalised in a purely strategic model under fairly general conditions.
The purpose of this chapter is to test for strategic neutrality in the best-of-
three team contest. To do so, I use a field dataset from professional squash team
tournaments as well as a lab experiment with the ball-catching task.
The squash team matches in my field dataset are particularly suited to test the
theory because the match structure mimics the theoretical set-up. By analysing
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the effect of the outcome of first pairwise battle on the outcomes of subsequent
battles in a team match, I find evidence consistent with strategic neutrality in team
matches. But as a test of strategic neutrality, the evidence remains inconclusive
because strategic neutrality would also follow if, for example, instead of trading off
effort costs and probability of winning, as is stated in the theory, players simply try
as hard as possible to win their battles. Such a non-strategic motivation might be
shaped by high levels of scrutiny from audience, whose presence compels athletes
to give their best efforts under any circumstance, or by a professional norm that
players should just play to their best for their teams.
Overall, the squash data supports the key game theoretic prediction of strategic
neutrality in team contests. However, to distinguish strategic neutrality from non-
strategic motivations, I need to turn to a laboratory experiment which permits
greater control over effort cost functions and observations of individual efforts.
The critical problem for the identification in the field is that we have no control
of effort costs and other field-specific confounding factors. The ball-catching task,
which permits an explicit control of effort cost functions, together with a highly
abstract and anonymous lab environment where there is a low level of scrutiny
or pressure for norm obedience, therefore allows us to directly test for strategic
neutrality in team contests. Consistent with the field results, I again find evidence
for strategic neutrality at the level of team match outcomes. A closer look into
individual efforts, however, reveals that the neutrality prediction does not perfectly
hold at the effort level.
2 Combining “Real Effort” with
Induced Effort Costs: The
Ball-Catching Task
2.1 Introduction
Experiments using “real effort” tasks enjoy increasing popularity among exper-
imental economists. Some frequently used tasks include, for instance, number-
addition tasks (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), counting-zero tasks (e.g.,
Abeler et al., 2011) and slider-positioning tasks (Gill and Prowse, 2012).1, 2 In this
chapter, we present a novel computerized task, called the “ball-catching task,”
which combines a tangible activity in the lab with induced material costs of effort.
In the task, a subject has a fixed amount of time to catch balls that fall randomly
from the top of the screen by using mouse clicks to move a tray at the bottom of
the screen. Control over the cost of effort is achieved by attaching material costs
to mouse clicks that move the tray.
1See Appendix A for a comprehensive list of existing real effort tasks.
2To our knowledge, one of the first experimental studies to use a real effort task for testing
incentive theory is Dickinson (1999) in which subjects were asked to type paragraphs in a 4-day
period. Other early studies implementing real effort tasks within typical laboratory experiments
include van Dijk et al. (2001); Gneezy and Rustichini (2000); Gneezy (2002) and Konow (2000).
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The ball-catching task shares an advantage of real effort tasks in that subjects
are required to do something tangible in order to achieve a level of performance, as
opposed to simply choosing a number (as is done in experiments that implement
cost of effort functions using a pure induced value method, where different number
choices are directly linked with different financial costs). A drawback, however, of
existing real effort tasks is that in using them the researcher sacrifices considerable
control over the cost of effort function. As noted by Falk and Fehr (2003, p. 404):
“while ‘real effort’ surely adds realism to the experiment, one should also note that
it is realized at the cost of losing control. Since the experimenter does not know the
workers’ effort cost, it is not possible to derive precise quantitative predictions.”
Incorporating material effort costs re-establishes a degree of control over effort
costs and, as we shall demonstrate, allows researchers to manipulate observable
effort costs and to make point predictions on effort provision.
Here, we report three studies aimed to evaluate the ball-catching task. In Study
1, we examine individual performance on the ball-catching task under piece-rate
incentives. Subjects incur a cost for each mouse click and receive a prize for
each ball caught. We first show that clicking behaviour corresponds closely to
comparative static predictions derived from piece-rate incentive theory. We then
estimate the relationship between clicks and catches and use this to predict how
the number of clicks will vary as the costs of clicking and the benefits of catching
are manipulated. We find that the number of mouse clicks is close to the predicted
number of clicks. These findings also add to the literature on empirical testing
of incentive theories (Prendergast, 1999) by presenting experimental evidence on
a tangible task supporting basic piece-rate incentive theory. By comparison, the
prominent field evidence reported by Lazear (2000) and lab evidence provided by
Dickinson (1999) support comparative static predictions of basic incentive theory,
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whereas we show that in the ball-catching task the theory also predicts activity
levels (the number of clicks) accurately.
In Study 2, we demonstrate how the task can be implemented in some classic
experiments. We administer the task in three classic experiments used to study
cooperation, fairness and competition, namely, team production (e.g., Nalbantian
and Schotter, 1997), gift exchange (e.g., Fehr et al., 1993) and a tournament (e.g.,
Bull et al., 1987). In all three experiments, the results reproduce the stylised
findings from previous experiments that used purely induced values. Moreover,
behaviour also follows equilibrium point predictions closely in those experiments
where point predictions are available.
In Study 3, we introduce an online version of the ball-catching task and conduct
the same experiment as in Study 1 using Amazon Mechanical Turk workers as
participants. Comparative statics results are replicated, which we view as an
important robustness check. Behaviour is noisier than in the lab, however, which
most likely is due to the more varied decision environment online compared to the
lab.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2 we describe
the ball-catching task. In Sections 2.3–2.5 we report the three studies using the
task. Section 2.6 provides a comprehensive discussion of the results of our three
studies. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 The Ball-Catching Task
The lab version of the ball-catching task is a computerized task programmed in
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and requires subjects to catch falling balls by moving
a tray on their computer screens. Figure 2.1 shows a screen-shot of the task. In
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the middle of the screen there is a rectangular task box with four hanging balls at
the top and one tray at the bottom. Once a subject presses the “Start the task”
button at the lower right corner of the screen, the balls will fall from the top of the
task box. In the version used in this chapter, the timer starts and balls fall one
after another in a fixed time interval. Balls fall at random in each column. The
software allows adjusting the speed of falling balls and the time interval between
falling balls. It is also possible to change the number of ‘columns’ (i.e., the number
of hanging balls) and fix a falling pattern rather than a random one. As will be
discussed later, flexibility in all these parameters will allow tight control over the
production function in this task, that is, the relationship between the number of
balls caught and the number of clicks made.
To catch the falling balls, the subject can move the tray by mouse clicking the
“LEFT” or “RIGHT” buttons below the task box. At the top of the screen, the
number of balls caught (CATCHES) and the number of clicks made (CLICKS) are
updated in real time. We will take the number of clicks as our observable measure
of “effort.” As will become clear later, we acknowledge that other forms of effort
(e.g., concentration, deliberation) may be exerted by the subject in this task.
Our subjects work on a task that, like all real effort tasks, involves a tangible
activity. However, two features distinguish our implementation of the ball-catching
task from most real effort tasks: (i) it is approximately costless in terms of physical
and cognitive costs required by the task, whereas most real effort tasks involve un-
observable physical or cognitive costs; (ii) costs are induced by attaching pecuniary
costs to mouse clicks, which implies that, unlike in most real effort tasks, costs
are under the control of the experimenter.3 By specifying the relation between
3In our implementation subjects have a short amount of time in which to click and catch
balls (one minute in Study 1). One could also implement the ball-catching task in a way that
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clicks and pecuniary costs we can implement any material cost of effort function.
The most convenient specification might be to use a linear cost function by simply
attaching a constant cost to every mouse click, but it is also possible to specify
any non-linear cost functions (we will present an example in subsection 2.4.2). In
the example of Figure 2.1 the subjects incurs a cost of 5 tokens for each mouse
click. Accumulated costs (EXPENSE) are updated and displayed in real time. It
is also possible to attach pecuniary benefits to catches. In Figure 2.1 the subject
receives 20 tokens for each ball caught and accumulated benefits (SCORE) are
updated on screen in real time.
Figure 2.1: A Screen-shot of the Ball-Catching Task
In existing real effort tasks output and effort are typically indistinguishable. In
the ball-catching task there is clear distinction between the catches and the clicks
variables, with the natural interpretation being that the former represents output
increases physical and cognitive costs and is perhaps more “effortful,” for example by increasing
the time frame within which balls are caught.
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and the latter input. Moreover, by choosing the time constraint, ball speed, etc.,
the researcher has flexibility in selecting the production technology.
Evidence collected in a post-experimental questionnaire suggests that subjects
find the ball-catching task easy to understand and learn. In the next section
we examine in more detail how subjects perform on the task under piece-rate
incentives. In section 2.5 we present a version of the ball-catching task that can
be used for online experiments.
2.3 Study 1: Testing the Ball-Catching Task Un-
der Piece-Rate Incentives
2.3.1 Experimental Design and Comparative Static Pre-
dictions
Study 1 examined performance on the ball-catching task under piece-rate incen-
tives. Each subject worked on the same ball-catching task for 36 periods. Each
period lasted 60 seconds.4 In each period one combination of prize-per-catch
(either 10 or 20 tokens) and cost-per-click (0, 5 or 10 tokens) was used, giving
six treatments that are varied within subjects (see Table 2.1). The first 6 peri-
ods, one period of each treatment in random order, served as practice periods for
participants to familiarize themselves with the task. Token earnings from these
periods were not converted to cash. The following 30 periods, five periods of each
treatment in completely randomized order (i.e., unblocked and randomized), were
4Unless otherwise stated, in the version of the ball-catching task we use in this chapter a
maximum of 52 balls can be caught within 60 seconds.
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paid out for real. In all, 64 subjects participated in the experiment with average
earnings of £13.80 for a session lasting about one hour.5
Table 2.1: Within-Subject Treatments in Study 1
Treatment No. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Prize per catch (P) 10 10 10 20 20 20
Cost per click (C) 0 5 10 0 5 10
Note: All subjects played five periods of all six treatments in random order.
Given a particular piece-rate incentive, how often would subjects click? Basic
piece-rate theory assumes that subjects trade-off costs and benefits of effort in
order to maximize expected utility. Assume that the utility is increasing in the
financial rewards, which are given by PQ−Ce, where Q is the number of catches
and e is the number of clicks, and assume the relationship between Q and e is given
by Q = f(e, ), where the function f is a production function, with f ′ > 0 and
f ′′ < 0, and  is a random shock uncorrelated with the number of clicks. Given
these assumptions the expected utility maximizing number of clicks satisfies:
e∗ = f
′−1(C/P ). (2.1)
This analysis posits a stochastic production function linking individual catches
and clicks, and so an individual’s optimal number of clicks may vary from trial
to trial as the marginal product of a click varies from trial to trial. This may
reflect variability in the exact pattern of falling balls from trial to trial. We also
recognize that the marginal product function might vary systematically across
individuals. To make predictions at the aggregate level, we will estimate the
production function (in subsection 2.3.3) allowing for individual specific random
5The experiment was run in two sessions at the CeDEx lab at the University of Nottingham
with subjects recruited using the online campus recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
Instructions are reproduced in Appendix B.1.1.
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effects and then use this estimate, evaluated at the mean of the random effects,
along with our incentive parameters to predict the average optimal number of
clicks. Before we proceed to this estimation, we discuss some features of the
optimal number of clicks and how they relate to our experimental design.
The first feature to note is that the optimal number of clicks is homogeneous
of degree zero in C and P . That is, a proportionate change in both input and
output prices leaves the optimal number of clicks unchanged. This feature reflects
the assumption that there are no other unobserved inputs or outputs associated
with working on the task that generate cognitive or psychological costs or benefits.
In fact we can think of two plausible types of unobservable inputs/outputs. First,
output may be a function of cognitive effort as well as the number of clicks. For
example, output may depend not just on how many clicks a subject makes, but
also on how intelligently a subject uses her clicks. If the production function is
given by f(e, κ, ), where κ represents cognitive effort, then e∗ will reflect a trade-
off between e and κ. If all input and output prices were varied in proportion
(including the “price” of κ) the optimal number of clicks would be unaffected.
However, a proportionate change in just C and P would affect e∗. If e and κ are
substitute inputs then a proportionate increase in C and P will result in a decrease
in e∗ as the subject substitutes more expensive clicking with more careful thinking.
Second, subjects may enjoy additional psychological benefits from catching balls.
For example, suppose that in addition to the pecuniary costs and benefits there
is a non-monetary benefit from a catch, and suppose this psychological benefit
is worth B money-units per catch. Again, proportionate changes in P , C and B
would leave the optimal number of clicks unchanged, but a change in just P and C
would not. Maximization of (P +B)Q−Ce implies that a proportionate increase
in C and P (holding B constant) will decrease e∗.
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Our experimental treatments allow us to test whether unobservable costs/benefits
matter compared with induced effort costs in the ball-catching task. Our design
includes two treatments that vary C and P while keeping the ratio C/P constant
(treatments 2 and 6 in Table 2.1). In the absence of unobserved costs/benefits, the
distribution of clicks should be the same in these two treatments. The presence of
unobserved costs/benefits would instead lead to systematic differences. Note that
with this design the prediction that the optimal number of clicks is homogeneous
of degree zero in C and P can be tested without the need to derive the underlying
production function, f , since all that is needed is a comparison of the distributions
of clicks between these two treatments.
A second feature of the optimal number of clicks is that, for positive costs of
clicking, the optimal number of clicks decreases with the cost-prize ratio. Our
design includes four further treatments that vary this ratio. Comparisons between
treatments with different cost-prize ratios allow simple tests of the comparative
static predictions of piece-rate theory, again without the need to estimate the
production function. The variation in incentives across treatments serves an addi-
tional purpose: it allows us to recover a more accurate estimate of the underlying
production function over a wide range of clicks.
A final feature of the optimal solution worth noting is that when the cost-per-
click is zero the optimal number of clicks is independent of P . In this case, since
clicking is costless the individual’s payoff increases in the number of catches, and
so regardless of the prize level the individual should simply catch as many balls as
possible. Again, if there are psychological costs/benefits associated with the task
this feature will not hold. Indeed, one could use the ball-catching task without
material costs of effort, basing comparative static predictions (e.g. that the num-
ber of catches will increase as the prize per catch increases) on psychological costs
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of effort. However, as in many existing real effort tasks, the ball-catching task
without material effort costs might exhibit a “ceiling effect,” that is unresponsive-
ness of the number of clicks to varying prize incentives.6 For this reason our design
includes two treatments where the material cost of clicking is zero (treatments 1
and 4 in Table 2.1). These allow us to test whether there is a ceiling effect in the
ball-catching task without induced clicking costs.
2.3.2 Comparative Statics Results
Figure 2.2: The Distributions and the Kernel Density Distributions of the Number
of Clicks in Study 1
6See an early review in Camerer and Hogarth (1999). Another possible reason for the “ceiling
effect” is that subjects may also simply work on the paid task due to some experimenter demand
effects (Zizzo, 2010), particularly in the absence of salient outside options (see Corgnet et al.
(2015c) and Eckartz (2014) for discussions).
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Figure 2.2 shows the distributions of clicks for each treatment, pooling over
all subjects and periods. Clear differences between panels show that clicking be-
haviour varies across incentive treatments. We begin by examining how these
differences relate to the comparative static predictions based on the optimal solu-
tion from Equation 2.1.7
Consider first the comparison between treatments 2 (P = 10, C = 5) and 6
(P = 20, C = 10). These treatments vary the financial stakes without altering the
cost/prize ratio. The basic piece-rate theory prediction is that this will not have a
systematic effect on clicking. As discussed in subsection 2.3.1 however, unobserved
psychological costs/benefits associated with the task will lead to systematic differ-
ences between the distributions of clicks in the two treatments. We find that the
distributions of clicks are very similar, with average clicks of 18.6 under low-stakes
and 18.4 under high stakes. Using a subject’s average clicks per treatment as the
unit of observation, a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (p = 0.880) finds
no significant difference between treatments 2 and 6. Thus, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the average number of clicks is invariant to scaling up the financial
stakes.
Next we ask whether variation in the cost-prize ratio affects clicking as pre-
dicted. Will increasing the cost-per-click, holding the prize-per-catch constant,
reduce the number of clicks? And will the number of clicks depend on the prize
level for a given clicking cost? First, we compare the top three panels of Figure 2.2,
where the prize is always 10. We observe a clear shift of the distribution of the
number of clicks when moving across treatments with lowest to highest induced
clicking costs. The average number of clicks falls from 58.7 to 18.6 to 8.8 as the
7We do not find any systematic change in average catches, average clicks or average earnings
over the 30 periods. See for additional analysis of individual level data.
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cost-per-click increases from 0 to 5 to 10. Friedman tests for detecting systematic
differences in matched subjects’ observations, using a subject’s average clicks per
treatment as the unit of observations, shows that the differences across treatments
are highly significant (p < 0.001). A similar pattern is observed in the bottom
three panels, where the prize is always 20, and again the differences are highly
significant (p < 0.001).
Next, we perform two vertical comparisons between treatments 2 and 5 and
between treatments 3 and 6. Holding the clicking costs constant, we find that
a higher prize leads to higher number of clicks in both comparisons (Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks test: p < 0.001).
Finally, a comparison between treatments 1 and 4 offers an examination of
whether a ceiling effect, observed in many other real effort tasks, is present in
the ball-catching task. In these treatments the cost-per-click is zero, but the
prize-per-catch is 10 in treatment 1 and 20 in treatment 4. If there is no “real”
psychological cost/benefit associated with working on the task, subjects should
simply catch as many balls as possible and we should observe the same distribution
of the number of clicks in these two treatments, thus exemplifying the typical
ceiling effect. Comparing the distributions of clicks across the zero-cost treatments
illustrated in Figure 2.2 suggests that distributions are very similar. Average clicks
are 57.8 in the low prize treatment and 58.7 in the high prize treatment. The
closeness of average clicking between treatments 1 and 4 is statistically supported
by a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (p = 0.215), again using a subject’s
average clicks per treatment as the unit of observation. The sharp contrast between
the strong prize effect in treatments with induced clicking costs and the absence
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of a prize effect in the zero-cost treatments illustrates that the ceiling effect can
be avoided by incorporating financial costs in the ball-catching task.8
In sum, as stated in the following result, we find that the comparative static
predictions of basic piece-rate theory are borne out in the experimental data.
Result 1: The main comparative static predictions are supported:
1. Varying the financial stakes without altering the cost/prize ratio does not affect
clicking behaviour.
2. Increasing the cost-per-click while keeping the prize-per-catch constant reduces
the number of clicks; increasing the prize-per-catch while keeping the cost-per-click
constant increases the number of clicks.
3. When the cost-per-click is zero, the value of the prize-per-catch does not affect
clicking behaviour (ceiling effects).
Our next goal is to derive point predictions about the number of clicks in the
various treatments and to compare them to the data. To be able to do so, we
next estimate the production function, which we will then use to derive the point
predictions.
2.3.3 The Production Function
Our empirical strategy for estimating the production function is to first specify a
functional form by fitting a flexible functional form to the catches-clicks data using
the full sample. Next, we estimate the production function, allowing for persistent
as well as transitory unobserved individual effects and fixed period effects. We
8We also administered a post-experimental questionnaire where we asked subjects to rate the
difficulty, enjoyableness and boredom of the task. On average, subjects reported that the task
was very easy to do and they had neutral attitudes towards the enjoyableness and boredom of
the task. Along with the quantitative data on clicks and catches, these responses are consis-
tent with our interpretation that in our implementation of the ball-catching task psychological
costs/benefits are not so important relative to pecuniary costs/benefits.
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then test whether the production function is stable across periods and invariant to
varying prize levels. We will also examine the stability of the production function
across experimental sessions.
Figure 2.3: The Relation Between Clicks and Catches and the Estimated Produc-
tion Functional Form
Note: The first entry in (*,*) denotes the prize per catch and the second the cost per click.
The fitted production functional form is given by Q = 9.507 + 5.568e0.5 − 0.003e2, where Q
denotes the number of catches and e the number of clicks. The estimates of coefficients are
from a fractional polynomial regression.
Figure 2.3 shows the observed catches-clicks data from all treatments along
with a fitted production function based on a fractional polynomial regression.9
The fitted production function has a clear concave shape, indicating a diminishing
9 Fractional polynomials, which are an alternative to conventional polynomials, can afford
more flexibility than conventional polynomials by allowing logarithms and non-integer powers in
the models. The curve-fitting procedure used in the regression selects the best-fitting model with
appropriate powers and/or logarithms. We also considered the possibility that the functional
form might differ for C = 0 treatments, and so we fitted fractional polynomials excluding these
data. We get the same specifications, and very similar coefficients.
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Table 2.2: Panel Data Regressions for Equation 2.2 in Study 1
Coefficient Estimates (std. err.)
(1) Full sample (2) Prize=10 (3) Prize=20
Intercept 10.107∗∗∗ 10.477∗∗∗ 9.405∗∗∗
(0.230) (0.308) (0.423)
Clicks0.5 5.495∗∗∗ 5.402∗∗∗ 5.660∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.216) (0.171)
Clicks2 −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
σω 0.366
∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.045) (0.042)
σu 0.796
∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.021) (0.016)
N 1905 946 959
Note: All period dummies are included and insignificant except for
period 2 using the full sample. *** p < 0.01
marginal rate of return to clicks. After a point, the production function is decreas-
ing, indicating that there is a “technological ceiling” beyond which more clicking
may actually lead to lower production levels. Observations in the decreasing range
are predominantly from the treatments with a zero-cost of clicking. As one of the
main advantages of using the ball-catching task is precisely that clicking can be
made costly, the decreasing part of the production function should be of little
concern, since with positive clicking costs the number of clicks will be within the
range where the empirical production function is concave and increasing.
Using the functional form suggested by the fractional polynomial regression,
we move on to estimate the following random coefficients panel data model:
Catchesi,r = β0 + β1Clicks
0.5
i,r + β2Clicks
2
i,r + (δr + ωi + ui,r)Clicks
0.5
i,r (2.2)
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where Catchesi,r and Clicksi,r are respectively the number of catches and the
number of clicks of subject i in period r. Period dummies δr (with the first period
providing the omitted category), an individual random effect ωi with mean zero
and variance σ2ω, and a random error ui,r with mean zero and variance σ
2
u are all
assumed to be multiplicative with Clicks0.5i,r . Our specification of multiplicative
heterogeneity and heteroskedasticity allows both persistent and transitory indi-
vidual differences in the marginal product function which could also vary across
periods. The model thus predicts heterogeneity in clicking both across and within
subjects.10 All equations are estimated using maximum likelihood and estimates
are reported in Table 2.2.11
Columns (1), (2) and (3) in Table 2.2 reports the coefficient estimates for the
full sample, the sub-sample with the prize of 10 and the sub-sample with the prize
of 20 respectively. Note the similarity between the estimates of the parameters
of the production function in all equations. The fitted production functions for
the two sub-samples with different prizes are shown in Figure 2.9 in section 2.9:
the two production functions almost coincide. Furthermore, we find that both
persistent and transitory unobserved individual effects are statistically significant,
and that the transitory unobservables account for more of the variation in clicking
than the persistent individual differences.
10The model specification of multiplicative terms with Clicks0.5i,r implies that the condi-
tional variation in catches is linear in clicks. We examined the relationship between clicks and
squared residuals from a simple pooled regression of the model Catchesi,r = α0 +α1Clicks
0.5
i,r +
α2Clicks
2
i,r + pii,r. We then regressed squared residuals on Clicksi,r as well as an nonlinear
term (either Clicks0.5i,r or Clicks
2
i,r). The coefficients on the nonlinear terms are not statistically
significant, supporting our modelling specification of a linear relationship between conditional
variation in catches and clicks.
11To estimate the Equation 2.2, note that dividing both sides by Clicks0.5i,r transforms the
model to a standard random effects model: Catchesi,r/Clicks
0.5
i,r = β0/Clicks
0.5
i,r + β1 +
β2Clicks
3/2
i,r + δr + ωi + ui,r. Usual econometric techniques then follow.
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To formally test whether the production function is invariant to different prize
levels, we proceed to estimate an augmented model by adding interactions of
the intercept, covariates Clicks0.5 and Clicks2 with a binary variable indicating
whether the prize is 10 or 20. We then perform a likelihood ratio test of the null
hypothesis that the coefficients on the interaction terms are all zero. We cannot
reject the null hypothesis, indicating that the production function is stable across
prize levels (χ2(3) = 4.70, p = 0.195).
To test the stability of the production function across experimental sessions,
we estimate an augmented model by adding interactions of the intercept, Clicks0.5
and Clicks2 with a session dummy. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
production function is invariant across sessions (χ2(3) = 2.60, p = 0.458). In fact
the fitted production functions are barely distinguishable.12 We summarise these
findings in the following result.
Result 2: The estimated production function, that is, the relationship between
catches and clicks, is increasing in clicks and concave. The production function is
stable across different prize levels as well as across different experimental sessions.
2.3.4 Comparing the Predicted and Actual Number of
Clicks
With the estimated production function from Equation 2.2 and treatment param-
eters, we are ready to see how quantitative predictions on clicking perform.
Table 2.3 compares the predicted number of clicks that is derived from Equa-
tion 2.1 given the estimated production function reported in the column (1) of
Table 2.2 and the cost-prize parameters, with the actual number of clicks for ev-
12See section 2.9 for details of the results. Estimates of Equation 2.2 for each session are given
in Table 2.7 and the fitted production functions are shown in Figure 2.10.
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ery treatment.13 We find that the average actual number of clicks is very similar
to the predicted number of clicks in treatments 1, 2, 4 and 6 and near to, but
statistically significantly different from, predicted clicks in treatments 3 and 5
(subjects seem to have over-clicked in treatment 3 and under-clicked in treatment
5).14 Thus, overall, not only did they change their behaviour in the predicted
direction when incentives changed, but also for given incentives their clicking was
close, on average, to the profit maximizing level. The results are surprising given
that subjects cannot know the production function a priori and therefore are in no
position to calculate the optimal level of clicking. Nonetheless, on average, they
behaved as if they knew the underlying structural parameters and responded to
them optimally. These findings are summarised in our next result.
Table 2.3: Comparisons Between the Predicted Number of Clicks and the Actual
Number of Clicks in Study 1
Treatment No. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Prize per catch (P) 10 10 10 20 20 20
Cost per click (C) 0 5 10 0 5 10
Predicted clicks 57.4 19.5 6.9 57.4 34.5 19.5
Av. actual clicks 57.8 18.6 8.8 58.7 30.9 18.4
(Std. Dev.) (12.2) (9.44) (5.02) (12.5) (15.8) (9.80)
p-value 0.723 0.367 0.000 0.276 0.040 0.294
Note: P-values are based on two-tailed one-sample t-tests using a subject’s average clicks
per treatment as the unit of observations when testing against the predicted clicks.
13Note that we have assumed a continuous production function. This assumption is made
mainly for expositional and analytical convenience. In reality, the production function is a
discrete relationship between catches and clicks.
14We also performed an out-of-sample test of predictions by comparing the actual number of
clicks in an experimental session with the predictions derived from data from the other session.
The results are essentially the same. See Table 2.8 in section 2.9 for details.
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Result 3: The average number of clicks is close to the point prediction in
all treatments but deviates statistically significantly from the point predictions in
treatments 3 and 5.
Figure 2.4 shows the predicted clicks and the distribution of actual clicks by
combining categories whenever the treatments have the same predicted clicks.
The distribution of clicks is approximately centered on the predicted clicks in each
case, but shows variability in clicking for any given C/P ratio. As noted earlier, if
the marginal product of clicking is subject to individual-specific and idiosyncratic
shocks variability in clicking is to be expected.
Figure 2.4: The Distributions and the Kernel Density Distributions of the Actual
Number of Clicks and the Predicted Clicks
Note: The vertical line in each panel represents the predicted number of clicks.
In the next section, we provide further tests for the suitability of the ball-
catching task by investigating its performance in well-known experimental set-
tings that hitherto have typically used induced-value designs. This will be a fur-
ther opportunity to see whether the ball-catching task produces behaviour that is
consistent with equilibrium comparative static or point predictions.
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2.4 Study 2: Applications - Team Production,
Gift Exchange and Tournament
The previous section has demonstrated the accuracy of predictions on clicking us-
ing the ball-catching task in an individual decision making task. In this section,
we use the ball-catching task in three classic interactive experiments that have
been used to study cooperation, reciprocity, and competition. We chose these
applications for several reasons. First, they represent important classes of experi-
mental games using induced-value designs. Second, they allow for further tests of
theoretical point predictions and/or of comparative static predictions in interac-
tive settings. Third, they illustrate the versatility of the ball-catching task with
regard to manipulations of the production function and the induced values for the
cost function. We will utilise the estimated production function from Study 1 to
derive predictions on effort whenever possible.
We ran five sessions, each with 32 subjects, for a total of 160 subjects. In each
session two unrelated treatments were conducted, each involving ten repetitions
of a task. Details of the treatments are specific to each session and will be ex-
plained separately below. Instructions for the second treatment were given after
the first treatment was completed. At the end of each session, a post-experimental
questionnaire was administered asking for subjects’ perception of the ball-catching
task, including its difficulty, enjoyableness and boredom. All the sessions were run
at the CeDEx lab at the University of Nottingham. Sessions lasted no more than
one hour and the average earnings were around £13.00.15
15Four of the treatments were unrelated to this chapter and are not reported. Instructions of
all reported experiments are reproduced in Appendix B.1.2.
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2.4.1 Team Production
The understanding of free-riding incentives in team production is at the heart of
contract theory and organisational economics (Holmstrom, 1982). A standard ex-
perimental framework for studying team production is the voluntary contribution
mechanism in which the socially desirable outcome is in conflict with individual
free-riding incentives (see a recent survey in Chaudhuri (2011) in the context of
public goods).
Our team production experiment was run over three sessions. One session
included a team production (TP) treatment, in which four team members worked
on the ball-catching task independently over 10 periods. The same four subjects
played as a team for the entire 10 periods. For each ball caught, the subject
contributed 20 tokens to team production while he/she had to bear the cost of
clicking, with a cost-per-click of 5 tokens. At the end of each period, total team
production was equally shared among the four team members. Each member’s
earnings were determined by the share of the production net of the individual cost
of clicking. Note that an individual’s marginal benefit from another catch is 5
tokens, whereas the marginal benefit accruing to the entire group is 20 tokens. The
other two sessions included control treatments where individuals play 10 periods
according to a simple individual piece-rate. In the first treatment (PR20) an
individual receives a prize-per-catch of 20 tokens and incurs a cost-per-click of
5 tokens. The second treatment (PR5) has a prize-per-catch of 5 tokens and a
cost-per-click of 5 tokens.
Effort provision in PR5 gives a “selfish” benchmark for the TP treatment,
while clicking behaviour in PR20 gives an “efficiency” benchmark. If a subject in
the TP treatment is only concerned about her own private costs and benefits from
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clicking and catching, and equates marginal costs to marginal private benefits, she
should click the same number of times as in PR5. On the other hand, if she is
concerned about total team production and equates marginal costs to marginal
social benefits, then she should provide the same number of clicks as in PR20. Our
hypothesis is that free-riding incentives would drive the number of clicks towards
the selfish benchmark, as is observed in many similar experiments using induced
values (e.g., Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) and many public goods experiments
using voluntary contribution mechanisms).
Figure 2.5 displays the average numbers (±1 SEM) of clicks in the three treat-
ments. The two horizontal lines represent the Nash predictions on optimal clicking
levels in PR20 and PR5 respectively (using the estimated production function from
Study 1 to compute the optimal clicking levels).
Figure 2.5: Average Clicks Over Time in Team Production
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The figure shows a clear declining average number of clicks over time in TP.
The average clicks decrease from 30 clicks to just above 17 clicks in the last period.
By comparison, the average clicks in PR20 decrease from 38 to 32 and in PR5 from
16 to 8 and thus are consistent with our findings in Study 1. Subjects in TP under-
click, relative to the efficiency benchmark, from the very first period and steadily
decrease their clicking. Even in the final period, however, average clicks exceed
the extreme selfishly optimal level. This empirical result is qualitatively similar to
previous findings from experiments using induced values, such as Nalbantian and
Schotter (1997) revenue sharing treatment and many public goods experiments,
and also from some real effort experiments on team incentives (e.g., Corgnet et al.,
2015b).
2.4.2 Gift Exchange
The gift exchange experiment (Fehr et al., 1993) examines reciprocal behaviour
between subjects in the role of firms and subjects in the role of workers. The gift
exchange game using induced-value techniques has been a workhorse model for
many experimental investigations of issues in labour economics and beyond (see
Ga¨chter and Fehr (2002); Charness and Kuhn (2011) for surveys).
Our version of the bilateral gift exchange experiment follows Ga¨chter and Falk
(2002), except that they used induced values whereas we use the ball-catching
task and slightly different parameters which we deem more suitable for the present
purpose. In our experiment, in each period the firm offers a wage between 0 and
1000 tokens to the matched worker who then works on the ball-catching task.
Each ball caught by the matched worker adds 50 tokens to the firm’s payoff. The
worker’s payoff is the wage minus the cost of clicking. To compensate for possible
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losses, every firm and worker received 300 tokens at the beginning of each period.
We implemented the gift exchange game in two sessions, one using a treatment
with stranger matching over ten periods and the other using a treatment with
partner matching over ten periods.
We made two key changes to the task compared with the version used in Study
1. First, we reduced the number of balls that could be caught within 60 seconds
from 52 to 20 by increasing the time interval between falling balls. We made
this change because we wanted to reduce the influence of random shocks as much
as possible. The change makes it easy for a subject to catch every ball so that
reciprocal behaviour by workers could be reflected in their efforts as well as in
their actual outputs. Second, the cost schedule was changed to a convex function
in accordance with the parameters used in most gift exchange experiments. The
cost for each click is reported in Table 2.4. For example, the 1st and 2nd clicks
cost 5 tokens each, the 3rd click costs 6 tokens, etc., and finally the last column
with No. 30+ means that the 30th and any further clicks cost 12 tokens each.
Notice that if, for example, the worker makes a total of three clicks she will incur
a total cost of 5 + 5 + 6 = 16 tokens.
Table 2.4: The Cost Schedule in Gift Exchange
No. of Click 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Cost 5 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 9
No. of Click 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30+
Cost 9 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 12
Based on numerous gift exchange experiments and in particular the results by
Ga¨chter and Falk (2002) and Falk et al. (1999) who also compared partners and
strangers in gift exchange, we expect gift exchange and predict that the recipro-
cal pattern is stronger with partner matching where it is possible to build up a
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reputation between a firm and a worker. Figure 2.6 confirms both predictions.
It shows the relationship between outputs and wages on the upper panel and the
relationship between efforts and wages on the lower panel. The data suggests a
clear reciprocal pattern in both treatments and an even stronger pattern in the
partner treatment whether we look at outputs or efforts.
Figure 2.6: Reciprocal Patterns in Gift Exchange
Note: the upper panel shows the relationship between outputs and wages in both treatments
and the lower panel displays the relationship between efforts and wages. The relationship in
the stranger matching treatment is shown in the left panels and in the partner matching
treatment in the right panels. The fitted lines are estimated from non-parametric Lowess
regressions with the bandwidth equal to 0.8.
For formal statistical tests we estimate the following random effects panel data
model for the number of clicks on the wage received:
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Table 2.5: Random Effects Regressions for Worker’s Clicks in Gift Exchange
Coefficient Estimates (std. err.)
(1) Stranger (2) Partner (3) Pooled
Wage 0.003∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Partner 1.154
(0.797)
Wage× Partner 0.014∗∗∗
(0.003)
Intercept 3.279∗∗∗ 3.746∗∗∗ 2.200∗∗
(0.681) (1.444) (0.952)
σω 1.753 3.346 2.293
σu 2.649 4.397 3.972
Hausman test df=10 df=10 df=11
p=1.000 p=0.956 p=0.984
N 160 160 320
Note: All period dummies are included and all of them are statisti-
cally insignificant. Partner is a binary indicator which equals 1 if the
treatment is the partner matching and 0 if the stranger matching. ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05
Clicki,r = β0 + β1wagei,r + ωi + δr + ui,r
where ωi is an individual-specific random effect identically and independently dis-
tributed over subjects with a variance σ2ω, δr denotes a period dummy for the
rth period (with the first period providing the omitted category), and ui,r is a
disturbance term, assumed to be identically and independently distributed over
subjects and periods with a variance σ2u.
Table 2.5 reports the estimates for both treatments and also for the pooled
sample with an additional interaction term. Consistent with gift exchange reci-
procity and the graphical evidence from Figure 2.6, workers in both treatments
respond to higher wages by clicking more, and the number of clicks differs sys-
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tematically from zero clicks. Furthermore, the strength of reciprocity is stronger
with partners than strangers as the interaction term between the wage received
and the treatment dummy in the column (3) is highly significant. These results
in our ball-catching gift exchange experiment are qualitatively similar to findings
from induced-value experiments in Falk et al. (1999) and Ga¨chter and Falk (2002).
Our results from the stranger treatment are also consistent with another early real
effort gift exchange experiment by Gneezy (2002) who used a maze solving task
(without induced values) to measure worker’s performance, although Gneezy’s
experiment was conducted in a one-shot setting.
2.4.3 Tournament
Tournament incentive schemes, such as sales competitions and job promotions, are
an important example of relative performance incentives (Lazear and Rosen, 1981).
One early laboratory experiment by Bull et al. (1987) found that tournament
incentives indeed induced average efforts in line with theoretical predictions. But
the variance of behaviour was much larger under tournament incentives than under
piece-rate incentives. Many induced value tournament experiments have been
conducted since (see Dechenaux et al. (2015) for a survey).
In one session we included a simple simultaneous tournament treatment. The
32 subjects were randomly matched into pairs in a period and each pair competed
in the ball-catching task for a prize worth 1200 tokens. The winner earned 1200
tokens net of any cost of clicking, whereas the loser received 200 tokens net of any
cost of clicking. The cost per click was always 5 tokens. Each player’s probability
of winning followed a linear success function (Che and Gale, 2000; Gill and Prowse,
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2012): prob{win} = (own output− opponent’s output + 50)/100. This procedure
was repeated over 10 periods.
We use this contest success function because it allows us to make a point predic-
tion on the expected number of clicks. This is because the specified linear success
function implies that an additional catch increases the probability of winning by
1/100. Thus, the marginal benefit of clicking is equal to the prize spread between
the winner prize and the loser prize, 1000, multiplied by 1/100, multiplied by the
marginal product of a click. The marginal cost of clicks is 5 tokens. Once again,
we simply utilise the estimated production function from Study 1 to compute the
optimal number of clicks which turns out to be 20 clicks. Notice that while an
additional catch increases earnings by 10 tokens in treatment 2 of Study 1, here
an additional catch increases expected earnings by 10 tokens.
Figure 2.7 displays the average clicks (±1 SEM) across all subjects and periods.
We observe quick convergence towards to the predicted clicking level. The variance
of clicks in tournament also appears to be larger than that observed in treatment
2 of Study 1. The standard deviation of clicks is around 12 in the former and 9.4
in the latter, perhaps reflecting the stochastic nature of the relationship between
catches and earnings under tournament incentives.16 Both results are qualitatively
similar to previous findings from Bull et al. (1987).
16This difference in variability of clicks between tournament and piece-rate incentives is smaller
than that found by Bull et al. (1987) in their induced value experiment, in which the standard
deviation of effort under tournament incentives was more than double that under piece-rate
incentives. Quantitative comparisons between their study and ours, however, should be treated
cautiously as there are numerous differences between studies (e.g. we use a piece-wise linear
contest success function, whereas they use a rank-order tournament).
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Figure 2.7: Average Clicks Over Time in Tournament
2.5 Study 3: An Online Version of the Ball-
Catching Task
2.5.1 The Ball-Catching Task on Amazon Mechanical
Turk
As a third test of the versatility of the ball-catching task, we introduce an on-
line version. This online version is programmed in PHP and has been designed
to resemble the lab version as closely as possible.17 The purpose of this section
is to show the potential (and limitations) of using the ball-catching task in on-
17See section 2.8 for discussion of technical considerations associated with implementing the
task.
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line experiments, which increasingly appear to be a valuable complement to the
experiments in the physical laboratory.
We ran the same experiment as in Study 1 on Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk).18 In total, we recruited 95 subjects from MTurk and 74 of them finished
the task. Recruitment took around 10 minutes. Given the unusually long dura-
tion of the task (50 minutes), the 78% completion rate suggests that our promised
payment is sufficiently attractive to most of the workers on MTurk. The average
payment, including a $3 participation fee, was around $5.90, which was well above
what most MTurk tasks offered. The average age was 35 years, ranging from 20
to 66 years; and 52% were male.
Paralleling the presentation of Study 1 results, Figure 2.8 summarises the dis-
tributions and the Kernel densities of the number of clicks for each treatment. In
general, we find that the comparative statics results are very similar to those in
Study 1. A Wilcoxon signed-ranks test using a subject’s average clicks per treat-
ment as the unit of observations suggests that homogeneity of degree zero also
holds here: the difference in clicks between the two treatments with the same C/P
ratio is not systematic (p = 0.309). The same is true for the difference in clicks
between the two treatments with C = 0 (p = 0.832). Similarly, when comparing
treatments with the same prize, Friedman tests indicate that comparative static
predictions for different costs are supported (p < 0.001 in both comparisons).
We observe some notable differences between the online and the lab version.
The variance of clicking in each treatment for MTurkers appears to be higher than
in the lab with student subjects. Moreover, we find that the production function
18See Horton et al. (2011) for a discussion of the usefulness of MTurk for experimental
economists.
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is not invariant to prize levels, nor is it stable across sub-samples, thus preventing
us from making meaningful point predictions.19
Figure 2.8: The Distributions and the Kernel Density Distributions of the Number
of Clicks in Study 3
2.6 Discussion
Real effort tasks have the advantage that they offer subjects something tangible
to do rather than just choosing among abstract options. The potential cost to
the experimenter is loss of control because subjects might experience unobserved
psychological benefits or costs. Thus, there is a trade-off between “realism” and
experimental control. The ball-catching task mitigates this trade-off because it
19Analyses are available from authors upon request.
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allows for a tangible activity and control over important parameters, such as the
production function and the cost function. This feature is particularly important
if the experimenter wants to test theoretical predictions, in particular, point pre-
dictions. Existing real effort tasks typically allow at best for comparative static
predictions, but not point predictions, because the latter requires full control over
all costs and benefits, be they material or psychological.
Psychological costs and benefits always exist to some degree because any deci-
sion environment inevitably triggers emotions and requires some cognitive effort.
Arguably, these psychological effects are stronger in real effort experiments than in
abstract induced value settings. Smith (1982, pp. 930–934) was well aware of these
non-monetary costs and benefits and argued that the “precepts” of induced value
experiments will provide the necessary control of the experimental environment.
The precepts are non-satiation in the reward medium (money), salience (rewards
in the experiments should depend on decisions), and in particular dominance (the
“reward structure dominates any subjective costs (or values) associated with par-
ticipation in the activities of the experiment,” p. 934). It is the control over
costs and benefits that renders experiments an informative tool to test economic
theories—be it an abstract induced value experiment or a real effort experiment.
Satisfying dominance may be harder to achieve in real effort experiments than in
induced value experiments.
Thus, the usefulness of the ball-catching task to test economic theories re-
quires that dominance holds: psychological costs and benefits should be relatively
small and dominated by pecuniary payoff considerations. In our piece-rate setting,
“small” means that, in a statistical sense, clicks should be homogeneous of degree
zero in those costs and prizes which the experimenter can manipulate. Our results
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in Study 1 unambiguously support this requirement. Thus, the ball-catching task
has passed a first important test for its usefulness to test economic theories.
As a second test, we derived further comparative static predictions about how
clicking levels should vary with changing costs and prizes. The results strongly
support the comparative static predictions. Theory also predicts that if clicking
costs are zero, people should catch as many balls as possible and prizes should
therefore not matter, which is what we observe. Thus, the ball-catching task also
passes this second test.
The third and most demanding test is whether observed (average) behaviour
also follows point predictions. This is the case and thus the ball-catching task also
passes this third test. We thus conclude from Study 1 that the ball-catching task
is in principle suitable for theory testing purposes, if the researcher thinks that
for his or her research question a design with tangible actions is desirable.
A complementary way of looking at the experiments reported in Study 1 is to
see them as a test in its own right of piece-rate incentive theory. In its most simpli-
fied version, the first-order condition of optimal clicks under piece-rate incentives
is expressed in Equation 2.1. Our experiment provides an environment to put the
comparative static predictions from Equation 2.1 as well as clicking level predic-
tions to a test. The experimental environment controls the production process
(the ball dropping), the costs of clicking to catch balls, as well as the piece rates
(the prizes) for each catch. Tests using field data, even those that have unusually
detailed data such as Lazear (2000), typically do not have detailed information
about effort costs that are necessary to predict effort levels. The ball-catching
task can accommodate assumptions about effort costs (e.g. the cost consequences
of ability differences) in the induced cost valuations given to subjects. The abil-
ity of the ball-catching task to control all aspects of the environment allows a
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complete behavioural characterisation of all predictions of piece-rate theory, not
just the comparative statics. Our results provide a comprehensive vindication of
piece-rate theory.
Study 2 reported three experiments to showcase the implementation and ver-
satility of the ball-catching task in three classic experimental paradigms that have
been studied extensively in induced value experiments: team production, gift-
exchange, and tournaments. In all three experiments the results are closely in
line with findings from their induced value counterparts. Particularly noteworthy
is that equilibrium predictions, derived from the production function of Study 1,
are closely met in all cases where we could derive an equilibrium prediction (in
the piece-rate treatments of the team production experiment, and in the tour-
nament). We also confirm the theoretical comparative static prediction that in
the gift-exchange game a fixed matching should lead to stronger reciprocity than
random matching. We see this as a strong encouragement for the suitability of the
ball-catching task in potentially many more settings. The chosen experiments also
demonstrate the versatility of the ball-catching task to manipulate the production
technology and the cost function.
One central feature of the ball-catching task is its ability to control effort costs
by inducing any effort cost function the experimenter deems appropriate. Recall
that effort costs in economic models of labour supply denote any cost a worker
might incur, physiological, psychological, or simply opportunity costs of foregone
leisure. Existing real effort experiments have tried to model opportunity costs of
effort by offering the subjects outside options, for example the opportunity to surf
the Internet (Corgnet et al., 2015c), to receive paid time-out for a few seconds
(Mohnen et al., 2008), to work on other productive individual tasks (van Dijk
et al., 2001), or to leave the task earlier than the deadline (e.g., Abeler et al.,
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2011). This method exploits the possibility of a trade-off between effort and off-
the-job leisure and, indeed, there is experimental evidence that subjects make such
a trade-off in response to different incentive schemes (see Corgnet et al. (2015c)
and Eckartz (2014)). However, compared to the ball-catching task which in its
most minimal version may take only one minute to complete, the “outside options”
method usually requires a rather long duration for it to work well (sometimes up
to 60 minutes as in Abeler et al. (2011)), thus preventing us from collecting re-
peated observations in the duration of a typical laboratory experiment. Moreover,
while outside options imply some real effort costs, it is still unclear how subjects
value them exactly without the help of structural estimation of the underlying
effort cost function.20 The ability of the ball-catching task to induce any cost
function, be it linear, or non-linear as in the gift-exchange experiment discussed
above (Table 2.4), circumvents the problem of unknown valuations and retains the
possibility of making point predictions on effort choices.
Studies 1 and 2 reported results of experiments conducted in the physical
laboratory using z-Tree. Study 3 presented results from the online version of the
ball-catching task, conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The results strongly
support the robustness of the ball-catching task with regard to all comparative
static predictions, including the crucial requirement of homogeneity of degree zero
in C and P . This is encouraging and important support for the suitability of the
ball-catching task.
However, the results from the online experiment also serve as an important
caveat because they reveal that the environment where subjects take their de-
20An alternative way to add realism to an experiment without sacrificing “control” over the
cost function is to reduce the effort cost close enough to 0. For example, Abeler and Ja¨ger (2015)
used the slider task by Gill and Prowse (2012) but allowed the use of the keyboard, and derived
lower bounds on the implied effort cost. The ball-catching task with the cost-per-click equal to
0 is in fact another example.
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cision might matter a great deal for the actual production function. In an on-
line experiment, there are inevitably many differences compared to the physical
laboratory: computer configurations (e.g., screen sizes and mice), speed of net-
work connections, distractions in the working environment, etc. will vary strongly
across online participants, but will typically be very similar for all subjects within
a given physical laboratory. Physical labs might also differ, so the production
function that can be used for deriving point predictions might also be lab spe-
cific. Hence, an important lesson is that for proper calibration of the production
function pre-testing is necessary in whatever lab is used, physical or online.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we introduced the ball-catching task, a task which subjects can
use mouse clicks to catch balls on screen, incurring material costs from each click.
The task’s greatest advantage over related real effort tasks lies in its versatility to
manipulate the production technology and in particular in its ability to control
‘effort’ costs. We presented three studies. Studies 1 and 3 showed that behaviour
in the ball-catching task in an individual decision making environment follows
important comparative static predictions derived from incentive theory. Studies
1 and 2 suggest that the ball-catching task also has the potential to derive and
test point predictions although Study 3 revealed that this most demanding fea-
ture of the ball-catching task requires careful calibration. Study 2 also showed
that behaviour elicited using the ball-catching task strongly resembles behaviour
in experiments using induced cost of effort designs. Together, the three studies
demonstrate that the ball-catching task is a potentially powerful tool for (theory
testing) experiments in “real effort” environments.
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2.8 Technical Appendix
Here, we describe the working and functionality of the ball-catching task, both
the z-Tree version and the online version, in more detail and also give suggestions
about how to implement the task in experiments.
The z-Tree code of the ball-catching task allows experimentalists to manipulate
the speed of falling balls and the time interval between falling balls directly in the
global table in z-Tree. Changes to the layout of the task, such as the number
of columns, height and width of the task box and the falling pattern, however,
require more involved re-programming of the task. In the version used in this
chapter, the falling pattern is random. There are in fact four independent balls
falling within a fixed time interval. Once a ball is caught or touches the bottom
of the task box, it will reappear in a randomly selected column and fall again.
The z-Tree version has been tested using z-Tree 3.3.8 and later versions. The
ball-falling and the tray-moving may become more sluggish with an increase in the
number of z-Leafs simultaneously running the ball-catching task. In our experi-
ments, we connected at most 16 z-Leafs to one z-Tree. A session with 32 subjects
as in our Study 1 was accomplished by simultaneously opening two z-Trees in two
separate master computers, each of which is connected with 16 z-Leafs. By af-
fecting the level of sluggishness subjects may experience the number of connected
z-Leafs may affect the production function. Other factors that may affect subjects’
performance include the size of the task displayed on the specific computer screen,
pixel resolutions of computer monitors, mouse configurations, etc. It is, therefore,
advisable to test the software thoroughly in the lab where the actual experiment
will be run. This will help for calibration of the production function to allow for
accurate point predictions.
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The online version of the ball-catching task can be administered using a
PHP/MySQL compatible server controlled by the experimentalist and a partic-
ipant can enter the experiment using a JAVASCRIPT-enabled browser (modern
browsers such as Firefox, Chrome, Safari and IE). As in the z-Tree version, the
speed of falling balls and the time interval between falling balls can be easily
changed in the program. The online version works differently from the z-Tree
version in that there is a ball-generating mechanism that produces each ball with
a fixed time interval from a randomly selected column. Therefore, unlike the
z-Tree version, the distance between two balls falling near to each other is al-
ways the same. Because of the different engine behind the online version, par-
ticipants typically do not experience any sluggishness in the ball falling and tray
moving, although it may happen due to network connection issues or not fully
JAVASCRIPT-compatible browsers.
The actual implementation of online experiments using this online version re-
quires additional considerations compared to laboratory experiments. As discussed
in the main text, performance of online participants, such as MTurkers, may be
affected by technological and environmental considerations that are not observed
by the experimenter. These include details of computer configurations (e.g., screen
sizes and mice), conditions of network connectivity, as well as environmental dis-
tractions, etc.
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2.9 Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures in
Study 1
Table 2.6 below reports the average number of clicks in each treatment for each
individual. We also test whether each individual exhibited qualitatively consistent
behaviour, by which we mean that the subject’s ranking of actual number of clicks
is the same as the ranking of predicted number of clicks across all treatments. We
predict the same level of clicking for treatments 2 and 6, and so we use an average
of the actual number of clicks in these two treatments in our subject level test of
consistency. Similarly, we predict the same level of clicking in treatments 1 and 4
and so the test uses the average clicks over these two treatments. Only 3 of the
64 subjects (less than 5%) behaved inconsistently: in all three cases the number
of clicks in treatment 5 is lower than that in treatments 2 and 6.
Table 2.6: Average Number of Clicks in Each Treatment by Subject
Subject (10,0) (10,5) (10,10) (20,0) (20,5) (20,10) Consistent
behaviour?
101 59.8 27.4 12 64.6 45 27.6 X
102 62.6 18.4 12.2 63.6 30.2 20 X
103 51 14.8 9.4 65 22.8 14.2 X
104 21.6 6 3 20.2 5.4 4.4 X
105 62 15.8 3.6 60.6 18 16 X
106 56.8 18.8 9 58.6 34.8 19.2 X
107 57.2 20.8 11.2 57.8 29.6 26 X
108 47.4 13.4 11.6 54.6 25.8 10.8 X
109 62.6 18.8 9.6 65 26 14.2 X
110 60.2 20.8 7.2 61.4 39 23.8 X
111 61.4 5.8 5 63.8 9 7 X
112 48.6 6.4 2.8 49.2 8.4 6.8 X
113 64.6 25 16 69.8 48.2 29.6 X
114 49.2 17.4 14.6 59 24.2 16.8 X
(Continued on next page)
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Table 2.6: (continued)
Subject (10,0) (10,5) (10,10) (20,0) (20,5) (20,10) Consistent
behaviour?
115 64 18.8 9.2 64.4 30.2 21.4 X
116 63.8 29.8 11 66 52.6 29.8 X
201 56.4 36.2 13.2 53 39.2 34.6 X
202 38.2 9.4 4.6 38 11.6 7 X
203 61.8 19.2 11.4 58.4 27.6 17 X
204 64 24.4 6.8 55 37.8 23.2 X
205 65.4 21 10.6 58.4 37.2 16.6 X
206 64.6 24.6 11.4 61.6 45.6 25.8 X
207 67.2 31.4 14.8 60.8 53.2 32.2 X
208 53 19.6 6.8 53 27.8 17.4 X
209 51.2 28.6 5.4 49.2 43.6 22.2 X
210 72.8 10.6 8 65.2 16.8 10.6 X
211 62.4 20.8 8.8 63 40 22.4 X
212 63.2 23.4 10.2 68.4 53 28.6 X
213 63.4 20 12.2 58 31.4 19.2 X
214 65.8 30.4 18.8 64.2 24.2 25.4
215 59.2 24.8 13.6 53.4 36.6 25.2 X
216 58.4 7.6 3.8 59.6 31.8 12.2 X
301 61.2 3.4 3.2 60.8 5.6 13.4
302 63.2 16.4 9 70 21.8 13 X
303 46.8 17.2 11 50.8 32.2 11.6 X
304 38.2 5 1.4 30.6 5.6 1.4 X
305 52.4 14.2 7.2 60 23.6 13.2 X
306 67 14.6 7.4 63.2 36.2 13.6 X
307 56.6 16.8 5.6 64.4 29.6 17.2 X
308 44.6 29.4 8.6 48.6 27.8 28.6
309 52.8 7.4 4 56.6 37 9.4 X
310 44 17.2 9.8 50.2 29.8 21.8 X
311 52.6 15.8 7.4 66.4 29.6 11.8 X
312 69.4 13.8 6.2 62.4 26.4 9.8 X
313 60.8 17 7.4 71.6 40.4 23.6 X
314 56.6 23.6 10 64.6 56.8 24 X
315 58.4 21.8 8.2 63 23 16.2 X
316 63.2 15.8 15.2 59.8 23.4 18.6 X
401 59.6 13.2 13.2 64.4 15.6 16.8 X
402 65 20.8 8.6 66.2 42.2 23.2 X
403 41.2 16.2 10.4 42.8 15.4 13 X
(Continued on next page)
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Table 2.7: Panel Data Regressions for Equation 2.2 for Separate Sessions
Coefficient Estimates (std. err.)
(1) Session 1 (2) Session 2
Intercept 10.544∗∗∗ 9.730∗∗∗
(0.324) (0.326)
Clicks0.5 5.315∗∗∗ 5.650∗∗∗
(0.189) (0.183)
Clicks2 −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
σω 0.427
∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.046)
σu 0.785
∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019)
N 959 946
Note: All period dummies are included and in-
significant in both sessions. *** p < 0.01
Table 2.6: (continued)
Subject (10,0) (10,5) (10,10) (20,0) (20,5) (20,10) Consistent
behaviour?
404 57.2 24.4 5.2 60.2 38.4 27.6 X
405 51.6 16.8 8 54 25.8 15 X
406 62.4 25.8 11.6 69 58.4 29 X
407 67 8.2 2.8 69 10 6.8 X
408 67.6 17.2 7.2 62.6 28.6 13.8 X
409 62.4 16 4.8 58.6 42 14.6 X
410 47.4 11.4 8.6 35.6 13.6 11.6 X
411 54.4 13 6.4 49.4 20.4 13.6 X
412 66.4 34.8 0 62.6 52.2 41.4 X
413 71.8 13.8 13.4 67.6 23.2 16.8 X
414 62 27.6 9.8 64.2 45 30 X
415 48.4 16 11.8 55.6 22.8 15.2 X
416 67.8 37.2 11.8 70.4 66 17.8 X
Note: we consider the average clicks of treatment 2 and 6 and average clicks of treatment 1 and
4 when evaluating the consistency at the individual level.
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Table 2.8: Comparisons Between the Predicted Number of Clicks and the Actual
Number of Clicks by Session
Treatment No. 1 2 3 4 5 6
Prize per catch (P) 10 10 10 20 20 20
Cost per click (C) 0 5 10 0 5 10
Predicted clicks (S2) 57.6 20.1 7.3 57.6 35.1 20.1
Av. actual clicks (S1) 58.1 19.7 9.6∗∗∗ 58.2 31.5 19.6
(Std. Dev.) (12.0) (9.11) (5.06) (12.4) (14.8) (9.90)
Predicted clicks (S1) 57.4 18.7 6.5 57.4 33.9 18.7
Av. actual clicks (S2) 57.5 17.6 8.0∗∗∗ 59.2 30.3 17.3
(Std. Dev.) (12.4) (9.66) (4.86) (12.6) (16.8) (9.60)
Note: The full sample is equally separately into two halves by session: S1 and S2. We
test the average actual clicks from S2 against the predicted clicks based on S1 and the
average actual clicks from S1 against the predicted clicks based on S2. P-values are based
on two-tailed one-sample t-tests using a subjects average clicks per treatment as the unit of
observations when testing against the predicted clicks. *** p < 0.01
Figure 2.9: Fitted Production Functions for Sub-samples With Different Prizes
Using Equation 2.2
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Figure 2.10: Fitted Production Functions for Different Sessions Using Equation 2.2
3 The Effect of Interpersonal
Comparisons in Real Effort
Competition
3.1 Introduction
Models of disappointment aversion (Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986) were
originally developed and tested in non-strategic settings, e.g., individual lottery
choice experiments. More recently, Gill and Prowse (2012), hereafter referred to as
GP, theoretically applied and experimentally tested an expectations-based version
of disappointment aversion in a strategic situation. In their model, two agents
compete for a single prize by sequentially exerting efforts, with each player’s chance
of winning the prize being a probabilistic function of both efforts. GP show that
if the second mover is disappointment averse, she would slack off when observing
higher first mover’s effort and even more so when the prize is also higher. In a real
effort experiment using the slider task, GP found evidence consistent with such a
discouragement effect.
The motivation of this chapter follows from an observation that disappoint-
ment aversion is modelled as an asocial construct and reflects a way in which
50
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an individual experiences sensations associated with gain/loss relative to a refer-
ence point, whereas GP’s experiment is a social environment in which subjects’
behaviours may additionally be affected by interpersonal comparisons. Social con-
texts that involve interpersonal comparisons have significant implications for eco-
nomic decision-making even when comparisons themselves have no direct strategic
consequence.1 In GP’s social environment, the presence of the opponent might be
behaviourally important because it might arouse emotions, such as social disap-
pointment/elation from payoff comparisons and context-dependent joy of winning,
in addition to the pecuniary reward. It might also be possible that one of the psy-
chological sources of disappointment aversion in a contest is from interpersonal
comparisons.2 To disentangle these conceptually distinct notions, we compare
two treatments. The first is a social treatment that features a game between two
players as in GP’s experiment. The second is an asocial treatment which removes
the scope for direct interpersonal comparisons between the paired movers by re-
moving the first mover and replacing her score with a number that corresponds
to the first mover’s effort.3 A treatment comparison therefore tests whether the
1In the experimental economics literature, interpersonal comparisons have been found to
change behaviour in ultimatum games (Blount, 1995; Bolton et al., 2005), gift exchange games
(Charness, 2004), trust games (Cox, 2004; Bohnet and Zechhauser, 2004), moonlighting games
(Falk et al., 2008), and other games (e.g., Offerman, 2002). In labour economics, peer effects on
productivity is also closely related to interpersonal comparisons (see, for example, field evidence
from Mas and Moretti (2009) and field experimental evidence from Falk and Ichino (2006)). In
the psychology literature, the class of studies of social facilitation also emphasises the importance
of internal awareness of being evaluated by others and its influence on individual performance
(e.g., Blascovich et al., 1999; Haley and Fessler, 2005).
2As noted by Gill and Prowse (2012, p. 495), their experimental results “provide no direct
evidence about the psychological basis that might underlie disappointment aversion.” They
suggest that one of the potential sources is a concern for equity which implies the possibility of
interpersonal comparisons as its social psychological origin.
3It remains as a possibility that subjects might still compare themselves to what they think
others in their session received.
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predictions of GP’s asocial disappointment aversion model would still be borne
out in the absence of any social context.4
Our research starts with a series of careful replications of GP’s original experi-
ment. Unlike GP, we find that performance in the slider task is neither responsive
to prizes nor to paired members’ efforts. We also find, in a re-examination of
GP’s data, that GP’s results are sensitive to one “outlier” subject. In fact, our
replications reproduce GP’s data if this subject is excluded.
These results motivate us to search for another real effort task with which to
test for disappointment aversion and the possible influence of social comparisons
on behaviour. We opt for the ball-catching task described in the previous chapter.
This task has several desirable features and has proved to reproduce behaviours
that are responsive to incentives. The ball-catching task permits a level of direct
control over key experimental variables, particularly the effort cost function, in
“real effort” environments. Most importantly, the ball-catching task generates a
controllable “effective cost (of output) function” that is convex and increasing in
output.
Our next experiment compares social and asocial treatments, but using the
ball-catching task in place of the slider task (keeping other aspects of the experi-
ment similar to GP). Contrary to the predictions of GP’s disappointment aversion
model, in both treatments we observe pronounced encouragement effects : a sec-
4Eisenkopf and Teyssier (2013) tested the role of interpersonal comparisons with a similar
design in a simultaneous-move competitive setting, using induced value methods. Their results
are encouragingly suggestive of the impact of interpersonal comparisons in the way that average
effort is higher in the presence of rivals. Also using induced values, Herrmann and Orzen (2008)
examined dynamic effects in a rent-seeking contest by using the strategy method to elicit one
player’s response to the rival’s efforts. Their results however suggest on average encouragement
effects at lower rival’s efforts but discouragement effects at higher ones, both in the presence
and absence of actual rivals; and interpersonal comparisons only increase average effort without
altering too much the dynamic pattern.
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ond mover increases her effort in response to higher first mover’s effort (or a larger
number), particularly when competing for low prizes.
In short, while interpersonal comparisons appear to have little impact on av-
erage efforts or dynamic effects, the predictions of GP’s disappointment model
fail in the first place both in our replications using the slider task and in the ex-
periment using the ball-catching task. But it is important to note that second
mover’s behaviour is nonetheless reference-dependent on first mover’s effort. We
suggest a simple alternative behavioural model, which treats first mover’s effort
as an exogenous reference point, that may reconcile our findings.
3.2 Experiment Using the Slider Task and Repli-
cations of GP
As the first natural step, we went to great lengths to replicate GP’s experiment as
closely as possible and implemented the corresponding asocial treatment. In total,
we made three such attempts. Here we only summarise the main findings. More
details on the experimental design and the experimental results are presented in an
Appendix (section 3.8). The main lesson from this series of replications is that we
fail to find either prize effects or discouragement effects on subjects’ performance
in the slider task in all of our experiments, as opposed to the results reported in
GP, and therefore the slider task is not ideal for answering our current research
question.
The first attempt followed almost the same experimental procedure as in GP.
However, in hindsight, we found that the visual length of each slider is slightly
shorter than that in GP’s experiment because of the smaller screen size of the
Chapter 3 54
computer monitors in the CeDEx lab, rendering the observed average efforts (the
number of correctly positioned sliders) slightly lower than those in GP. Therefore,
in the second attempt, we kept the visual length of each slider exactly the same as
they would look in GP’s original experiment. Furthermore, we also used the same
sequence of one variable (prize sequence) that was generated in GP’s experiment
in order for a better chance of replication success. Built upon the design of the
second attempt, in our third and last attempt, we only recruited inexperienced
subjects who had participated in at most one other experiment and we conducted
all experimental sessions on weekdays at the same time of the day (14:00–15:30),
thereby being even more similar to GP’s subject participants and experimental
procedure.
3.2.1 Experimental Procedure
Each experiment consists of two treatments. The SOCIAL treatment aims at
replicating GP’s experiment. In the ASOCIAL treatment, we remove the scope
for interpersonal comparisons from the SOCIAL treatment so as to identify the
impact of interpersonal comparisons on the second mover’s behaviour.
In each session of the SOCIAL treatment, 10 subjects played the role of the
first mover and another 10 the role of the second mover. Roles were randomly
determined and remained the same for the whole duration of the session. Each
first mover was randomly paired with a second mover in each round. The game
was repeated for two practice rounds followed by ten paying rounds. We selected
the same sample size as GP: 60 first movers and 60 second movers; exactly the
same software and experiment instructions were used and the same experimental
procedure was followed.5
5We are grateful to David Gill and Victoria Prowse for sharing their software with us.
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In each paying round, a winner prize for each pair was randomly drawn from
{£0.10, £0.20, . . . , £3.90}. Each pair was informed of the prize of the round before
they started their tasks. The first mover completed her task first and the second
mover learned the first mover’s points score (the number of correctly positioned
sliders in 120 seconds) before starting her task. After they finished the tasks, the
prize was awarded to one of the pair based on the probability of winning that
is equal to her own points score minus her pair member’s points score plus 50
and then all divided by 100. At the end of each round, each subject learned her
own and her pair member’s points score, her probability of winning the prize and
whether she was the winner or loser in that round.
In the ASOCIAL treatment, the removal of the scope for interpersonal com-
parisons is achieved by transforming the original strategic game to an individual
decision-making task with as few changes as possible. First of all, we replaced
each first mover’s points score in each round with a number that has the same
value as the realised first mover’s points score observed in the same round in the
SOCIAL treatment. Likewise, we also replaced each prize in each round with the
realised prize in the same round in the SOCIAL treatment. In a particular round,
a “second mover” in the ASOCIAL treatment (though they were not referred to
as “second movers” but as “participants” in the experiment) would then observe a
number instead of the first mover’s points score with the same value and compete
for the same prize.
Unlike in the SOCIAL treatment where the second mover knew that the first
mover’s points score was provided by a real human subject who was participat-
ing in the same session, the participants in the ASOCIAL treatment were simply
told that these numbers were “given numbers.” This procedure makes sure that
the second movers in the SOCIAL treatment and the subjects in the ASOCIAL
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treatment dealt with the same decision problems from the perspective of GP’s
disappointment aversion model and were incentivised by the same prizes. The
important difference lies in the presence of rivals, the impact of which can be
attributed purely to interpersonal comparisons.6 Furthermore, in order to keep
subjects’ practical experiences with the slider task as similar as possible in both
treatments, the subjects in the ASOCIAL treatment were asked to wait two min-
utes before they could start their tasks just as second movers had to wait two
minutes for their paired first mover to finish the task before they started their
own tasks in the SOCIAL treatment.
3.2.2 Summary of Experimental Results
In a nutshell, while we replicate many features of GP’s data, such as average
effort and learning effects, we fail to replicate their main results. Specifically,
we find neither discouragement effects nor prize effects, even though our total
sample size is three times as large as GP’s. More direct evidence from estimating
GP’s structural model on our data confirms that disappointment aversion does
not appear to play as important a role in our sample as in GP’s. Finally, contrary
to our own hypothesis, we find no systematic difference between the SOCIAL and
ASOCIAL treatments.
6In section 3.7, we provide a theoretical model that produces testable predictions as to the
effect of interpersonal comparisons on second mover’s behaviour. Specifically, we have rela-
belled GP’s notion of disappointment aversion as asocial disappointment aversion, while inter-
personal comparisons would introduce a notion of social disappointment aversion through the
channel of ex post payoff comparisons. The model predicts that social disappointment aver-
sion would increase second mover’s effort relative to the ASOCIAL benchmark but would not
change the pattern of discouragement effects. However, interpersonal comparisons based on a
context-dependent joy of winning—more intensive joy of winning against a human opponent than
against a goal—would strengthen the degree of discouragement effects relative to the ASOCIAL
benchmark.
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This series of careful replications shows the difficulty in reproducing GP’s cen-
tral findings. In section 3.8, we discuss a re-examination of GP’s sample. As it
turns out, we find an “outlier” subject who behaved very differently from other
subjects and this “outlier” subject turns out to be the main reason why GP found
the evidence of discouragement effects in their reduced form regressions. In fact,
when we add this “outlier” subject to one of our replication samples, the “missing”
discouragement effects as well as the prize effects re-emerge in both the reduced
form regressions and the structural estimation.
In light of our replication results and the “outlier effect,” we believe that we
have in fact “successfully” replicated GP when excluding the “outlier” subject.
The issue seems to be, however, that provided a rather short duration of working
time (120 seconds) behaviours in the slider task are largely unresponsive to prize
incentives.7 This observation leads us to run another experiment using the ball-
catching task, which has proven to produce behaviours that are responsive to
incentives within a short period of working time.
3.3 Experiment Using the Ball-Catching Task
The experiment also consists of two treatments: the SOCIAL and ASOCIAL
treatments, in both of which we replace the slider task with the ball-catching task
while keeping other aspects of the experiment as closely as possible to GP.
We ran six computer sessions at the CeDEx lab at the University of Notting-
ham. In four sessions we implemented the SOCIAL treatment and in two other
sessions the ASOCIAL treatment. We recruited subjects via ORSEE (Greiner,
2015) from the undergraduate student subject pool (excluding those who were
7A recent paper by Araujo et al. (2015) reports a piece-rate experiment about individual
effort in the slider task and they also find very weak incentive effects.
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studying economics or psychology and those who participated in previous replica-
tion studies). The experiment instructions (reproduced in Appendix B.2.2) were
both disseminated to all subjects in paper form and read aloud by the experi-
menter. Thirty subjects participated in each session, with 180 subjects in total.8
The average earnings for subjects were around £13.30, including a £4 show-up
fee, for a session lasting about ninety minutes.9
3.3.1 Experimental Procedure
The experiment using the ball-catching task is very similar to the experiment
presented above. Here we only discuss the alternations in design that we deem
necessary.
First, 30 subjects, instead of 20 in a session of GP and our replications, par-
ticipated in each session in order to fully utilise the capacity of the CeDEx lab.
Second, in each paying round, a winner prize for each pair was randomly drawn
from {£0.50, £0.60, . . . , £4.30}. In order to compensate for possible losses, we
also awarded a loser prize of £0.40 to every losing subject, thus keeping the prize
spread ranging from £0.10 to £3.90 as in GP. The cost-per-click is fixed at £0.02
throughout the session.10 Each pair was informed of the winner and loser prizes
before they started their tasks. The first mover completed her ball-catching task
first and the paired second mover only learned the first mover’s catches before
she started her own task. The winner prize was then awarded to one of the pair
members based on her probability of winning that is equal to her own catches
8We selected the same sample size as GP: 60 second movers in the SOCIAL treatment and 60
participants in the ASOCIAL treatments. In GP, 20 subjects participated in each session and
hence there were 120 subjects in total.
9Instructions are reproduced in Appendix B.2.2.
10Given the cost-per-click, subjects might incur negative profits if they clicked too much com-
pared to their received (loser) prize. In practice, negative profits happened in some periods for
some subjects, but no subject received negative total profits summed over all periods.
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minus the other pair member’s catches plus 50, all divided by 100. At the end of
each round, each subject would learn her own catches and clicks, her pair member’s
catches (catches only, not clicks), her probability of winning the winner prize and
whether she was the winner or loser in that round.
Third, in the ASOCIAL treatment, we replaced each first mover’s catches in
each round with a number that has the same value as the realised first mover’s
catches observed in the same round in the SOCIAL treatment. Likewise, we also
replaced each prize in each round with the realised prize in the same round in the
SOCIAL treatment.
3.4 Experimental Results
Consistent with GP’s empirical analysis, we focus on the second mover’s catches
in response to the paired first mover’s catches and the prize. We also present com-
plementary analysis using the second mover’s clicks in an Appendix (section 3.9).
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 summarizes the 60 first movers’ and 60 second movers’ catches in each
round from the SOCIAL treatment and the catches of the 60 subjects (who as-
sume the role of the second movers) in each round from the ASOCIAL treatment.
Catches range from 8 to 51 for all subjects.11 In the SOCIAL treatment, on aver-
age the first and second movers catch similar number of balls within each round.
The catches of the subjects in the ASOCIAL treatment is however slightly higher
than those of the second movers in the SOCIAL treatment within each round.
11In the ball-catching task, even if a subject never clicks, she will still catch some randomly
falling balls.
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Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 presents the Kernel density distributions of catches for
all type of subjects. Using average catches over the 10 rounds by a subject as the
unit of observation, a Wilcoxon rank-sum test suggests that there is no systematic
difference in catches between the first and second movers in the SOCIAL treatment
(two-tailed, p = 0.998). A Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test indicates a
systematic difference in catches between the second movers from the SOCIAL and
their counterpart subjects from the ASOCIAL treatments (two-tailed, p = 0.030).
For all types of our subjects, average catches decrease from up to around 35 to
roughly 30 over the 10 rounds.
Figure 3.1: Distributions of Second Mover Catches
Figure 3.2: Distributions of First Mover Catches
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Table 3.1: Summary of First and Second Mover Catches
Paying
Round
Mean q1 SD q1 Mean q2 SD q2
Minimum Maximum
q1 q2 q1 q2
SOCIAL
1 31.750 6.791 32.117 5.415 11 15 46 51
2 30.267 6.311 30.600 6.043 9 14 43 44
3 30.900 6.010 30.517 6.010 11 10 42 40
4 30.150 7.044 30.350 6.758 8 10 45 45
5 30.017 6.718 29.617 6.717 9 12 47 42
6 30.133 6.833 28.317 8.192 9 8 42 41
7 30.033 6.569 29.500 7.053 12 10 41 42
8 29.867 5.519 29.267 7.564 10 8 43 42
9 30.583 6.877 29.117 7.612 10 9 44 44
10 29.850 6.658 29.633 8.141 10 8 43 47
ASOCIAL
1 / / 34.567 5.016 / 19 / 47
2 / / 32.000 4.726 / 14 / 43
3 / / 32.467 5.589 / 9 / 41
4 / / 31.183 6.910 / 9 / 45
5 / / 31.333 6.771 / 10 / 43
6 / / 30.283 6.894 / 13 / 45
7 / / 31.117 6.181 / 9 / 41
8 / / 31.683 6.706 / 9 / 43
9 / / 30.800 5.865 / 11 / 42
10 / / 29.683 7.592 / 8 / 43
Note: q1 and q2 denote, respectively, first and second movers’ catches and SD the standard
deviation.
3.4.2 Reduced Form Estimation
Turning to dynamic effects between two movers, GP’s model predicts discourage-
ment effects on second mover’s catches irrespective of the possibility of interper-
sonal comparisons. Figure 3.3 shows the reaction curves of second mover’s catches
to first mover’s catches estimated by non-parametric lowess regressions in both
treatments. Contrary to GP’s results, we find pronounced encouragement effects,
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that is, second movers increase efforts in response to higher first mover’s effort, in
both treatments.
Figure 3.3: Lowess Regressions of Second Mover Catches on First Mover Catches
Formally, we use the same random effects panel data regression as in GP to
examine the behaviour of the second movers in response to the first mover’s catches
conditional on controls for the prize and the round effects. Table 3.2 reports the
estimates of the parameters for both treatments and for the pooled sample from
the two treatments. GP’s estimates, as reported on p. 483 in the first column of
their table 2, are reproduced in Column (4) in Table 3.2 for comparisons (first
mover’s catches corresponds to first mover’s points score in the slider task). In
GP’s estimates, the negative size of the interaction term between first mover’s
points score and prize implies that the discouragement effect does not arise at
lower prizes, but become large and significant at high prizes. Consistent with
Figure 3.3, our results, however, show an opposite dynamic pattern: at high prizes
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first mover’s catches does not significantly affect second mover’s catches, while at
low prizes there is a significant encouragement effect.12
In the ASOCIAL treatment, the interaction term between first mover’s catches
and prize, which is significant at the 5% level, seems to suggest even weaker
encouragement effects at high prizes than those in the SOCIAL treatment. The
results using the pooled sample, however, show that any difference in the coefficient
estimates between the two treatments is not systematic as all of the estimates
of the parameters that include a treatment control are not jointly statistically
significant.13 In short, while behaviour in GP’s experiment using the slider task
shows discouragement effects, behaviour in our experiment using the ball-catching
task however exhibits encouragement effects.14
12Note that this is so even after controlling prizes that may simultaneously positively affect
the first and second movers’ catches. We estimate the model excluding all prize controls and
again find statistically significant effects of first mover’s catches on second mover’s catches in
both treatments.
13Following the same exercise in GP (p. 483, footnote 20), we can test whether behaviour
varies over time due to gradual learning during the course of the experiment. By estimating
the same model with separate coefficients on first mover’s catches and the interaction term for
the first five rounds and for the next five rounds. These separate coefficient estimates do not
statistically significantly differ in both treatments (SOCIAL: p = 0.904; ASOCIAL: p = 0.120).
Also following GP’s discussion on the concern of probability weighting (pp. 492–493), we test
whether the encouragement effect operates throughout the range of second mover’s winning
probability. We estimate the same model with separate coefficients on first mover’s catches
and the interaction term for the highest 50% of first mover’s catches and for the lowest 50% of
first mover’s catches. These estimates show encouragement effects of similar magnitude and the
estimates corresponding to the upper half of first mover’s catches are not statistically significantly
different from those corresponding to the lower half (SOCIAL: p = 0.123; ASOCIAL: p = 0.789).
14In the spirit of the “outlier effect,” we also re-examine our sample using the ball-catching
task and classify those subjects who did not click at all in most rounds as “outliers.” We find
three such “outliers” but only in the SOCIAL treatment. After excluding those observations,
we still find statistically significant encouragement effects.
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3.4.3 Structural Estimation
Evidence presented so far clearly suggests encouragement effects, as opposed to the
predicted discouragement effects, in both the SOCIAL and ASOCIAL treatments.
GP’s original model of disappointment aversion could potentially account for
encouragement effects if we assume that second movers are “elation seeking,” that
is, the parameter of disappointment aversion, λ2, is negative (see the definition of
λ2 in section 3.7), reflecting the notion that a relative utility gain is more pleasur-
able (elation) than an equal-sized relative utility loss is painful (disappointment).
The type of emotion may as well arise in contests where players value the relative
utility from winning higher than that from losing. Formally, in the structural
model GP assume that the disappointment aversion coefficient λ2 is to follow a
normal distribution, N(λ˜2, σ
2
λ), and is independent for each second mover. Also fol-
lowing GP, the “effective cost (of output) function” (see the transformation made
to the cost of effort function in section 3.7) is assumed to take a general polynomial
form, Coutput2 (q2) = bq2 + cq
ϕ
2 /ϕ, where q2 is the second mover’s catches, in order
for a better chance for fitting GP’s model. Unobserved cost differences and round
effects enter the cost of effort function through the convexity parameter, c, which
is separately additive of a common component, κ, round effects, δr, individual
specific effect, µn, and an idiosyncratic error, pin,r, for the nth second mover in the
rth round. More details on the model specification and the estimation strategy
can be found in GP.
The parameters are estimated using the Method of Simulated Moments
(MSM). Table 3.3 reports the MSM estimates for both treatments. The pa-
rameter estimate of the strength of disappointment aversion on average, λ˜2, is
significantly lower than zero and the heterogeneity of disappointment aversion
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Table 3.3: MSM Parameter Estimates
SOCIAL ASOCIAL GP
(1) (2) (3)
λ˜2 −1.329∗∗∗ −1.369∗∗∗ 1.758∗∗∗
(0.403) (0.296) (0.640)
σλ 3.763
∗∗∗ 4.768∗∗∗ 1.868∗∗∗
(0.716) (0.480) (0.634)
b −0.127∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.407∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.018)
κ 0.435∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 2.063∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.040) (0.135)
σµ 0.686 0.085
∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗
(0.510) (0.022) (0.151)
σpi 0.371 0.198 0.716
∗∗∗
(0.311) (0.134) (0.204)
ψ 2.368∗∗∗ 2.532∗∗∗ 2.534∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.237) (0.128)
dq2/dq1(v = £0.10, low λ2,n) N/A
a N/Aa 0.000
(0.001)
dq2/dq1(v = £2, average λ2,n) 0.159
∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗
(0.060) (0.030) (0.013)
dq2/dq1(v = £3.90, high λ2,n) −0.317∗∗∗ −0.317∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.059) (0.034)
N×R 600 600 590
OI test 25.017[0.201] 43.849[0.002] 13.425[0.858]
Note: aEstimations using GP’s statistical package did not produce these numbers.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard deviations of the transitory and persistent
unobservables in the cost of effort function, σµ and σpi, are computed from the estimates
of the parameters of the Weibull distributions. Estimates of κ , σµ and σpi have been
multiplied by 100. Reaction functions and gradients are produced by simulation methods
with the gradients evaluated at q1 = 20. Low, average, high λ2,n refer to the 20th, 50th,
and 80th percentiles of the distribution of λ2,n. Newey OI tests report the test statistics
and p-values are shown in brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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across the individuals, σλ, is significantly greater than zero in both treatments.
Contrary to GP’s estimates, as reported on p. 487 in the second column of their
table 3, that are reproduced in Column (3) in Table 3.3, in both treatments our
estimates translate to encouragement effects when λ2 is not too high (not ex-
ceeding zero, indicating elation seeking). While there is no discernible differences
between the SOCIAL and ASOCIAL treatments, the Newey test for the validity
of overidentifying restrictions does not reject the validity of the model in the
SOCIAL treatment but rejects in the ASOCIAL treatment. Therefore, it remains
inconclusive that GP’s model can organize our data even if we allow the second
movers to be “elation seeking.”
Another noteworthy finding is that the estimated effective cost (of output)
function exhibits a decline at low output level given the negative estimate of b,
which is similar to GP’s but smaller in magnitude. These estimates of the cost
of output function are, however, not compatible with our assumption on the cost
function of catches, although we cannot exclude the possibility that catching the
first several balls is psychologically enjoyable more than clicking is financial costly.
This observation might also simply be the result of over-fitting: when we force the
estimate of b to be non-negative, then the Newey test clearly rejects GP’s modelling
specification in both treatments (p < 0.001).
3.5 An Alternative Model
New evidence collected in this paper rejects the model of disappointment aversion
regardless of whether interpersonal comparisons are possible or not. In this section,
we explore a simple alternative model using a different type of reference-dependent
preferences (not belonging to the class of expectations-based reference-dependent
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preferences such as GP’s notion of disappointment aversion) to explain the en-
couragement effects. Specifically, the observed first mover’s catches is treated as
an exogenous reference point, against which the second mover directly compares
her own catches. Then the second mover’s decision problem can be written as
EU2(q1, q2) = u2(v)P2(q1, q2) + u2(0)(1− P2(q1, q2))
+ h(P2(q1, q2)− 1/2, u2(v))− Coutput2 (q2), (3.1)
where q1 and q2 denote the first mover’s and second mover’s catches, v the nor-
malised winner prize with the normalised loser prize as 0, and Coutput2 (q2) the
“effective cost of output” function. The component h(·, ·) represents the second
mover’s affective evaluation system of the tournament outcome in the progress of
catching up with the first mover’s catches. We assume that h(0, ·) = 0 and the
first derivative with respect to the first argument h1(x, ·) > 0 for any x ∈ R. This
assumption of reference-dependence requires that performance is evaluated rela-
tive to a goal, which if achieved gives the player a certain chance of winning the
tournament (here without loss of generality assume it is a 50% chance), and that
performance short of the goal is deemed a utility loss and performance exceeding
the goal a gain. We also assume that h11(x, ·) < 0 for any x ∈ R, reflecting
the dissipation of motivation in the progress of catching up with the first mover’s
catches.15 The second argument in h relates to the prize level. Specifically, we
assume that h11(·, y1) > h11(·, y2) for y1 > y2, implying that higher prizes induce
15We don’t assume loss aversion (i.e. h1(−x, ·) > h1(x, ·) for any x > 0) and diminishing
sensitivity (i.e. h11(x, ·) > 0 for x < 0 and h11(x, ·) < 0 for x > 0), which often accompany
reference-dependence in many prospect theory like models. An implication of loss aversion is
that there would be “bunching” of second mover’s catches around some first mover’s catches; an
implication of diminishing sensitivity is that we would observe discouragement effects for myopic
second movers if the first mover’s catches is high enough. However both implications are not
supported in our data.
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lower rates of dissipation of motivation. This is a plausible assumption as second
movers may experience more persistent (technically, more linearised) emotions
from output comparisons when stakes are higher.
To make comparative static predictions on dynamic effects and prize effects,
we differentiate the first order condition of Equation 3.1 with respect to q1, and
provided our assumptions on the cost function it gives
dq2/dq1 = −( 1
2γ
)2h11(P2(q1, q2)− 1/2, u2(v))[(Coutput2 )′′]−1(q2) > 0.
It is easy to see that the model predicts that the second mover’s catches increases
in the observed first mover’s catches, and the strength of the encouragement effect
decreases in the prize level. The intuition for the first prediction is clear. For
the second, note that lower rates of dissipation of motivation, or more linearised
emotions from output comparisons, imply that second movers actually become
relatively less sensitive to the changes in first mover’s catches than to the under-
lying material incentives. Both predictions are consistent with our experimental
data using the ball-catching task.
This simple model essentially captures an affective evaluation system in the
ball-catching task that is separate from a cognitive system which only evaluates
material utilities. The model does not differentiate between situations when in-
terpersonal comparisons are possible or not because in either case second movers
treat the observed first mover behaviour or a value-equivalent number as a goal.
This formulation is consistent with our experimental evidence.
The affective system is myopic in that the second mover evaluates only a local
optimisation problem, which is subject to extra gain or loss utility from comparing
performance to a goal in the process of catching up with the first mover’s catches.
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We note that the first mover’s catches serves as a “mere” goal as the attainment
of the same level of performance is not accompanied by a discontinuous change in
a pecuniary reward. Hence, “mere” goals are fundamentally psychological.16
3.6 Conclusion
Recent developments on expectations-based reference-dependent preferences cast
doubt on their empirical applicability. For example, in explaining endowment
effects where expectations-based reference-dependence has long been the leading
theory, a recent experiment by Goette et al. (2015) has shown that the point predic-
tions of a version of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences, namely,
personal equilibrium defined by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), are not supported, al-
though the comparative static predictions go in the right direction. Expectations-
based reference-dependent preferences, presumably cognitively less burdensome
than the requirements of perfect rationality, still demands rational expectations of
particular emotions. For example, GP’s disappointment aversion model requires
that an agent rationally anticipates the emotions from her choices and chooses
efforts optimally by taking into account the anticipated emotions, a process that
asks for non-trivial attention and mental capacity. Alternatively, our simple model
treats the observed first mover’s catches or a value-equivalent number as a goal
that acts as a direct reference point, perhaps a “hot” target, without some “cold”
calculation of outcomes that have material and/or emotional (e.g., disappoint-
ment) consequences.
16See Heath et al. (1999),Wu et al. (2008) for discussions on goals that act as reference points,
and Goette and Huffman (2007),Pope and Simonsohn (2011),Allen et al. (2014) and Corgnet
et al. (2015a) for field and lab evidence that goals are not merely expectations but can be
manipulated so as to incentivise effort to move nearer to the goal.
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Overall, the new evidence collected in this chapter suggests that disappoint-
ment aversion could not be empirically extended to the strategic setting exam-
ined in GP; the comparative statics also go against the theoretical predictions.
Nonetheless, the behaviour of our second movers is reference-dependent: working
harder in face of a stronger opponent. In this respect, our results are broadly
consistent with the core feature of reference-dependence in that otherwise we
should observe no dynamic effect between first and second movers at all. A simple
model that incorporates an affective evaluation system and treats the observed
first mover’s catches as a goal or as an exogenous reference point appears to be a
better descriptive model of what we find in our experiment using the ball-catching
task.
3.7 Appendix: Theoretical Predictions Built
upon GP’s Model
In the section, we build upon GP and provide a simple model, which combines
disappointment aversion and interpersonal comparisons. We then derive testable
hypotheses regarding the impact of the latter.
In a sequential-move tournament with a generic pair of agents, let e1 and e2
represent the first and the second movers’ efforts (which is the number of correctly
positioned slider in the slider task or the number of clicks in the ball-catching
task), e1, e2 ∈ [0, e¯]. Assume that there is a deterministic production relationship
between output and effort for each agent, denoted as qi = f(ei), where f
′ > 0 and
f ′′ < 0.17 Given the pair’s outputs, the second mover’s probability of winning the
17In the slider task, f is effectively an identity function. In the ball-catching task, the pro-
duction relationship is stochastic by its nature because of the randomness of ball falling and
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winner prize is given by P2(e1, e2) =
f(e2)−f(e1)+γ
2γ
, and P2 ∈ [0, 1] for a constant
parameter γ ≥ f(e¯). Without loss of generality, we normalise the loser prize
as 0 and the winner prize as v. Therefore, the second mover’s material utility
from the tournament payoff is given by u2(y2), where y2 ∈ {0, v}. GP introduce
an endogenous expectations-based reference point that is equal to the expected
material utility, which adjusts not only to own choice but to the pair member’s
choice in the similar spirit as the choice-acclimating reference point first introduced
by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007). Hence, the endogenous reference point is given by
R2 = E[u2(y2)|e1, e2] = u2(v)P2(e1, e2) + u2(0)(1− P2(e1, e2)).
GP introduce disappointment aversion by adding a gain-loss utility around the
endogenous reference point in addition to the material utility. A second mover
would experience disappointment when the material utility of the realised tourna-
ment payoff, u2(y2), is less than the reference utility, R2, and experience elation
when u2(y2) exceeds R2. In particular, a relative utility loss is more painful than
an equal-sized relative utility gain is pleasurable. By additionally assuming ad-
ditive separability between the utility from the prize and cost of effort, C2(e2),
which is a non-concave function, we can rewrite the second mover’s total utility
as
U2(e2, R2, y2) = u2(y2)+1u2(y2)≥R2G2(u2(y2)−R2)+1u2(y2)≤R2L2(u2(y2)−R2)−C2(e2),
(3.2)
where the gain function associated with elation is defined on {x|x ≥ 0} such that
G2(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R+; the loss function associated with disappointment is
plausibly some unobserved non-monetary costs/benefits. In order to keep the theoretical model
as well as the econometric framework as close as possible to GP, we assume that all of the
randomness are captured in the unobserved non-monetary costs/benefits, which then would be
subject to the empirical estimation.
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defined on {x|x ≤ 0} such that L2(x) < 0 for all x ∈ R−; G2(0) = L2(0) = 0;
and G2(x) < |L2(−x)| for all x > 0, bearing the notion that disappointment is a
stronger emotion than elation.
The context in GP’s model is completely asocial. For a second mover, their
model of disappointment aversion abstracts from how the realised output of the
paired first mover, f(e1), is revealed to her, that is, whether it is revealed as the
paired first mover’s output or purely as a number with the same value. However,
the literature on interpersonal comparisons suggests that the different labelling
can make a difference to the second mover’s behaviour. Specifically, if we assume
that a second mover additionally anticipates sensations from payoff comparisons,
she would exert higher effort and therefore produce higher output for a given value
of first mover’s output. But the strength of discouragement effects remains the
same.
Formally, let’s assume that a second mover is endowed with social utilities of
being ahead/behind or social elation/disappointment arising from payoff compar-
isons in addition to her material utility and gain-loss utility arising from asocial
elation/disappointment. Again assuming additive separability of utility, the second
mover’s total utility now becomes:
U2(e2, R2, y2) = u2(y2) + 1u2(y2)≥R2G2(u2(y2)−R2) + 1u2(y2)≤R2L2(u2(y2)−R2)
+ 1u2(y2)≥u1(y1)A2(u2(y2)− u1(y1)) + 1u2(y2)≤u1(y1)B2(u2(y2)− u1(y1))
− C2(e2), (3.3)
where A2 associated with social elation is defined on {x|x ≥ 0} such that A2(x) > 0
for all x ∈ R+; B2 associated with social disappointment is defined on {x|x ≤ 0}
such that B2(x) < 0 for all x ∈ R−; A2(0) = B2(0) = 0; and A2(x) < |B2(−x)|
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for all x > 0, bearing the notion that social disappointment is a stronger emotion
than social elation.
As in GP, to operationalise the model, it is assumed that the material utility of
the prize is linear in money, i.e., u2(y2) = y2, and the gain-loss utility around the
reference point R2 is piecewise linear, i.e., G2(x) = g2 · x and L2(x) = l2 · x. Both
g2 and l2 are constant and greater than zero. The magnitude of disappointment
aversion is simply measured by λ2 = l2 − g2, which is strictly positive given the
assumption of disappointment aversion. Likewise, we linearise the social utilities
as A2(x) = a2 ·x and B2(x) = b2 ·x. Both a2 and b2 are constant and greater than
zero.
Given these assumptions, the second mover’s expected utility is given by:
EU2(e2, e1) = P2(v + g2(v −R2) + a2(v − 0))
+ (1− P2)(0 + l2(0−R2) + b2(0− v))− C2(e2)
= vP2 − λ2vP2(1− P2) + [P2v(a2 + b2)− b2v]− C2(e2),
(3.4)
where the term λ2vP2(1− P2) arises from asocial elation/disappointment and the
term [P2v(a2 + b2)− b2v] from social elation/disappointment.
For the ease of comparisons between GP’s and our results and also because a
second mover can only observe the paired first mover’s output in the ball-catching
task, we transform Equation 3.4 by using the output instead of the effort as the
domain. Assume that q1, q2 denote the first and the second movers’ outputs in
a round. Then P2(q2, q1) =
q2−q1+γ
2γ
and the cost (of output) function can be
rewritten as C2 ◦ f−1(q2), which is a convex function given the assumptions on f
and C2.
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Given such transformation, the predictions from GP (Proposition 2, p. 480)
immediately follow: When there is no disappointment aversion, i.e., λ2 = 0, the
second mover’s optimal output does not depend on the first mover’s output be-
cause the first mover’s output has no impact on the second mover’s marginal
probability of winning. When there is disappointment aversion, i.e., λ2 > 0, there
is a discouragement effect : a second mover would reduce her effort and therefore
her output after observing higher first mover’s output.
The transformed Equation 3.4 also implies that the optimal second mover’s
output conditional on the first mover’s output in the presence of interpersonal
comparisons, (q∗2|q1)social, is higher than the optimal one in the absence of inter-
personal comparisons, (q∗2|q1)asocial, given that a2 + b2 is positive. However, adding
social elation/disappointment from payoff comparisons does not affect the pattern
of discouragement effects.
Based on above discussions, we derive the following hypotheses with regards
to interpersonal comparisons that arise from payoff comparisons:
Hypothesis 1. On average the second mover’s catches is lower in the ASOCIAL
treatment than that in the SOCIAL treatment.
Hypothesis 2. The strength of discouragement effects remains the same in both
treatments.
Assuming a context-dependent joy of winning in addition to the pecuniary re-
ward may, however, produce differential discouragement effects. For example, if
a second mover experiences more intensive joy of winning against a human oppo-
nent than against a goal, we expect to observe stronger discouragement effects in
the SOCIAL treatment than in the ASOCIAL treatment. This prediction follows
immediately from Proposition 3 in GP (p. 480).
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Hypothesis 2’. The strength of discouragement effects is stronger in the SOCIAL
treatment than in the ASOCIAL treatment.
3.8 Appendix: Details on Replication Experi-
ments Using the Slider Task
This section is intended to be self-contained and can be read as a report on a
replication of Gill and Prowse (2012) in its own right. We have provided, in
total, three attempts to replicate GPs experiment as closely as possible and to
implement corresponding ASOCIAL treatments that are meant to remove the
scope for interpersonal comparisons from the replication experiment, which is
called the SOCIAL treatment in the main text.
3.8.1 Experimental Procedure
In each attempt, we ran nine computer sessions at the CeDEx lab at the University
of Nottingham. In six sessions we implemented the SOCIAL treatment and in
other three sessions the ASOCIAL treatment. We recruited subjects via ORSEE
(Greiner, 2015) from the undergraduate student subject pool (excluding those
who were then studying economics or psychology). The experiment instructions
(reproduced in Appendix B.2.1) were both disseminated to all subjects in paper
form and read aloud by the experimenter. Twenty subjects participated in each
session, with 180 subjects in each attempt. Overall, 540 subjects participated in
this experiment. The average earnings for subjects were around £14.00, including
a £4 show-up fee, for a session lasting about ninety minutes.
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We used the same slider task as in GP. The slider task lasts two minutes,
during which a subject can use the mouse to drag and drop the 48 sliders that
are displayed on a single screen. To correctly position a slider, the slider must
be exactly at the middle, which is numbered 50 on a 0–100 scale. The number of
correctly positioned slider at the end of the two minutes is interpreted as the effort
exert by the subject in the task. More details on the slider task can be found in
Gill and Prowse (2012).
The SOCIAL treatment aims at replicating GP’s experiment. Exactly the
same software and experiment instructions were used and the same experimental
procedure was followed.18 In each session of the SOCIAL treatment, 10 subjects
played the role of the first mover and another 10 the role of the second mover.
Roles were randomly determined and remained the same for the whole duration
of the session. Each first mover was randomly paired with a second mover in each
round. We followed the “no contagion” matching protocol as in GP so that no
first mover’s behaviour in the previous rounds could directly or indirectly affect
second mover’s behaviour in the current round. The game was repeated for two
practice rounds followed by ten paying rounds. In practice rounds, each subject
was paired with an automaton so that these experiences would not contaminate
the matching protocol in the paying rounds.
In each paying round, a prize for each pair was randomly drawn from {£0.10,
£0.20,. . . , £3.90}. Each pair was informed of the prize before they started their
slider task. The first mover completed her task first and the second mover learned
the first mover’s effort before starting her task. After they finished the task, the
prize was awarded to one of the pair members based on the probability of winning
that is equal to her own points score minus her pair member’s points score plus
18We are grateful to David Gill and Victoria Prowse for sharing their software with us.
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50 and then all divided by 100. At the end of each round, each subject learned
her own and her pair member’s points score, her probability of winning the prize
and whether she was the winner or loser in that round.
In the ASOCIAL treatment, the removal of the scope for interpersonal com-
parisons is achieved by transforming the original strategic game to an individual
decision-making task with as few changes as possible. First of all, we replaced
each first mover’s points score in each round with a number that has the same
value as the realised first mover’s points score observed in the same round in the
SOCIAL treatment. Likewise, we also replaced each prize in each round with the
realised prize in the same round in the SOCIAL treatment. In a particular round,
a “second mover” in the ASOCIAL treatment (though they were not referred to
as “second movers” but as “participants” in the experiment) would then observe a
number instead of the first mover’s points score with the same absolute value and
compete for the same prize. Unlike in the SOCIAL treatment where the second
mover knew that the first mover’s effort was provided by a real human subject
who was participating in the same session, the participants in the ASOCIAL treat-
ment were simply told that these numbers were “given numbers.” This procedure
makes sure that the second movers in the SOCIAL treatment and the subjects in
the ASOCIAL treatment dealt with the same decision problems from the perspec-
tive of GP’s disappointment aversion model and were incentivised by the same
prizes. The important difference lies in the presence of rivals, the impact of which
can be attributed purely to interpersonal comparisons. Furthermore, in order to
keep subjects’ practical experiences with the slider task as similar as possible in
both treatments, the subjects in the ASOCIAL treatment were asked to wait two
minutes before they could start their tasks just as second movers had to wait two
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minutes for their paired first movers to finish the task before they started their
own tasks in the SOCIAL treatment.
To show precisely what the differences between the two treatments looked like
to the subjects, Figure 3.4(a) presents the information displayed on top of the
screen of the slider task to the second movers in the SOCIAL treatment (below
is the slider task itself), and Figure 3.4(b) shows the information displayed to the
subjects (who acted as if they were second movers) in the ASOCIAL treatment.
The key differential information has been italicised (but not in the experiment).
Figure 3.4: Key Differential Information for the Second Movers in the Two Treat-
ments
As mentioned before, we have provided three replication attempts of GP’s
experiment and run three corresponding ASOCIAL experiments. These three
replications reflect our effort to gradually match as much detail on the experi-
mental design and procedure as possible to GP’s original experiment. The first
attempt followed exactly the above procedure. But in hindsight, we found that
the visual length of each slider is slightly shorter than that in GP’s experiment
because of the smaller screen size of the computer monitors in the CeDEx lab,
rendering the observed average effort slightly lower than GP’s.19 Therefore, in
the second attempt, we kept the visual length of each slider exactly the same as
they would look like on the GP’s computer setup. Furthermore, we also used
the prize sequence generated in GP’s experiment in order for a better chance of
19GP used 22-inch widescreen monitors with a 1680×1050 pixel resolution, whereas we used
19-inch monitors with a 1280×1080 pixel resolution.
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replication success. Built upon the design of the second attempt, in our third and
last attempt, we only recruited inexperienced subjects who had participated in at
most one other experiment and all nine sessions were conducted on weekdays at
the same time of the day (14:00–15:30), thereby being even more similar to GP’s
subject participants and experimental procedure.
3.8.2 Experimental Results
Throughout our analysis, one subject from the ASOCIAL treatment in the first
attempt, one subject from the ASOCIAL treatment in the second attempt and
one second mover from the SOCIAL treatment in the third attempts are dropped
because they appear to have been unable to position any slider correctly.20
As in the main text, we do not find any systematic difference between the two
treatments. Therefore, we will present the results from all SOCIAL treatments
and relegate those from all ASOCIAL treatments to subsection 3.8.6. Paralleling
the presentations of the experimental results in GP, we start with some summary
statistics and proceed to reduced form regressions and then structural estimation.
Table 3.4 summarises the behaviour of the second movers and the corre-
sponding first movers in each round for each replication. In the first replication,
SOCIAL-1, average second mover’s effort is lower than GP’s by around 4 sliders
in each round, indicating that the shorter length of the slider task reduced average
productivity. In the next two replications, SOCIAL-2 and SOCIAL-3, average sec-
ond mover’s effort is at the comparable level with GP’s in each round, increasing
from above 22 sliders to around 27 sliders over the 10 rounds. In each replication
and within each round, first and second movers on average exert similar amount
of effort. In addition, Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 also show that second mover’s
20GP also found one second mover could not position any slider in their experimental sample.
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efforts in our replications exhibit similar distributions and similar learning effects
(except for level differences) compared to those in GP.
Figure 3.5: Kernel Density Distributions of Second Mover Efforts in All SOCIAL
treatments
Recall that GP’s model of disappointment aversion (Proposition 3, p. 480)
predicts that a second mover would respond to higher first mover effort by de-
creasing her effort choice and even more so when competing for a higher prize.
To test this discouragement effect, we use the same random effects panel data re-
gression as in GP. Table 3.5 reports the estimates for each replication. Compared
to GP’s estimates which are reproduced in Column (1), the responses of second
mover’s effort to first mover’s effort and even to prize are never statistically sig-
nificant in any replication. The test of joint significance for the estimates of first
mover’s effort, prize and their interaction cannot reject the null effect (SOCIAL-
Chapter 3 82
Figure 3.6: Evolution of Average Second Mover Efforts in All SOCIAL treatments
1: χ2(3) = 1.26, p = 0.739; SOCIAL-2: χ2(3) = 1.19, p = 0.754; SOCIAL-3:
χ2(3) = 6.22, p = 0.101). Moreover, using the pooled sample of all three SOCIAL
treatments, the estimates, which are reported in Column (5), show that the only
statistically significant difference between SOCIAL-1 and SOCIAL-2/SOCIAL-3
is the level difference in second mover’s effort. Overall, we fail to replicate any
reduced form evidence of discouragement effects.
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Table 3.4: Summary of First and Second Mover Efforts in All SOCIAL Treatments
Paying
Round
Mean e1 SD e1 Mean e2 SD e2
Minimum Maximum
e1 e2 e1 e2
SOCIAL-1
1 18.700 5.264 19.133 5.706 2 0 29 29
2 20.617 5.368 20.033 4.665 8 3 36 29
3 20.450 3.864 21.000 4.322 12 8 31 29
4 20.850 4.290 21.067 4.558 3 5 29 31
5 21.800 4.120 21.400 4.727 9 5 32 31
6 21.967 3.673 21.667 4.336 13 9 31 32
7 22.500 3.652 22.267 4.206 14 6 29 30
8 22.383 4.255 22.900 4.185 9 5 30 31
9 22.367 3.844 23.217 4.261 14 8 30 33
10 22.583 4.188 23.533 4.351 12 5 31 33
SOCIAL-2
1 22.717 4.454 23.183 4.663 10 7 32 33
2 23.717 4.291 23.683 4.421 15 7 33 33
3 23.900 4.261 24.600 4.677 15 13 33 34
4 24.517 3.994 25.350 5.532 17 2 35 37
5 24.517 5.469 26.033 4.801 7 17 38 37
6 25.583 4.556 26.417 4.216 16 17 39 38
7 26.200 4.646 26.483 4.553 15 18 40 36
8 26.100 4.371 27.033 5.079 13 1 37 35
9 26.383 4.720 27.500 3.771 11 20 38 35
10 27.250 5.376 27.783 5.496 10 0 42 38
SOCIAL-3
1 22.373 4.831 22.407 5.282 9 5 33 32
2 24.017 5.005 24.119 3.882 4 17 33 35
3 24.492 4.673 24.678 4.886 5 0 33 33
4 24.627 5.239 26.186 3.771 0 19 35 35
5 26.170 4.276 26.136 3.857 11 19 33 37
6 26.424 4.157 26.966 3.801 12 17 36 39
7 26.509 4.175 27.712 4.009 12 19 37 37
8 27.102 3.977 26.949 5.594 13 1 35 40
9 27.390 4.156 27.254 6.351 17 0 37 38
10 27.170 5.025 28.237 4.372 0 21 36 40
Note: e1 and e2 denote, respectively, first and second movers’ effort (the number of corrected
positioned sliders) and SD the standard deviation. There are 60, 60 and 59 second movers
from, respectively, SOCIAL-1, SOCIAL-2 and SOCIAL-3.
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A substantive support of GP’s model prediction comes from their structural
estimation of the strength of the disappointment aversion parameter. Again, we
use the same structural model as in GP to estimate the relevant parameters.21
Table 3.6 reports the MSM estimates for each replication. Instead of using GP’s
preferred specification, we use the specification with non-quadratic costs of effort
for a better chance of fitting the model. Compared with GP’s estimates that are
reproduced in Column (1), the estimate of the disappointment aversion parame-
ter, λ2, is never statistically significant from zero and its magnitude is much lower
in any replication than in GP, thereby indicating no evidence of disappointment
aversion for any level of first mover’s effort and prize. Tripling the sample size
by pooling observations from all SOCIAL treatments does not help recover a sta-
tistically significant estimate, either. Our estimates, however, support that there
is some heterogeneity in the disappointment aversion parameter across second
movers as σλ is statistically significantly greater than zero in the pooled sample.
Despite that, even at the highest prize of £3.90, a 40 slider increase in first mover’s
effort decreases second mover’s effort by only 2.2 sliders for a second mover with
a high λ2,n (defined as the 80th percentile of the distribution of λ2,n), while in GP
the corresponding value is 5.1 sliders.
To summarize, while we replicate many descriptive statistics of GP’s data, we
find no support for discouragement effects in all three of our replications of GP.
21Because there is a level difference in second mover’s effort between SOCIAL-1 and GP, we
made a minor change to the sample of SOCIAL-1 by shifting all first/second mover’s efforts
upward by 4 sliders.
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3.8.3 How Can We Bridge the Gap Between GP’s Findings
and Ours?
GP excluded one subject (ID: 302) throughout their analysis on the basis that this
subject seemed unable to move any slider. This leads us to wonder whether there
are any more subjects who were not able to move sliders or behaved like outliers
in GP’s sample. Indeed, we find one (ID: 318). This subject clearly could move
sliders but for some reasons he/she did not move any slider in 5 rounds (rounds
5, 6, 7, 9, and 10). In these 5 rounds, there is a wide variation in both prize and
first mover’s effort: prizes range from £0.6 to £3.9 and first mover’s efforts from
23 to 35 sliders.
We examine the effect of this “outlier” subject using the same random effects
regressions and report estimates in Table 3.7. In Column (1) where we exclude this
“outlier” subject from GP’s sample, we find that the evidence of discouragement
effects, as identified by the statistically significant estimate of the interaction term,
is substantially weakened. The exclusion of this “outlier” also renders the prize
effect to be only marginally statistically significant at the 10% level.
To see whether the “outlier” might explain our replication failure, we add
the observations for this “outlier” subject to each of our replication samples and
estimate the same random effects model. Surprisingly, we recover both the prize
effect and the discouragement effect in the first replication sample. The estimates
in the second and the third replication samples remain statistically insignificant
but the inclusion of the “outlier” does help move the estimates closer to GP’s. The
test of joint significance for the estimates of first mover’s effort, prize and their
interaction rejects the null effect in the first replication but not in the next two
Chapter 3 88
replications (SOCIAL-2 + outlier: χ2(3) = 7.39, p = 0.060; SOCIAL-2 + outlier:
χ2(3) = 4.25, p = 0.236; SOCIAL-3 + outlier: χ2(3) = 2.56, p = 0.465).
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Table 3.8 reports the corresponding MSM estimates. The new estimates for
the disappointment aversion parameter by excluding the “outlier subject” from
GP’s sample, though still statistically significant, is now smaller than the original
estimates both in terms of the average strength and the magnitude of heterogene-
ity across the population. These reductions translate to much weaker simulated
discouragement effects: at the highest prize of £3.90, a 40 slider increase in first
mover’s effort decreases second mover’s effort by 3 sliders for a second mover with
a high λ2,n, which is otherwise 5.1 sliders if not excluding the “outlier” subject.
When we add the observations for this “outlier” subject to the first replication
sample, both the strength and the heterogeneity of the disappointment aversion
parameter become highly statistically significant and at the comparable level with
original GP’s estimates. Correspondingly the strength of simulated discourage-
ment effects is also at the comparable level with GP’s. We note, however, that our
MSM results do not provide conclusive evidence that GP’s structural model fits
our replication sample well when we add the “outlier” subject from GP’s sample
to ours, since the Newey test for the validity of overidentifying restrictions rejects
the validity of the specification even allowing for non-quadratic costs of effort,
suggesting a bad goodness of fit. Similar to what we find from the reduced form
regressions, the strength and the heterogeneity of the disappointment aversion
parameter in the second and the third replications remain statistically insignifi-
cant but the inclusion of the “outlier” does help move the estimated strength of
discouragement effects closer to GP’s.
In sum, we find that one additional “outlier” subject in GP’s sample seems to
be the major reason why we observed discouragement effects and prize effects in
GP and it also partially explains why we failed to replicate GP’s central findings.
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3.8.4 Is Our Replication an “Informative” Replication
Failure?
From Table 3.2, the coefficient estimates of Prize and First Mover Catches×Prize
are not statistically significantly different from zero, but they are statistically
significantly different from original GP’s estimates if we pool GP’s and our sample
and set up a proper dummy variable for the observations from GP’s sample, hence
suggesting a replication failure.
Now the question is that whether the replication failure is truly “informative.”
Simonsohn (2015) suggests that an informative replication failure should fail to
reject the null of zero effect, but it should also reject the null of a smaller effect than
the original one. Then we shall conclude that the true effect does not exist or is
too small to be detected by a sample of the size of the original study. Simonsohn
(2015) discusses the definition and calculation of the small effect, d33%, in the
context of difference-in-means tests, however his idea can be easily applied to our
regression analysis, including random effects models.
Specifically, an approximate formula which links the size of the test, the power
of the test, the effect size, and the standard error of the effect size can be easily
derived as β/se(β) ≈ tn,1−α/2 + tn,p, where β is the effect size, n the size of the
sample, α the significant size of the test, and p the power of the test.22 We note
that se(β) is of the order 1/
√
Nt in random effects models, where N is the number
of subjects and t is the number of rounds (Snijders and Bosker, 1993, p. 248).
22Suppose the null hypothesis H0 : µ = 0 against H1 : µ < 0. The effect size is β and the
standard error is se(β). Note that it is customary to define that the effect size is positive even
if the specified alternative believed to be true is negative. The critical value at the left-tail is
tn,α/2 and therefore in a two-tailed test we can reject the null hypothesis at the significant level
of if the sample value is smaller than tn,α/2se(β). The power of the test (we neglect the right-tail
probability) is then given by p ≈ t−1n ( tn,α/2se(β)+βse(β) ), which implies that tn,p ≈ tn,α/2 + β/se(β).
Rearranging gives us β/se(β) ≈ tn,1−α/2 + tn,p.
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The small effect, d33%, is the effect size that a sample of the size of the original
study would have a 33% power. Since |β|√
Ntse(β)
in the regression analysis is of the
same order as Cohen’s-d in difference-in-means tests, where β is the estimated
parameter coefficient in GP, we could analogously define γ33% =
|β|√
Ntse(β)
as the
small effect in the regression analysis. Given the above formula, the original sample
size of Nt and the significant level of α, γ33% can be derived from
√
Ntγ33% ≈
tNt,1−α/2 + tNt,33%.
In our replication study, we have a sample of the size twice as large as the
original study (using only data from SOCIAL-2 and SOCIAL-3 as average efforts
are similar to GP’s) and our reported effect size is |τ |√
2Ntse(τ)
, where τ is the esti-
mated parameter coefficient in our pooled sample including the observations from
SOCIAL-2 and SOCIAL-3.23 How confidently can we conclude that the reported
effect size is even statistically significantly smaller than the small effect, γ33%? The
question boils down to what the probability of observing an effect size smaller than
the reported one under the null of γ33% is. To answer it, we need to compute p
from the equation |γ33% − |τ |√2Ntse(τ) |
√
2Nt = t2Nt,p. But 1 − p is the value that
we care about: the probability of observing an effect size that is smaller than the
reported one under the null of γ33%.
Consequently, 1 − p is 0.003 and 0.002 for the coefficients, Prize and First
Mover Catches×Prize, using the estimates from a random effects regression for the
pooled sample including the observations from SOCIAL-2 and SOCIAL-3. Hence
we reject the null of the small effects for both prize effects and discouragement
effects.
23Without shifting the efforts in SOCIAL-1 to be at the comparable level with those in GP, we
should only use the sample from SOCIAL-2 and SOCIAL-3. In fact, it would only strengthen our
conclusion if we would shift the efforts in SOCIAL-1 upward and include them in the following
power analysis.
Chapter 3 94
3.8.5 Summary
We replicated GP’s experiment and implemented the ASOCIAL treatment, which
corresponds more closely to GP’s asocial disappointment aversion model. We
collected three times as large sample size as GP’s. Surprisingly, we failed to
replicate GP’s central results of discouragement effects in all three replications.
However, contrary to our own hypothesis, interpersonal comparisons do not seem
to have any discernible influence on the behaviour of our second movers.
A re-examination of GP’s original sample shows that their discouragement
effects are likely to be merely driven by one “outlier” subject. This conjecture is
substantiated when we add this “outlier” to one of our samples and subsequently
recover the “missing” discouragement effect as well as the prize effect. Finally,
a power analysis following Simonsohn (2015) shows that the true discouragement
effect, if ever exists, must be too small to be detected using our current sample
size.
3.8.6 Tables for All ASOCIAL Treatments
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Table 3.9: Summary of Effort in All ASOCIAL Treatments
Paying
Round
Mean e1 SD e1 Mean e2 SD e2
Minimum Maximum
e1 e2 e1 e2
ASOCIAL-1
1 18.700 5.264 18.966 4.021 2 5 29 26
2 20.617 5.368 19.627 3.595 8 7 36 26
3 20.450 3.864 20.424 4.691 12 2 31 31
4 20.850 4.290 21.153 3.956 3 11 29 29
5 21.800 4.120 21.509 3.540 9 12 32 31
6 21.967 3.673 21.932 4.008 13 14 31 32
7 22.500 3.652 21.932 3.759 14 8 29 30
8 22.383 4.255 22.831 3.495 9 14 30 31
9 22.367 3.844 22.458 4.415 14 0 30 31
10 22.583 4.188 23.170 3.063 12 17 31 30
ASOCIAL-2
1 22.717 4.454 24.983 6.282 10 11 32 38
2 23.717 4.291 25.068 5.493 15 10 33 38
3 23.900 4.261 26.119 4.492 15 19 33 36
4 24.517 3.994 26.051 5.479 17 17 35 37
5 24.517 5.469 26.848 4.642 7 18 38 38
6 25.583 4.556 26.729 4.895 16 18 39 39
7 26.200 4.646 27.915 5.120 15 17 40 41
8 26.100 4.371 27.848 5.119 13 14 37 39
9 26.383 4.720 27.390 5.086 11 16 38 39
10 27.250 5.376 28.475 4.935 10 19 42 38
ASOCIAL-3
1 22.373 4.831 22.950 4.928 9 10 33 34
2 24.017 5.005 24.133 5.592 4 7 33 37
3 24.492 4.673 24.217 5.814 5 0 33 40
4 24.627 5.239 25.150 5.731 0 10 35 38
5 26.170 4.276 26.200 4.884 11 17 33 41
6 26.424 4.157 26.683 4.969 12 16 36 40
7 26.509 4.175 26.750 5.632 12 6 37 37
8 27.102 3.977 27.250 5.470 13 8 35 39
9 27.390 4.156 27.233 5.782 17 14 37 41
10 27.170 5.025 27.083 6.274 0 4 36 43
Note: ASOCIAL-i denotes the ith attempt. e1 and e2 denote, respectively, given number
and subject’s effort (the number of corrected positioned sliders) and SD the standard devi-
ation. There are 59, 59 and 60 subjects from, respectively, ASOCIAL-1, ASOCIAL-2 and
ASOCIAL-3.
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3.9 Appendix: Complementary Analysis Using
the Second Mover’s Clicks
We can do a similar exercise on descriptive statistics and reduced form analysis
using the clicking data.
Table 3.12: Summary of First and Second Mover Clicks
Paying
Round
Mean e1 SD e1 Mean e2 SD e2
Minimum Maximum
e1 e2 e1 e2
SOCIAL
1 30.067 15.676 33.783 16.690 0 0 70 80
2 27.767 14.851 28.400 16.638 0 0 59 70
3 28.433 15.820 28.100 15.318 0 0 60 73
4 27.367 16.759 26.033 15.675 0 0 65 68
5 26.033 16.217 25.450 15.987 0 0 62 59
6 24.917 16.008 21.117 13.910 0 0 66 57
7 25.033 16.611 23.183 15.803 0 0 64 61
8 25.050 15.567 22.133 14.739 0 0 64 69
9 25.700 16.317 21.100 14.851 0 0 63 70
10 24.233 16.599 21.300 13.745 0 0 68 54
ASOCIAL
1 / / 35.633 18.808 / 4 / 90
2 / / 30.017 16.103 / 1 / 65
3 / / 32.567 17.389 / 0 / 70
4 / / 30.333 18.492 / 0 / 66
5 / / 30.333 19.078 / 0 / 75
6 / / 31.167 21.145 / 0 / 67
7 / / 29.067 17.895 / 2 / 76
8 / / 29.300 19.262 / 0 / 75
9 / / 29.383 18.436 / 0 / 66
10 / / 27.767 19.442 / 0 / 72
Note: e1 and e2 denote, respectively, first and second movers’ clicks and SD the standard
deviation.
In the main text, we observe that catches vary from 8 to 51 for all subjects.
Clicks, however, vary more wildly from 0 to 90 as shown in Table 3.12. In the
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Figure 3.7: Distributions of Second Mover Clicks
Figure 3.8: Distributions of First Mover Clicks
SOCIAL treatment, average clicks of the second movers are higher than those
of the first movers at first few rounds but then become lower at later rounds,
perhaps reflecting that the second movers gradually clicked more carefully than
the first movers. Average clicks of the subjects from the ASOCIAL treatment are,
however, uniformly higher than both the first and second movers from the SOCIAL
treatment. Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 present the Kernel density distributions
of clicks for all type of subjects. Using average clicks per subject over the 10
rounds as the unit of observation, a Wilcoxon rank-sum test suggests that there
is no systematic difference in clicks between the first and second movers in the
SOCIAL treatment (two-tailed, p = 0.958). A Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-
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ranks test indicates a systematic difference in clicks between the second movers
from the SOCIAL and the counterpart subjects from the ASOCIAL treatments
(two-tailed, p = 0.060). For all types of our subjects, average clicks decrease from
up to around 35 to roughly 21 over the 10 rounds. Hence, despite a much quicker
decline in clicks than in catches, the statistical differences between the behaviours
of different types of subjects seem independent of whether we use catches and
clicks as a measure of effort. In any case, the results on average catches/clicks run
encounter to our own hypothesis discussed in section 3.7.
Figure 3.9: Lowess Regressions of Second Mover Clicks on First Mover Catches
Turning to the dynamic effects, the reaction curve of second mover’s clicks to
first mover’s catches, presented in Figure 3.9 also shows encouragement effects in
both treatments.
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We estimate the same random effects regressions but using the clicking data,
and the results show similar but somewhat weaker evidence for encouragement
effects compared to those findings using the catching data as presented in the
main text. In more detail, Table 3.13 reports the estimates of the same model
except for using second mover’s clicks as the dependent variable. We find statisti-
cally insignificant effects of first mover’s catches on second mover’s clicks in both
treatments. These might, however, be imprecise estimates due to a small sam-
ple. When we estimate the model using the pooled sample, we find a statistically
significant encouragement effect at the 10% level (p = 0.068). Furthermore, it
appears that the only treatment difference lies in average clicks: average clicks are
statistically significantly higher in the ASOCIAL treatment than in the SOCIAL
treatment at the 10% level (p = 0.064).
In addition, we provide some statistics for the first movers, Table 3.14 and
Figure 3.10 show that prizes have strong and statistically significant effects on first
mover’s catches and clicks. This observation justifies the importance of including
prize controls in the reduced form model explaining the second mover’s catches or
clicks.
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Table 3.13: Random Effects Regressions for Second Mover Clicks
SOCIAL ASOCIAL Full
(1) (2) (3)
First Mover Catches 0.186 0.147 0.202∗
(0.117) (0.103) (0.110)
Prize 3.419∗ 4.599∗∗∗ 3.606∗∗
(1.897) (1.673) (1.792)
First Mover Catches×Prize −0.010 −0.055 0.003
(0.060) (0.054) (0.057)
ASOCIAL 9.449∗
(5.102)
ASOCIAL× −0.074
First Mover Catches (0.156)
ASOCIAL×Prize 0.858
(2.526)
ASOCIAL×Prize× −0.052
First Mover Catches (0.081)
Constant 19.413∗∗∗ 24.629∗∗∗ 17.323∗∗∗
(3.856) (3.804) (3.729)
σω 10.345 16.107 13.532
σ 10.280 9.042 9.731
N×R 600 600 600
Hausman test for random
versus fixed effects
χ2(12) = 4.68 χ2(12) = 1.67 χ2(15) = 5.06
p = 0.968 p = 1.000 p = 0.992
Note: σω denotes the standard deviation of the time invariant individual specific random
effects and σ denotes the standard deviation of the time varying idiosyncratic errors which
are i.i.d. over rounds and second movers. Standard errors are in parentheses. All round
dummies (with the first round as the omitted category) are included and the estimates
are statistically significant at all rounds. ASOCIAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
observation belongs to the ASOCIAL treatment. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.14: Fixed Effects Regressions for First Mover Clicks/Catches
Clicks Catches
(1) (2)
Prize 4.417∗∗∗ 2.198∗∗∗
(0.594) (0.234)
Constant 20.070∗∗∗ 26.776∗∗∗
(2.470) (0.950)
σα 4.109 1.781
σ 15.512 6.111
N×R 600 600
Note: σα denotes the standard deviation of the time invariant individual specific fixed
effects and σ denotes the standard deviation of the time varying idiosyncratic errors which
are i.i.d. over rounds and first movers. Standard errors are in parentheses. All round
dummies (with the first round as the omitted category) are included and the estimates are
only marginally statistically significant at rounds 8 and 9 in Column (1), and the rest are
statistically insignificant. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Figure 3.10: Lowess Regressions of First Mover Clicks/Catches on Prize
4 Testing Contest Theory in the
Field and in the Lab: Strategic
Effects in Dynamic Team
Contests
4.1 Introduction
Collective competitions between teams or groups are prevalent in economic and
political activities, for example, globalised competitions where multi-national cor-
porations compete for market shares in each region, electoral competitions where
rival political parties campaign over legislative seats, and team sports tournaments
such as tennis and squash. The confrontation between teams can be conveniently
modelled as a dynamic team contest with multi-period “battles”; each team player
participates in one of the battles against her counterpart player from the rival
team, and these pairwise battles are executed in a successive order to determine
the winning team.
In dynamic contests, do dynamic behavioural effects between different periods
or different players naturally arise? The answer to this question is important for
104
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understanding of behaviours in contests as well as for the optimal design of con-
tests.1 Given their importance, we have seen considerable efforts from theorists
(see a survey in Kovenock and Roberson (2012)), who typically (but not always)
found some forms of dynamic effects, for instance, in elimination tournaments
within organisations (e.g., Rosen, 1986; Konrad and Kovenock, 2010), R&D races
between firms (e.g., Harris and Vickers, 1985, 1987), political campaigns and elec-
tions (e.g., Strumpf, 2002; Klumpp and Polborn, 2006; Konrad and Kovenock,
2009; Ha¨fner, 2015; Fu et al., 2015), and sports (e.g., McFall et al., 2009; Szyman-
ski, 2003).2 Complementing the theoretical work, empirical evidence on dynamic
effects are also found in the field usually using sports data (e.g., Malueg and Yates,
2010; Ferrall and Smith, 1999; Neugart and Richiardi, 2013). However, because
many key variables are not controlled for, or cannot be observed, in the field,
researchers are increasingly turning to laboratory experiments to test contest the-
ories (e.g., Zizzo, 2002; Eriksson et al., 2009; Gill and Prowse, 2012; Kuhnen and
Tymula, 2012; Mago et al., 2013). This chapter contributes to the understanding
of behaviours in a specific dynamic team contest by combining the advantages
of naturally occurring field data and laboratory experiments to provide a more
comprehensive analysis than any one of the approaches can offer alone.
Specifically, we analyse a field dataset from high-stakes professional squash
team tournaments (820 team matches) and conduct a complementary laboratory
experiment. The contest structure in the field and in the lab is a “best-of-three”
contest between two teams. In such a contest, six players from competing teams
are paired in three pairwise component matches and each pair competes head-to-
1Gradstein and Konrad (1999) point out:“. . . contest structures are the outcome of a careful
design with the view of attaining a variety of objectives, one of which is maximisation of efforts
by contenders.”
2Also see Konrad (2009, Chapter 8), Konrad (2012), and Dechenaux et al. (2015, Section 4)
for more examples and reference.
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head on each of these component matches, which are to be played out sequentially.
The winning team is the one that prevails in at least two component matches. Fu
et al. (2015) theoretically show that dynamic effects among component matches
exhibit strategic neutrality : given players’ characteristics the outcomes of pre-
vious component matches do not affect the outcome of the current component
match.3 This theoretical property is fairly robust to various contest rules(e.g., all-
pay auction, generalised Tullock contest), information structures(e.g., complete
information, two-sided incomplete information), and formulations of payoffs.
In the squash tournament, after the first component match ends, individual
players will learn about whether their team is leading or falling behind. Examining
the effect on the outcomes of second component matches of their teams being in
the leading or the lagging position, our empirical results do not allow us to reject
strategic neutrality. We also test our hypothesis on third component matches and
find similar results.
However as a test of strategic neutrality, the evidence remains inconclusive
because strategic neutrality would also follow if, for example, instead of trading off
effort costs and probability of winning, as is stated in the theory, players simply try
as hard as possible to win their battles. Such a psychological motivation might be
shaped by high levels of scrutiny from team coaches and audiences, whose presence
compels athletes to give their best efforts under any circumstance, or simply by a
professional norm that players should just play to their best for their teams.
Overall, the squash data are consistent with the key game theoretical predic-
tion of strategic neutrality in team contests. However, in order to disentangle
strategic neutrality from psychological motivations, we need to turn to a lab ex-
3Recently, Feng and Lu (2015) extend the insights by Fu et al. (2015) and analyse effort-
maximising optimal prize allocations in best-of-three individual and team contests.
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periment, which permits greater control over effort cost functions and observations
of individual efforts.
The lab contest resembles the field contest structure and matches closely with
the theoretical setup. Each player from a three-player team competes against a
player from a rival team by working on a tangible task, called the ball-catching task
as introduced in chapter 2. Allowing players to do something intense and tangible
while still keeping effort costly in pecuniary terms, the ball-catching task not only
mimics the intense nature of competitive activities, but forces players to trade-off
the benefits of higher probability of winning with the costs of higher effort—a
crucial part of the mechanism underlying strategic neutrality. The experiment
allows for a direct test of whether the neutrality results are strategically-based
or psychologically-based: if the theoretical prediction is also borne out in the lab
the incentive must be strategically-based; the psychological motivation loses its
explanatory power in such an abstract environment with a low level of scrutiny
and of pressure for norm compliance, and with players having to spend pecuniary
cost of effort in return for higher output.
In short, by examining the outcomes of second component matches, our ex-
perimental results provide strong evidence of strategic neutrality, consistent with
the field findings. At the level of individual efforts, however, we find non-neutral
effects on second mover’s effort of first component match outcomes. Specifically,
second movers whose teams were leading were less likely to drop out by exerting
zero effort than those from lagging teams. The asymmetric dropping-out pattern,
which contributes to the non-neutral effects on average second mover’s effort, ap-
pears in turn to be mainly driven by a gender difference: women dropped out
less often than men (across gender difference), especially when their teams were
leading (within gender difference). Our finding of the across gender difference in
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dropping out is not necessarily inconsistent with the received literature on gender
differences in competitive preferences, which suggests that men are more competi-
tive than women in deciding to enter competitions (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund,
2011)), since women could be less inclined to enter competitions because they
anticipate that they find it harder to quit. However, the within gender difference
reflects the strategic aspects of dropping-out behaviors in teams and thus cannot
be easily accommodated by existing theories of gender difference in preferences..4
Overall, we find both field and lab evidence for strategic neutrality in best-
of-three team contests, particularly at the level of match outcomes. In contrast,
the literature on dynamic contests has almost exclusively focused on individual
contests where two generic individuals have to compete repeatedly on multiple
battlefields. For example, in best-of-(2n+1) individual contests, a non-strategic
effect—strategic momentum has been shown both theoretically (Ferrall and Smith,
1999; Klumpp and Polborn, 2006; Konrad and Kovenock, 2009; Sela, 2011) and
empirically (McFall et al., 2009; Malueg and Yates, 2010; Mago et al., 2013; Ir-
fanoglu et al., 2014); (see however Ferrall and Smith (1999) and Fu et al. (2013) for
countervailing evidence in the field and in the lab respectively). More generally,
strategic neutrality in best-of-three team contests can be contrasted to findings
about non-neutral behavioural effects of interim performance feedback in multi-
stage tournaments between individuals, in theories (e.g., Strumpf, 2002; Ederer,
2010; Goltsman and Mukherjee, 2011), in field studies (Magnus and Klaassen,
4Amongst a few papers that examined the role of gender in team competition, Healy and Pate
(2011) and Dargnies (2012) focused on gender differences in choosing to compete either in teams
or as individuals. They found that while women preferred to compete in teams, men preferred
to compete as individuals. Dargnies (2012) additionally identified this gender difference to the
fact that men tended to fear being the victims of the other free-riders in the teams. Ironically,
our experimental results suggest that men tended to be strategic “free-riders” or “opportunists”
themselves; women behaved as if they were more competitive than men, for women seemed more
“irresponsible” by dropping out less often, especially when their teams were in advantageous
positions in competition.
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2001; Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta, 2010; Berger and Pope, 2011; Kocher et al.,
2012; Neugart and Richiardi, 2013; Pope and Schweitzer, 2011) and in experiments
(e.g., Berger and Pope, 2011; Eriksson et al., 2009; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2011;
Gill and Prowse, 2012; Kuhnen and Tymula, 2012; Ludwig and Lu¨nser, 2012). The
neutral dynamic effects in best-of-three team contests, as empirically established
in this chapter, thus present an interesting case in which group behaviour differs
systematically from individual behaviour.
The only other paper that, as far as we know, also empirically examined best-of-
three team contests is Fu et al. (2013), who employed a laboratory experiment and
found evidence consistent with strategic neutrality. Their experiment, however,
does not allow a distinction of strategic neutrality and psychological motivations
largely because of their employment of a real effort task where researchers typically
have no control over effort cost functions. We shall discuss the differences between
their experiment and ours in the discussion section of the laboratory experiment.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Session 4.2, we de-
scribe the model and derive testable hypotheses. Session 4.3 presents the field
evidence using the squash data. In Session 4.4 we discuss the lab experiment.
Session 4.5 concludes with additional remarks.
4.2 Theory of Best-of-Three Team Contests
This section is based on Fu et al. (2015) who developed a general theory of best-
of-(2n+1) team contests. We derive testable predictions in a simple best-of-three
version, which is also the game empirically examined both in the field study and
in the lab experiment.
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4.2.1 The Model
In the basic setup, two teams compete in a contest for a final trophy W , which
is shared equally among winning team members. Six risk neutral players from
two competing team are paired in three pairwise component matches, which are
played out sequentially. We refer to the paired players in a first component match
as “first movers,” pairs in a second component match “second movers,” and pairs
in a third component match “third movers.” The team that prevails in at least
two component matches is awarded the trophy.
The component match is modelled as an all-pay auction with incomplete in-
formation. But as will be discussed later, the results hold under a much wider
range of situations. Two rival players simultaneously exert their efforts, bi(t), i =
A,B; t = 1, 2, 3, where i denotes the team that a player belongs to and t the
participating order. Players’ innate abilities, modelled as their marginal costs of
effort, are allowed to be heterogeneous, but are private information to each player.
However, it is common knowledge that each player’s marginal cost ci(t) is inde-
pendently distributed over [
¯
ci(t), c¯i(t)] with twice continuously differentiable density
function fi(t)(·) > 0.
It can be readily inferred from the structure of the game that in each component
match, a pair always competes for a common effective prize spread, which is for
each player the difference in continuation values from winning and from losing
a component match. The continuation value is the expected gross payoff from
winning or losing her component match assessed by the participating player just
before the start of her component match but after observing the outcomes of all
previous component matches. Since the sum of continuation values at any state
of the world for the two rival players always equals the trophy (unless the current
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component match is trivial, i.e., one team has won the first two component matches
in a best-of-three team contest), the effective prize spreads are always the same
for the two rival players (Observation 1 in Fu et al. (2015)).
To demonstrate this observation, we focus on the behaviours of second movers.
First consider the second mover from the leading team (let the leading team be
team A). The second mover’s continuation value from winning her component
match is the final trophy: W ; her continuation value from losing and reaching
the third component match is W · PA(3), representing the expected gross payoff
from losing assessed by this second mover, where PA(3) represents her third mover
teammate’s probability of winning the third component match. The effective prize
spread for the second mover from the leading team is, therefore, W · (1 − PA(3)).
Now consider the rival second mover from the lagging team B. The rival second
mover’s continuation value from winning is W · PB(3) = W · (1 − PA(3)), where
1−PA(3) is the complementary probability of winning the third component match
by her own team’s third mover; her continuation value from losing is 0. The
effective prize spread for the second mover from the lagging team is, therefore, also
W · (1−PA(3)). Note that a victory for one second mover must be accompanied by
the defeat of the rival second mover and, hence, at any state of the world the sum
of continuation values for the two second movers must equal the final trophy: in
the state when the second mover from the leading team wins, continuation values
are W and 0 for herself and her rival; in the state when the same second mover
loses, continuation values are W ·PA(3) and W · (1−PA(3)) for herself and her rival.
Now we shall write down the utility function for the player i in the tth com-
ponent match against the player j as
pii(t)(bi(t), ci(t)) = V · Pr(bj(t)(cj(t)) ≤ bi(t))− ci(t) · bi(t), (4.1)
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where V is the common effective prize spread. bi(t)(ci(t)) and bj(t)(cj(t)), i, j = A,B,
represent the bidding (effort) functions for the two rival players respectively, and
both functions are strictly decreasing in realised marginal cost whenever the effort
is non-negative. The utility function is thus given by the player’s expected payoff
from competing in her component match, i.e., the effective prize spread multiplied
by the probability of winning the component match, minus her effort cost.
Following Amann and Leininger (1996), it can be shown that at the unique
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in each component match, each player’s effort depends
on the cost distributions of both rival agents and is linearly correlated with the
common effective prize spread, i.e., bi(t)(·, V ) = V · bi(t)(·, V = 1) (Observation 2
in Fu et al. (2015)). Let µi(t) be player i(t)’s expected probability of winning her
component match. The equilibrium stochastic outcome, defined as (µ∗A(t), µ
∗
B(t)),
in component match t, then depends only on the cost distributions of both rival
players because given the linear equilibrium bidding strategy, each player’s proba-
bility of winning the component match is independent of the value of the effective
prize spread, and thus the size of the trophy.
Hence, the key proposition, which we label strategic neutrality, immediately
follows.
Proposition 1. (Theorem 1 in Fu et al. (2015)) Whenever the continuation values
for both players are non-zero, i.e., in a non-trivial component match, the equilib-
rium stochastic outcome of their component match only depends on the charac-
teristics of both competing players, independent of the previous component match
outcomes and the size of the trophy.
In the special case of a best-of-three team contest, strategic neutrality implies
that the stochastic outcome of the second component match is not distorted by
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the realised first component match outcome. Note that the proposition does not
imply that second mover’s effort is also independent of the realised first component
match outcome. In fact, this implication is true only if the third component match
is between two completely symmetric players since then the effective prize spread
is held fixed at half of the trophy.
Fu et al. (2015) show that strategic neutrality holds under much broader set-
tings. As long as the contest success function is homogeneous of degree zero,
including the popular family of the ratio-form contest success functions (Skaper-
das, 1996) and the all-pay auction, strategic neutrality remains intact. Moreover,
it also holds under various information structures as long as the information struc-
ture is symmetric (i.e. a player’s characteristics are symmetrically known to all
other players), including important classes of complete information and two-sided
private information. Therefore, strategic neutrality is fairly insensitive to con-
test rules, information structures, strategies (effort outlays are only required to be
non-negative), and payoffs (the size of the trophy does not matter).
Two factors may, however, affect the neutrality result. First, we have assumed
constant marginal costs of effort and risk neutrality. If either of them does not
hold, the equilibrium stochastic outcome is partially dependent on the value of
the effective prize spread in that a player’s equilibrium effort is no longer a linear
function of the common effective prize spread. This implies that in our empirical
strategy, we must either control the value of the effective prize spread or directly
control effort cost functions and risk attitudes. As will become clear, we will take
up the first approach in the field study and the second one in the lab experiment.
Second, we have assumed that there is no private (pecuniary or psychological)
reward in each component match. In fact, we can relax this assumption by al-
lowing a pair to have the same private reward. However, such private rewards, if
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asymmetric, can lead to non-neutral strategic effects since two rival agents would
have different effective prize spreads. Both in the squash matches and in the lab
experiment, no monetary private reward was awarded to winning players, although
we cannot preclude the absence of any psychological private reward.
Strategic neutrality in a best-of-three team contest stands in sharp contrast to
strategic momentum or discouragement effect in a best-of-three individual contest
(Konrad and Kovenock, 2009). Strategic momentum posits that the player who
wins the first component match is disproportionately more likely to win the second
component match, given both rival players’ characteristics. The reason is that the
effective prize spreads of the second component match are no longer common for
two rival players because both players have to internalise the expected costs of
effort from the third component match. Intuitively, the leading player has higher
incentives to win the second component match in order to save on her effort costs
in the otherwise occurring third component match, while the lagging player has
the opposite incentive. In the team contest, however, there is no such incentive
since a player does not have to bear the costs from any other component matches.
4.2.2 Model Predictions
To summarise, strategic neutrality implies the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Given players’ characteristics, a second mover’s probability of win-
ning the second component match is independent of their team’s being in the leading
or the lagging position.
In the lab experiment, we can afford to test more hypotheses with regards
to team match outcomes as well as individual efforts, and will present them in
subsection 4.4.2.
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4.3 Field Evidence From the Best-of-Three
Team Squash Match Data
4.3.1 Field Data
To test the theoretical predictions, we examine the behaviour of professional
squash players in 31 highest-stakes professional squash team championship tour-
naments during 1998–2014, including Men’s World Team Championship, Women’s
World Team Championship, and Women’s European Team Championship.5 The
data, available at http://www.squashinfo.com, include 820 national team
matches with game-level scores and monthly updated world rankings for all
second movers. All of the tournaments begin with a qualification stage using
a Round-Robin type tournament followed by an elimination stage adopting the
Monrad system.6 This tournament format requires teams to have lots of matches
and maintain player involvement right through to the end of the tournament until
a final position is produced for each team. The data include matches from both
stages.
Professional team squash data is particularly suited to test the theoretical
predictions. A team match follows exactly the same best-of-three rule as in the
theory. Each national team normally comprises 3–5 players. Before a match, the
identity of players and the order in which they will play the component matches
are predetermined and each player can play at most once in a match. Thus, the
5Both World championships are biannual events and the European championship is an annual
event. We do not include Men’s European Team Championship because this tournament adopts
a peculiar “best-of-four” game form with ties broken by points count back.
6The details of Monrad system are complicated. See its adoption in squash tournaments at
http://www.englandsquashandracketball.com/system/files/2099/original/The Court
Challenge Series - Competition Organisers Guide.pdf. Since we only focus on the
dynamics within each team match, the specific format of the tournament is inessential for our
analysis.
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structure of a team squash match corresponds to the theoretic best-of-three team
contest (all-pay auction) with complete information.7 Since a team coach usu-
ally has flexibility in choosing the three players for each match, both the previous
team matches and the shadow of future competition are unlikely to affect indi-
vidual decisions in the current match as much as they might be in the individual
tournament.8 For those reasons, we will treat each team match as an independent
observation in the following analysis despite the complex tournament format.
Table 4.1: Actual and Simulated Match Outcomes in the Field Data
Men’s World Women’s
World
Women’s
European
No. of matches 362 228 230
Actual
% of matches with a final
score of 2:0
69.3 67.5 64.3
Simulated
% of matches with a final
score of 2:0
72.0 76.0 69.2
Note: Simulated final scores are calculated based on a simple criterion: the player with
higher ranking wins in each component match. The final score is then simply adding up the
wins and loses from relevant component matches.
The world rankings are based on ranking points earned by players competing
in PSA individual tournaments according to how far they advance and the prize
money. The total number of points a player earns over the previous 12 months
7It is conceivable that teammates who often attend training camp together before a major
tournament may know of the competence of each other more accurately than players from rival
teams. If this superior knowledge implies deviations from players’ skill levels as reflected at cur-
rent world rankings, this fact will nullify strategic neutrality. However, since in the professional
squash world there are much more individual tournaments which rankings are based on, the
concern about “hidden” information of players’ competence does not appear to be warranted in
reality.
8In some individual tournaments, previous matches and future competition may affect per-
formance in the current match. See, for example, Brown and Minor (2014) for an analysis using
data from professional individual tennis tournaments.
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is divided by a divisor that increases in the number of tournaments played. The
PSA world rankings are then a rank order of average earned points by all players,
and are updated monthly. More important for our empirical analysis, the rank-
ings are based on players’ performance in individual tournaments and therefore
uncorrelated with their performance in past team tournaments. We will use the
PSA rankings as indicators of players’ athletic strengths.
Table 4.1 shows some summary statistics reported separately for each type of
championship. The match ends with a final score of 2:0 in approximately 67.3%
of all matches. More 2:0 than 2:1, at first glance, appears to suggest a non-neutral
strategic effect, but it might merely reflect that stronger second movers tend to
team up with better teammates. We can examine the influence of the within-
team ability matching by simulating the match outcomes using the PSA rankings.
Based on a simple criterion that the higher-ranked player wins the component
match against her paired lower-ranked opponent, we find that the simulated final
score ends up 2:0 in about 72.3% of all matches. Hence, the within-team positively
assortative ability matching could confound the evidence of strategic effects, and
therefore must be taken into account when performing empirical analysis.
4.3.2 Field Results
In this sub-section, we will present empirical tests of the theoretical predictions.
First, we present descriptive statistics by showing that the propensity of higher-
ranked second movers to lose is independent of the outcomes of the first component
matches. Next, we estimate two econometric models to formally test the predic-
tions. The first one is a single equation model that explains the outcomes of the
second component matches. The second one takes into account the potential se-
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lectivity bias, which, as will be shown, does not alter the results from the single
equation model.
Descriptive Statistics
The theory predicts that higher-ranked second movers are equally likely to lose
their component matches whether their teams are in the leading position or in the
lagging position. In Table 4.2, we calculate the percentages of cases where higher-
ranked second movers lost their component matches in three different ways. Panel
(1) shows the statistics for the full sample in which the percentage of losing after
the team won the first component match is 16.6% and that after the team lost
the first component match is 31.4%. On average, higher-ranked second movers
are 14.8% more likely to lose if they are in the lagging teams (Fisher’s exact test,
p < 0.001), implying discouragement effects on second movers from the lagging
team. Notice that there are more leading cases than lagging ones, again suggesting
that there is a positive correlation in rankings between a first mover and a second
mover from the same team.
To adjust for potential biases induced by a positive correlation in rankings
between team members, Panel (2) presents the statistics using the sub-sample
where the ranking ratio of a higher-ranked second mover and the paired lower-
ranked second mover is larger than 0.8 so that the potential ability differential
between two second movers is not too large. The difference in percentages of
losing does not reduce (14.0%) but becomes statistically insignificant (Fisher’s
exact test, p = 0.177). Note that the 0.8 cutoff, albeit arbitrary, results in almost
equal numbers of leading and lagging cases, reflecting an improved control for the
assortative ability matching.
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Table 4.2: Percentage of Cases Where Higher-Ranked Second Movers Lost in the
Field Data
(1) Full sample
Leading 94/565 = 16.6%
Lagging 80/255 = 31.4%
(2) RatioRank2 > 0.8
Leading 22/51 = 43.1%
Lagging 32/56 = 57.1%
(3) RatioRank2 > 0.8 & RatioRank3 > 0.8
Leading 19/41 = 46.3%
Lagging 22/44 = 50.0%
Note: RatioRank2 denotes the ranking ratio of a higher-ranked second mover and the paired
lower-ranked second mover. RatioRank3 denotes the ranking ratio of a higher-ranked second
mover’s third mover teammate and the paired opponent third mover.
Lastly, the results from Panel (2) may still favour discouragement effects be-
cause as discussed in the theory the prediction does not hold if we relax the
assumptions of constant marginal costs of effort and risk neutrality (recall the
discussion in subsection 4.2.1 that the outcomes of previous component matches
would affect the value of the common effect prize spread, and if either assumption
is violated, it would in turn affect the outcome of the current component match).
One way to control these two factors, to some degree, is to examine the cases where
third movers’ rankings are also close and therefore to keep the common effective
prize spread constant for all second movers. Given two symmetric third movers
the common effective prize spread for a second mover always equals one half of
the final trophy, implying that each second mover would have ex-ante equal prob-
ability of winning the second component match independent of the outcome of the
first component match.9 Panel (3) reflects this attempt by focusing only on the
9Strictly speaking, even after controlling RatioRank3 > 0.8, the unobserved size of the final
trophy can still distort the outcome of a second component match even for completely symmetric
second movers. If homogeneous second movers have non-neutral risk attitudes, their valuations
of the effective prize spread can still be different even when the third movers are completely
symmetric. Formally, assuming a non-linear utility function, U , the “effective utility spread”
for the second mover in the lagging position is U(v/2) − U(0) and that for the second mover
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sub-sample where both the ranking ratio of a higher-ranked second mover and the
paired lower-ranked second mover, and the ranking ratio of their respective third
movers are larger than 0.8. The difference in percentages of losing becomes much
smaller (3.6%) and is not statistically significantly different from zero (Fisher’s
exact test, p = 0.829).
Overall, descriptive statistics provide support for the theoretical prediction. In
the following, we formally test the predictions by estimating econometric models.
Single Equation Models: Estimating Strategic Effects
We test the theoretical prediction using the following specification:
Win2(is) = β0+β1Leading(is)+β2RatioRank2(is)+β3RatioRank3(is)+δ+ω(s)+(is),
(4.2)
where the dependent variable is an indicator variable: Win2(is) = 1 if the higher-
ranked second mover won the second component match in match i of tournament
s, and zero otherwise. Similarly, the indicator variable Leading(is) = 1 if the
higher-ranked second mover’s first mover teammate won the first component match
in match i of tournament s, and zero otherwise. RatioRank2(is) represents the
second movers’ ability differential, measured by the ratio of the rankings of the
higher-ranked second mover and that of his/her paired lower-ranked second mover.
RatioRank3(is) represents the third movers’ ability differential, measured by the
ratio of the ranking of the higher-ranked second mover’s third mover teammate
and that of his/her paired third mover. δ captures the home advantage of whether
the higher-ranked second mover’s team played on the home field, the neutral field
in the leading position is U(v) − U(v/2). These two effective utility spreads are typically not
exactly the same. In the lab experiment, we both control the size of the final trophy and measure
individual risk attitude to control this additional field confound.
Chapter 4 121
Table 4.3: Determinants of Second Component Match Outcomes in the Field Data
Dep. Var.: Higher-ranked
second mover won
Coefficient Estimates (std. err.)
(1) (2) (3)
Leading 0.147∗∗∗ 0.052 0.006
(0.033) (0.043) (0.046)
RatioRank2 −0.564∗∗∗ −0.559∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.073)
RatioRank3 −0.029
(0.019)
Home 0.049
(0.133)
Neutral 0.024
(0.084)
Constant 0.686∗∗∗ 0.991∗∗∗ 1.197∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.041) (0.093)
Fixed effects for each tournament No No Yes
R2 0.028 0.159 0.214
N(matches) 820 820 453
Note: All equations are estimated using linear probability regressions with a robust
variance estimator that is clustered at the event level. Clustered standard errors in
parentheses. *** p < 0.01
or the opponent field (with the opponent field providing the omitted category).
ω(s) is a matrix of tournament event fixed effects and (is) is the error term.
The theory predicts that the coefficient of Leading should be 0. While
RatioRank2(is) imposes a restriction on the second movers’ ability differential,
RatioRank3(is) helps control, to some degree, the potential influence of underlying
non-constant marginal costs of effort and non-neutral risk attitudes for similar
reasons when we presented the descriptive statics in Panel (3) in Table 4.2. All
equations are estimated using a linear probability model with a robust variance
estimator that is clustered at the event level.10
10In the following regression analyses whenever the dependent variable is binary, all equations
are estimated using linear probability (panel data) regressions. Results from corresponding
probit specifications are quantitatively close.
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Table 4.3 reports estimates of Equation 4.2 with various controls. Consistent
with the descriptive evidence, the coefficient estimate of Leading is not statisti-
cally significantly different from zero in the full sample if second movers’ ability
differentials are controlled. When the controls for third movers’ ability differen-
tials, home advantage, and tournament fixed effects are added, the estimate is even
closer to zero and remains insignificant.11 Overall, we find support for strategic
neutrality from the single equation estimates.
Testing for Selectivity Bias
In this subsection, we ask whether the results from the single equation models are
robust. In particular, the primary concern is that there may exist some unobserved
characteristics of a team that influence all of its players’ performance such that
being in a leading position is correlated with these unobserved variables. The
unobserved characteristics may include team morale and training status at the
moment of the match. As a consequence, if we do not treat the variable Leading
as endogenous, we may have overstated the effect of being in a leading position
on the second mover’s performance. Given the above single equation estimates,
this implies that the coefficient of Leading may have a negative size, which is to
be interpreted as an encouragement effect on the lagging team.
To properly deal with the selection problem on the unobservables, we estimate
an instrumental-variables linear probability model by using RatioRank1 (the rank-
ing ratio of a higher-ranked second mover’s first mover teammate and the paired
first mover) to instrument Leading. The IV results rest on the premise that
RatioRank1 is a valid instrument. To be so, the excluded instrument must satisfy
11Note that there is a loss of some observations because of some missing information in
RatioRank3. If we use the same sub-sample to re-estimate the model specification used in
Column (2) of Table 4.3, the coefficient estimate of Leading remains statistically insignificant.
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Table 4.4: Determinants of Second Component Match Outcomes in the Field Data:
IV Estimates
Dep. Var.: Higher-ranked
second mover won
Second-stage Estimates (std. err.)
(1) (2)
Leading 0.052 −0.075
(0.161) (0.174)
RatioRank2 −0.545∗∗∗ −0.569∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.127)
RatioRank3 −0.044∗∗∗
(0.016)
Home 0.163
(0.169)
Neutral 0.066
(0.120)
Constant 0.986∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.146)
Fixed effects for each tournament No Yes
R2 0.151 0.215
N(matches) 565 353
Note: All equations are estimated using linear probability regressions with Leading
as the endogenous variable instrumented by the variables appearing in equation (2).
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01
that (i) it strongly influences the prospect of winning the first component match,
and (ii) conditional on RatioRank2 it is uncorrelated with the error term in Equa-
tion 4.2. It is easy to show the first qualification. In a probit model that explains
the probability of winning the first component match, the coefficient estimate of
RatioRank1 is highly statistically significant (p < 0.001). The second qualification
can also be confirmed by including RatioRank1 in Equation 4.2. If the excluded
instrument can only influence the probability of winning in the second compo-
nent match through the channel of whether being in the leading team or not,
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then its estimated coefficient in the single equation model should be statistically
insignificant. This is indeed the case (p = 0.767).12
Formally, following Equation 4.2, the endogenous variable Leading can be
written as
Leading(is) = γ0+γ1RatioRank1(is)+γ2RatioRank2(is)+γ3RatioRank3(is)+δ+ω(s)+pi(is),
(4.3)
where all the covariates but RatioRank1(is) are the same as in Equation 4.2 and
pi(is) is an error term uncorrelated with (is). RatioRank1(is) serves as an excluded
instrument that provides an identification for the system consisting of Equation 4.2
and Equation 4.3. All equations are estimated using an IV linear probability model
with a robust variance estimator that is clustered at the event level.
Table 4 reports the second-stage results from two-stage least-squared estimates
of the system. The results show that the coefficient estimates of Leading are sta-
tistically insignificant and quantitatively close to the corresponding single equation
estimates, indicating that potential endogeneity does not systematically bias the
estimates.
4.3.3 Strategic Neutrality or Psychological Motivations?
There is an important concern with the evidence presented so far: the above
analyses provide consistent but not conclusive evidence for the strategic mechanism
behind the neutrality result. For example, instead of carefully trading off effort
costs and probability of winning, as is implicitly assumed in the theory, players
12It should be noted, however, that it is not a formal test if the single equation model is
misspecified. But it does give us a clear indication of the patterns in the data. Also, given the
independent nature of component matches it is implausible that conditional on second movers’
ability differential the first movers’ ability differential will directly affect the outcome of the
second component match before the first component match ever begins.
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simply try as hard as possible to win their battles. Such a motivation seems
natural if the effort just involves physical, physiological or psychological exertion.
The psychological motivation could be strengthened by a professional norm that
a professional player should just play to her best. The strength of such a norm
could be shaped by high levels of scrutiny in the field: as Levitt and List (2007,
p. 157) put it, “the moral cost of violating a social norm increases as scrutiny
. . . rises.” As a result, the psychological principle implies the neutrality result as
well as the strategic incentive does.
One (indirect) strategy to shed light on this issue is to look into the individual
component matches, each of which is itself a best-of-five individual contest between
paired players. In any best-of-(2n+1) individual match, the strategic model pre-
dicts that a leading position at any stage discourages the laggard from winning the
next set (we call a “component match” in a best-of-five individual contest a set),
a phenomenon called “strategic momentum” or “discouragement effect” (Konrad
and Kovenock, 2009). On the other hand, the competing psychological motiva-
tion again predicts neutrality between sets within individual component matches.
Therefore, given the differential predictions of the strategic model for dynamic
effects in individual contests, any evidence of non-neutral dynamic effects within
individual component matches implies that individual players do have strategic
considerations, and in turn implies that the observed neutrality between individ-
ual component matches is more likely to be strategically-based.
We test the theoretical predictions for the set outcomes within individual com-
ponent matches using the following specification:
Wink(is) = α0+α1LeadingMargink(is)+α2RatioRankk(is)+δ+ω(s)+νk(is), (4.4)
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where the dependent variable is an indicator variable: Wink(is) = 1 if the higher-
ranked player won the ith set of component match k of tournament s, and zero
otherwise. LeadingMargink(is) calculates the difference in the number of sets the
high-ranked player won so far relative to his/her opponent before the ith set in
component match k of tournament s. RatioRankk(is) represents the players’ ability
differential, measured by the ratio of the ranking of the higher-ranked player and
that of the paired opponent.
In a best-of-five individual contest, we could examine strategic effects at the
second, the third, and the fourth sets. LeadingMargin can take on the value of 0
or 1 at the beginning of the second set, 0, 1 or 2 at the beginning of the third set
and 1 or 2 at the beginning of the fourth set.13 Note that LeadingMargin captures
the current state within a component match, which is all that matters from the
theoretical viewpoint. Nonetheless, we also estimate an alternative specification
in which we use indicator variables for whether the high-ranked player won in
each of the previous sets instead of LeadingMargin, thereby allowing for a finer
examination of dynamic effects between sets.
Table 4.5 reports estimates of the parameters in Equation 4.4 for all higher-
ranked players. The results show a positive impact of LeadingMargin on the
probability of winning the current set, be it the second, third or fourth set. Fur-
thermore, estimates from Columns (3) and (5) show that strategic momentum
occurs at every stage, meaning that each further victory in the previous sets con-
tributes to a higher probability of winning the current set, consistent with the
theoretical predictions.14 Together, the evidence suggests that individual players
13The fifth set is a case where LeadingMargin is always 2.
14We also estimate the same model separately for each mover type and report estimates in
Table 4.9 in section 4.6. The results for each mover type show similar strategic momentum to
those for all players. Following the strategy of Malueg and Yates (2010), additional confirma-
tion of strategic momentum is from examining whether a player’s probability of winning the
Chapter 4 127
do seem to engage in strategic considerations, which are reflected by the observed
strategic momentum within component matches, and therefore provides more sub-
stantive evidence for strategic neutrality between component matches.15
4.3.4 Robustness
Although we have mainly focused on second component matches, we can also
examine whether the outcome of the third component match is independent of the
outcome of the first component match as the theory predicts. Note that a third
component match is non-trivial only if the match score is thus far 1:1. We only
focus on non-trivial third component matches. Table 4.10 in section 4.6 reports
estimates of a model that explains the outcomes of third component matches
from the perspective of higher-ranked third movers. The coefficient estimates of
Leading, which are not statistically significantly different from zero, confirm that
strategic neutrality is also supported in third component matches.
In our main specification we do not include individual-specific fixed effects be-
cause a large fraction of players has only appeared once in our full sample: among
all higher-ranked second movers, over 60% players appear only once. Moreover,
since even the same player’s athletic strength and physical fitness may as well
vary widely over the years (recall that all tournaments are held either biannu-
ally or annually), it is not terribly sensible to add individual-specific fixed effects.
(non-trivial) fifth set is independent of the outcome of the fourth set. We do not reject the null
hypothesis, and this result again favours the strategic model rather than the potential psycho-
logical momentum in individual contests, that is, the fifth set outcome would be affected by the
realisations of previous sets, as discussed by Malueg and Yates (2010).
15This result is consistent with the field findings by Malueg and Yates (2010) and experimental
evidence by Mago et al. (2013), but contradicts the experimental findings by Fu et al. (2013).
Ferrall and Smith (1999) also studies a best-of-(2n+1) type tournament using field data from
professional baseball, basketball, and hockey championships, but they found neutral dynamic
effects. The mixed evidence on dynamic effects may reflect differences in experimental designs
as well as field environments.
Chapter 4 128
Nonetheless, we could estimate fixed effects panel data models with the same co-
variates appearing in Equation 4.2. Table 4.11 in section 4.6 reports estimates
and the results are quantitatively similar to the estimates reported in Table 4.3.
The same exercise can be applied to the estimation of strategic momentum within
individual component matches. Table 4.12 in section 4.6 produces estimates that
are also quantitatively similar to those reported in Table 4.5.
A final and minor point is that one might worry that those matches from
qualifying stages are presumably with lower stakes in expectations, especially for
those strong teams. All of our results are, however, robust if we only focus on the
subset which only comprises matches from elimination stages.
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4.3.5 Discussion
In short, the squash data support strategic neutrality in team contests. The
comparisons between dynamic effects between and within individual component
matches suggest that the psychological incentive which might also lead to neutral-
ity in team matches seems unconvincing. After all, professional players usually do
have their strategies about how to keep stamina during the course of the game,
rather than strive for every points in the game. However, the evidence remains
indirect and therefore not fully conclusive. The problem with a direct identifica-
tion of strategic neutrality is that we cannot observe costs of effort, if any, in the
field (recall that considerations about saving on effort costs are key parts of the
underlying strategic incentive). A clear inference may also be clouded by some
confounding factors such as unobserved individual ability differences,16 private
valuations of winning, and other environmental distractions.
The identification problem associated with testing the theory using the field
data calls for further examinations by running a lab experiment. By creating a
context-free and anonymous decision-making environment, a laboratory experi-
ment serves as a more rigorous testing field in that it helps control key variables
and also helps isolate those confounding factors that aﬄict the field data, and
therefore permits a direct identification of the underlying behavioural principle.
In addition, our design allows us to observe individual efforts that are otherwise
unobservable in the field.
16the PSA world rankings may not perfectly reflect players’ competence at the moment of
the match. For example, fatigue or unexpected injuries, which are unobservables in the field
data, may impact players’ actual odds of winning. Some peculiar past records from previous
tournaments between some specific pairs of players may also render the current PSA ranking an
imperfect skill measurement.
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4.4 Laboratory Experiment
4.4.1 Experimental Design
The experiment has two parts. In the first part, four periods but the first are
incentivised by a piece-rate. The first part is primarily meant to gauge individual
ability in the work task. In the second part, 12 periods of best-of-three team
contest in which subjects compete by working on the same task are played for real
money. Both the team composition and the matching of two competing team in a
contest are randomised in every period at the session level. The game structure is
the same as in the field and exactly matches the theoretical model. At any point
of the entire experiment, subjects do not know others’ identity or performance.
Our design has two crucial elements: randomisation and a tangible work task.
Randomisation as employed in our experiment serves three major purposes:
(i) recall that we have attempted to control non-neutral risk attitudes and non-
constant marginal costs of effort in the field study by controlling RatioRank3.
By the same token, randomisation both within team and between teams at each
period helps fix the effective prize spread of playing the second component match
at a constant level (half of the final trophy) because the stochastic outcome of the
third component match is always 50-50 from an ex-ante viewpoint. (ii) We have
considered the potential selectivity bias in the field study. With randomisation
at each period at the session level, there is no scope for building up a team envi-
ronment from past plays that may systematically bias the behaviour of a whole
team. Furthermore, effective randomisation helps generate a lab dataset in which
second movers with higher ability are equally likely to be in the leading team or
the lagging team. In the field, we observe instead a higher number of leading
cases because of the positively assortative matching in team composition (see Ta-
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ble 4.2). Constructing a more “balanced” dataset will give a higher power to our
statistical tests. (iii) Randomisation and indeed the lab itself helps isolate other
field confounds such as injuries, fatigue, and mutual past records.
We use the ball-catching task as the work task introduced in chapter 2. In
the ball-catching task, a subject has a fixed amount of time to catch balls that
fall randomly from the top of the screen by using mouse clicks to move a tray at
the bottom of the screen. The number of clicks is interpreted as the effort in a
period. This task requires concentration but little skill, and involves a flavour of
sporting excitement that represents the intense nature of real-world competition.
The task only lasts one minute and thus allows us to repeatedly measure the
behaviour of each subject. More importantly, the ball-catching task permits a level
of control over the effort cost function by attaching financial costs to mouse clicks
(interpreted as effort), and therefore subjects who work on the ball-catching task
have to engage in an explicit trade-off between the benefits of higher probability
of winning and the costs of higher effort level. Additionally, the ball-catching
task also allows us to make a priori quantitative predictions on subject’s effort
provision. In each component match of a best-of-three, the winner is the player
who catches more balls at the end of the allowed time; the marginal cost of effort
(clicking cost) is held constant throughout the experiment.
With randomisation and the ball-catching task, only the contest structure
is likely to systematically affect subjects’ decisions because randomisation both
within team and between teams renders any information from past plays essen-
tially “worthless” for the inference of the match outcome in the current period.
Moreover, randomisation makes it unlikely for some team members to build “team
identity” as they could not exploit such reputational resources in future interac-
tions. Hence the strategic mechanism, which rests on the assumption that one
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does not internalise the cost of effort incurred by other team members, is more
likely to be the dominating behavioural principle in the lab. Equally important,
the strategic incentive is further accentuated by the explicit monetary trade-off
inherent in the ball-catching task.
Some design choices regarding the information structure make the lab setting
different from the field. In the field, each player’s type, reflecting the athletic
skills and physical fitness, is nearly complete information, and feedback on games
is immediate. The theory suggests the information regarding each player’s type is
immaterial as long as the information structure is symmetric. Furthermore, the
difference in the richness of feedback information is also harmless as long as we
observe the outcomes of previous component matches. For these reasons, we chose
a simpler lab design in which subjects have no information about others’ identities
or performances during the entirety of the experiment, and feedback only contains
the outcomes of previous component matches in a period. Thus the lab contest
corresponds to the theoretic all-pay auction with two-sided private information.17
Another small difference between the lab and the field is that in our experiment
third component matches will not be played if one team has already won the first
two component matches. This is, however, not always true in the field for reasons
like courtesy or exercises.
Our experimental design does not preclude that other psychological factors
such as altruism, differential private valuations of winning, and some peculiar belief
updating, might alter the neutrality prediction.18 But unlike the psychological
17Technically, the theory requires the assumption of a common prior of all players’ ability
distributions. However, it is difficult to implement this requirement in our experiment; and since
all players work on exactly the same ball-catching task, it is plausible that this requirement is
satisfied in practice.
18Altruism: altruism implies that subjects may internalise part of the effort costs borne by
their team members in their utility evaluations, and thus leading teams would be more likely to
win second component matches than lagging teams. Differential private valuations of winning :
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principle that generates the neutrality result, these psychological factors, if ever
exist, would alter the neutrality in one direction or another. Incidentally, testing
against these psychological factors squares well with the general purpose of this
lab experiment: giving a stress test for the theory—if the strategic incentives do
not dominate other psychological incentives in such a “favourable” environment,
they cannot be the guiding behavioural principle in the field.
The parameters of the experiment are as follows. In the first part, the first
period is not paid and the next three periods are paid by a piece rate, in which
each caught ball awards 20 tokens. In the second part, each member from the
winning team is awarded a winner prize of 1200 tokens and each member from the
losing team a loser prize of 400 tokens. The loser prize is used to compensate for
potential losses because of over-competing. In both parts, each mouse click that
moves the tray costs 10 tokens. Given these parameters, predicted average effort
levels are 20 clicks for first and second movers and 40 for third movers, although
in theory all of them should play according to mixed strategies in equilibrium
because of the all-pay technology.19
for example, a second mover from a lagging team may have a higher valuation of winning her
component match than one from a leading team because of the pivotal status of this match,
implying that lagging teams would be more likely to win second component matches. This effect
may further be strengthened by self-image (i.e. self-derived utility of being the “saviour” of her
team) or aversion of being “responsible” for the defeat of her team. Peculiar (asymmetric) belief
updating : for instance, upon knowing the outcome of the first component match, the second
mover from the lagging team might perceive her teammates as less competitive or skilled than
their opponents and thus she will entertain a lower continuation value, while the rival second
mover from the leading team would perceive her team members as more superior than their
opponents. Such a belief updating leads to discouragement effects on lagging teams.
19To derive these predictions, note that the effective prize spread in the third component
match is 800. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the expected effort cost is half the total prize
spread and thus the expected effort is 40 for ex-ante symmetric third movers. As for the ex-ante
symmetric first and second movers, the effect prize spread is always 400 and thus their expected
efforts are 20.
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4.4.2 Hypothesis
As in the field study, we mainly focus on the second component matches and the
second mover’s behaviour. The lab experiment affords to test more testable predic-
tions than the field data. Besides the main hypothesis outlined in subsection 4.4.2,
we derive two more hypotheses.
First, due to randomisation the numbers of cases in which a second mover with
higher ability belongs to the leading team or the losing team should be equal. If
strategic neutrality holds, we expect support for hypothesis 2 :
Hypothesis 2: There are equal numbers of final match scores of 2: 0 and 2: 1.
Second, the experiment also allows us to observe individual effort which is
measured by the number of clicks in a period. If strategic neutrality holds, we
should find support for hypothesis 3 :
Hypothesis 3: The number of clicks by second movers in the leading team is not
different from those in the lagging team.20
4.4.3 Experimental Procedure
Six computerised sessions were conducted at the CeDEx lab at the University of
Nottingham. The software was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We
recruited 180 subjects from a campus-wide college student pool through ORSEE
(Greiner, 2015). Among all recruited subjects, 59% are female and the majority of
subjects are between 18 and 23 years old. No academic discipline accounts for more
20Alternative hypotheses can be derived by assuming that each player behaves as if he/she
plays in a structurally equivalent best-of-three individual contest. Given the all-pay contest
success function, the alternative for Hypothesis 2 is that the final match score is always 2:0.
Similarly, the equilibrium effort of a second mover in the lagging team is 0 and that of a second
mover in the leading team only needs to be slightly higher than 0. It is because the effective prize
spread for the former is 0 and that for the latter is the final trophy. Therefore, the alternative
for Hypothesis 3 is that the former players effort is higher than the latter players effort.
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than 10% of the majors of all subjects. Upon arriving at the lab, each participant
was randomly allotted a computer booth by the experimenter. Instructions of the
first part of the experiment were disseminated to all participants and then read
aloud by the experimenter. After they had finished the first part, instructions
of the second part were distributed and again read aloud by the experimenter.21
A post-experimental survey, including questions about general risk attitudes and
general competitiveness, concluded the session. A typical session lasted around
one and a half hours with the average earnings around £11.2.
4.4.4 Experimental Results
First, we present the results at the level of match outcomes using both descrip-
tive statistics and a formal econometric model similar to Equation 4.2 used in
the field study. Next, we move on to examine the second mover’s effort and its
determinants.
Match Outcomes
Hypothesis 2 suggests that we should observe as many final match scores of 2:0 as
of 2:1. This hypothesis is confirmed with a remarkable accuracy in the lab data:
there are 179 cases of 2:0 and 181 cases of 2:1.
One may worry that randomisation may not effectively smooth the influence of
individual abilities on the aggregate outcomes in a relatively smaller lab sample.
To deal with this concern, we first proxy individual ability in the task by his/her
average catches from the first part of the experiment, and then simulate a final
team score for every pair of competing teams by assuming that the player with
relatively higher ability always wins in the component match against his/her paired
21Instructions are reproduced in Appendix B.3.
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opponent and ties are broken randomly. The simulation results in 185 cases of 2:0
and 175 cases of 2:1 and the difference is not statistically significant (two-tail
binomial test: p = 0.635).22 We conclude that Hypothesis 2 is well supported in
the lab data.
As for Hypothesis 1, we estimate a fixed effects panel data model that parallels
the one used in the field study. The panel data model specification is as follows:
Win2(imt) = β0+β1Leading2(imt)+β2AbilityRival2(im)+δ2(t)+ω2(i)+2(imt), (4.5)
where i represents the second mover, m the match and t the second mover’s periods
of experience with the ball-catching task (because some third movers might not
need to play in certain periods). A second mover is called “stronger” if his/her
average catches from the first part is higher than that of the rival second mover.
Win2(imt) is a binary indicator of whether the stronger second mover i with t
periods of experience won the second component match in match m. Leading2(imt)
is a binary indicator of whether the stronger second mover’s first mover teammate
won the first component match. AbilityRival2(im) represents the ability of the
“weaker” rival second mover, also measured by his/her average catches from the
first part of the experiment.23 δ2(t) are experience dummies (with the first period
of experience providing the omitted category). ω2(i) is a matrix of second mover
fixed effects and 2(imt) is the error term.
22Average catches from the first part is correlated with average catches in the contest (Spear-
man’s coefficient: 0.218). If we instead use average clicks from the first part as the proxy for
individual ability (Spearman’s coefficient: 0.208), the simulation results in 195 cases of 2:0 and
165 cases of 2:1 and the difference is still not statistically significant (two-tail binomial test:
p = 0.126).
23Using average clicks from the first part as the proxy for ability produces quantitatively
similar results.
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Table 4.6: Determinants of Second Component Match Outcomes in the Lab Data
Dep. Var.: Higher-ranked
second mover won
Full No dropouts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leading 0.008 0.011 −0.031 −0.020
(0.063) (0.063) (0.075) (0.074)
AbilityRival2 −0.023∗∗ −0.030∗∗
(0.011) (0.012)
Constant 0.725∗∗∗ 1.399∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 1.680∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.330) (0.110) (0.368)
σω 0.411 0.417 0.391 0.395
σu 0.439 0.435 0.457 0.450
N(matches) 352 352 304 304
Subject 137 137 124 124
Note: All equations are estimated using linear fixed effects regressions. All experience
dummies are included and none is statistically significant at the 5% level. ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4.6 report estimates for Equation 4.5 for the
full sample with or without the control of opponent second movers’ abilities. The
coefficient estimates of Leading are nearly zero and not statistically significant at
all conventional levels in both model specifications. The sign of the coefficient of
rival second movers’ abilities intuitively shows the negative impact of a stronger
rival second mover on the component match outcome.
Overall, the theoretical predictions at the level of match outcomes (Hypotheses
1 and 2) are well borne out in the lab. In the following, we look more closely at
individual efforts that otherwise cannot be observed in the field.
Second Mover Behaviour
Hypothesis 3 predicts that we should also observe as high effort levels in leading
cases as in lagging cases for second movers. Table 4.7 reports some descriptive
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statistics for second movers.24 Using the full sample, we observe that second
movers from leading teams made 2.30 more clicks than those from lagging teams
but the difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.409, two-tailed t-test with
clustered standard error at the subject level). The data on catches, which mea-
sure outputs, also show no statistically significant difference between leading and
lagging cases.25
Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics for Second Movers in the Lab Data
Obs.
Clicks Catches
Avg. SD Min. Max. Avg. SD Min. Max.
(1) Full
Leading 360 26.95 17.15 0 76 30.86 8.37 7 49
Lagging 360 24.65 17.09 0 75 29.75 8.88 7 47
(2) No drop-out
Leading 318 30.51 14.97 1 76 33.30 5.22 11 49
Lagging 299 29.68 14.21 1 75 33.11 5.07 12 47
To provide formal econometric evidence, we estimate the following random
effects panel data model:
Clicks2(imt) = γ0 + γ1Leading2(imt) + δ2(t) + ω2(i) + pi2(imt), (4.6)
24Table 4.13 in section 4.7 reports the average clicks and catches of second movers by periods
of experience with the ball-catching task. The results show no definite ascending or descending
trend over time in either average clicks or average catches.
25As an axillary hypothesis, the theory predicts a mixed strategy of second mover’s effort on the
range between 0 and 40. The actual effort varies on the range of 0 and 80 clicks with an average
around 26 clicks. The mixed strategy can be firmly rejected by an equality of distribution test
(p < 0.001). Moreover, second mover’s effort is significantly higher than the average equilibrium
effort (p < 0.001, two-tailed t-test with a clustered standard error at the subject level). Figure 4.1
shows the distribution of second mover’s clicks and reveals a significant proportion of drop-out
cases (around 14%) in the lab data. Table 4.14 reports all types of players’ clicks and catches in
the experiment. The results show that average clicks of first movers is statistically significantly
higher than the predicted average of 20 clicks, and that of third movers is statistically significantly
lower than the predicted average of 40 clicks. In sum, we find no support for the equilibrium
effort predictions.
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Table 4.8: Random Effects Panel Data Regressions for Second Mover Clicks in the
Lab Data
Dep. Var.: Second
mover clicks
Full No drop-out
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leading 2.372∗∗ 0.413 0.429 −0.625
(0.922) (1.371) (0.712) (1.099)
Female −1.818 −3.465
(2.430) (2.270)
Leading × Female 3.564∗ 1.773
(1.847) (1.432)
Constant 24.233∗∗∗ 25.300∗∗∗ 26.639∗∗∗ 28.766∗∗∗
(1.797) (2.316) (1.447) (2.005)
σω 13.551 13.589 12.950 13.024
σu 10.896 10.853 7.460 7.455
N(matches) 720 720 617 617
Subject 178 178 170 170
Note: All equations are estimated using linear random effects regressions. All experience
dummies are included and none of them are significant. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01
where i represents the second mover, m the match and t the second mover’s periods
of experience with the ball-catching task. Clicks2(imt) is the effort of the stronger
second mover i with t periods of experience in match m. Leading2(imt) is a binary
indicator of whether the stronger second mover’s first mover teammate won the
first component match.
Column (1) in Table 4.8 reports estimates for the full sample. The coefficient
estimate of Leading is statistically significant at the 5% level and its value is
quantitatively similar to the difference in average clicks appearing in Panel (1) of
Table 4.7. Hence, there seems to be a positive leading effect at the effort level,
although it is not large enough to overturn match outcomes.
To investigate the factors that underlie the positive leading effects, first notice
that there is a non-negligible number of drop-out cases (i.e. no clicks) for second
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movers(see Figure 4.1), implying that the positive leading effect on average clicks
may conceal heterogeneous effects on individual efforts. Dropping-out behaviour
is not uncommon in tournaments and has been previously observed both in lab
experiments (e.g., Schotter and Weigelt, 1992; Mu¨ller and Schotter, 2010) and in
field experiments (e.g., Fershtman and Gneezy, 2011).
Figure 4.1: The Distribution of Second Mover Clicks in the Lab Data
More specifically, the drop-out rate is 11.7% in leading cases and 16.9% in
lagging cases. Among them, 28 subjects dropped out at least once in leading
cases and 38 subjects in lagging cases, implying that the dropping-out was not
just driven by a specific group of subjects. The 5.2% difference in drop-out rates
is also statistically significant at the 5% level (p = 0.043, two-tailed proportion
test). Therefore, it appears that second movers dropped out more often when they
were from lagging teams. The difference in drop-out rates is, however, not large
enough to overturn match outcomes as columns (3) and (4) in Table 4.6 show
that the coefficient estimates of Leading remain statistically insignificant for the
subsample excluding drop-out cases. Since being in a lagging team implies a lower
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chance to win the whole match, it is not entirely surprising that some players
might simply think that it is not worth giving a try in the first place or that they
are probably less willing to trust their own third movers.
An association between lower drop-out rate and higher second mover’s effort
in leading cases suggests that the difference in dropping-out is likely to underlie
the positive leading effect at the effort level. In Table 4.7, when drop-out cases
are excluded from the full sample the difference in average second mover’s clicks
between leading and lagging cases becomes even narrower and remains statistically
insignificant (p = 0.819, two-tailed t-test with clustered standard error at the
subject level). Consistent with the descriptive evidence, Column (3) in Table 4.8
shows that when drop-out cases are excluded the otherwise statistically significant
leading effect on second mover’s clicks becomes insignificant. Together, evidence
indicates that an asymmetric dropping-out pattern between leading and lagging
cases drives the positive leading effects on average second mover’s effort.
But who dropped out? Motivated by the literature of lab experiments on
gender differences in competitive preferences, we ask whether there are also some
gender differences in effort provision and dropping-out behaviour.
To this end, we estimate an augmented model of Equation 4.5 by adding an
interaction term between Leading and Female, where the Female dummy equals
one if the subject is a female. Columns (2) and (4) in Table 4.8 report estimates.
We find that the estimate of the interaction term statistically significantly differs
from zero (p = 0.054) in the full sample but becomes insignificant in the subsample
excluding drop-out cases (p = 0.216), implying that women caused the positive
leading effects by dropping out less often than men.26
26Table 4.15 in section 4.7 reports detailed descriptive statistics on second mover’s behaviour
by gender.
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Figure 4.2: Comparisons of Drop-out Rates Within and Across Gender
Notes: All p-values are produced by two-sample tests of proportions.
More direct evidence on the association between gender and dropping-out can
be found when we calculate drop-out rates for leading and lagging cases by gender.
Figure 4.2 summarises all the statistical comparisons within and across gender. For
men, the drop-out rate is 17.9% (=29/162) in leading cases and 21.5% (=32/149)
in lagging cases. In contrast, for women, the drop-out rate is 6.6% (=13/198) in
leading cases and 13.7% (=29/211) in lagging cases. The overall gender difference
in drop-out rates is highly statistically significant (p < 0.001, two-tailed test of
proportions) and remains statistically significant in either leading or lagging cases.
The difference in drop-out rates between leading and lagging cases is not statisti-
cally significant for men (p = 0.428, two-tailed test of proportions) but statistically
significant at the 5% level for women (p = 0.017, two-tailed test of proportions).
Finally, the difference-in-difference in drop-out rates for gender can be shown for-
mally in a random effects panel data model similar to Equation 4.5, but where the
dependent variable is replaced by a binary indicator of whether a second mover
dropped out. Table 4.16 in section 4.7 reports estimates. The negative size of the
coefficient estimate of Female suggests women on average dropped out less often
men though the difference is not significant. Similarly, the negative but insignif-
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icant coefficient estimate of the interaction term of Leading and Female implies
that though women responded to the difference between leading and lagging by
dropping out less often in the leading cases than men did, there is no significant
statistical evidence for such differential responses. In sum, descriptive evidence
shows that women dropped out less often than men and women were even less
likely to drop out when their team was in the leading position, but we find weaker
statistical support from the regression analysis (as reflected more strongly when
using second mover’s clicks as the dependent variable than drop-out rates).
4.4.5 Robustness
As we did in the field study, we can also test whether third component match
outcomes and third mover’s clicks are independent of the outcomes of first com-
ponent matches as the theory predicts. Table 4.17 and Table 4.18 in section 4.7
show the corresponding regression analyses. The estimates on the coefficient of
Leading, which are not statistically significantly different from zero in both tables,
suggest that strategic neutrality holds for third movers both at the level of match
outcomes and at the level of individual efforts.
We can also rule out the possibility that we observe strategic neutrality in
the lab simply because the second movers are confused about what to do or not
sufficiently incentivised. If so, drop-out rates should be similar across leading and
lagging cases for all second movers. Instead, we find a lower drop-out rate in
leading cases.
Finally, the gender differences in dropping-out seems independent of gender
differences in risk-lovingness or in competitiveness (see a survey in Croson and
Gneezy (2009)), and also cannot be attributed to a gender stereotype in team
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environments that the salience of gender in team composition that makes women
work harder (Ivanova-Stenzel and Ku¨bler, 2011; Vesterlund et al., 2015). Although
a general tendency for men to drop out more often than women can explain the
across-gender difference in dropping-out, it cannot explain the within-gender dif-
ference in dropping-out, i.e., the gender difference in leading effects (women were
less likely to drop out in leading cases than in lagging cases).27
4.4.6 Discussion
Taken together, in the lab experiment we again find evidence of strategic neutrality
at the level of match outcomes. The neutrality finding is genuinely strategically-
based because the competing psychological principle loses its explanatory power
in our lab environment and the confusion of subjects is unlikely to explain the
asymmetric dropping-out pattern. With “microscopic lens,” however, we find a
positive leading effect on average second mover’s effort: the average second mover’s
effort in leading cases was slightly higher than that in lagging cases. The leading
effect seems to be driven by an asymmetric dropping-out pattern that in turn
could be attributed to women who dropped out less often than men, especially
when their teams were in the leading position.
As noted in the introduction, our lab experiment is most closely related to Fu
et al. (2013). Their experimental design differs from ours in three major aspects.
First, they used a within-subject design where subjects first played best-of-three
team contests without feedback of previous component match outcomes and then
played the same contests with feedback (before playing any contest, all subjects
worked on individual tasks paid by the same piece-rate); both parts were one-
27see formal evidence in Table 4.19 and Table 4.20, and their accompanying discussions in
section 4.7.
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shot games. Second, competing players were paired by their abilities using their
performances in the last part, such that each pair of competing players had almost
equal abilities in the task. Every three randomly selected pairs then comprised
two competing teams. Therefore, although the team composition might change
between two team contests (with and without feedback), two competing teams
always had equally competitive players in each component match. Third, Fu et al.
(2013) used a counting-zero task that lasts five minutes as the work task for each
player.
Fu et al. (2013)’s experiment achieved the identification of strategic effects
by comparing second movers’ efforts in team contests with feedback to those in
team contests without feedback. If strategic neutrality holds, then there should
be no systematic difference in second movers’ efforts. Fu et al. (2013) indeed
found evidence consistent with strategic neutrality. Compared to our design, we
note that their design is likely to trigger psychological motives including the one
discussed in subsection 4.3.3. It is because the matching procedure is common
knowledge to all subjects in their experiment, and therefore might create an intense
environment among subjects to win against “equally competitive” opponent in the
task. This issue might be further accentuated by their usage of a counting-zero
task which may only bear non-pecuniary costs of effort or psychological disutility
in a working duration of five minutes, and that might encourage subjects to simply
work as hard as possible in the task. As a consequence, the experiment of Fu et al.
(2013) does not allow a clear distinction of strategic neutrality and psychological
motivations.28
28Fu et al. (2013) also ran a treatment of best-of-three individual contests with a similar within-
subject design. They found opposite evidence for strategic momentum: leading players slacked
off while lagging players worked harder. However, as noted in our field study, a comparison
between individual versus team contests provides only indirect evidence for strategic neutrality
in team contests. Moreover, their finding of the opposite of strategic momentum in individual
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4.5 Concluding Remarks
Combining the advantages of naturally occurring field data and laboratory exper-
iments to test theories not only strengthens our belief in the empirical relevance
of the theory, but also reveals richer behavioural patterns than any one of the
empirical approaches can offer alone. In this chapter, we exploit a field dataset
to test strategic effects in best-of-three team contests, and complement the field
observations with a laboratory experiment. Using the field data from high-stakes
professional squash team tournaments, we find evidence consistent with strategic
neutrality. A laboratory experiment is subsequently conducted to directly test
whether the neutrality result is indeed driven by the strategic incentives. Fur-
thermore, the experiment allows us to directly measure individual efforts that are
otherwise unobservable in the field. In the lab, we again find evidence of strategic
neutrality at the level of team matches, but the lab data reveal a non-neutral
effect on second mover’s effort, which is mainly driven by dropping-out behaviour,
and in turn appears to reflect some gender differences. In short, both of our field
and lab data provide strong support for strategic neutrality at the level of team
matches. At the level of individual efforts, however, the predictions do not hold
so well.
Our approach of combining field and lab data to test the same theory also
adds to a small collection of evidence of field and lab parallelism. Using data from
a game show and a scaled-down version in a classroom experiment, Post et al.
(2008) found that a version of prospect theory can organise participants’ risk-
taking behaviour better than the standard expected utility theory in both settings.
O¨stling et al. (2011) examined field data from a nationwide lottery game and lab
contests makes it difficult to judge whether subjects had similar strategic mindsets in two contests
and thus reacted to corresponding incentives in the predicted directions.
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data from a dedicated experiment that matches the theoretical assumptions more
closely. They also found that the theory fits reasonably well with both the field
and the lab data. In the context of best-of-three team contests, our field and lab
data lend reasonable support to theoretical predictions and field & lab parallelism.
There is, however, a small collection of papers finding that field and lab paral-
lelism might suffer when sufficient field experience with similar games is an implicit
assumption for the theory to apply empirically. Field experience could explain
why some of the “behavioral anomalies” were only found in laboratory experi-
ments using college students. Prominent studies of the effect of field experience
on parallelism include “winner’s curse” in auctions among college students and ex-
perienced company executives (Dyer et al., 1989) or sports card dealers (Harrison
and List, 2008), and minimax play between students and professional soccer play-
ers (Palacios-Huerta, 2008); (see however Levitt et al. (2010) for countervailing
evidence). In our best-of-three team contests, however, field experience appears
to be neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for establishing parallelism as
we find that even student subjects played according to theoretical predictions.
In light of the non-neutral effect on individual efforts in the lab data, some
caveats on extrapolating the results to the field are in order. The success of
generalising those lab findings on effort provision, dropping-out behaviour and
gender differences to the field may depend on the specific field setting, to which
we wish to generalise. In some field settings such as squash, the theory as well as
our lab environment does not capture the level of scrutiny or social pressure. In the
squash matches, for instance, “monitoring” by team coaches and audiences would
probably eliminate dropping-out behaviour altogether. Nonetheless, in some other
field settings where the scrutiny level is low or monitoring is too costly, we might
as well find dropping-out behaviour.
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Likewise, gender differences do not apply to some field settings such as sports
contests, where the nature of the environment excludes such a possibility. But in
some other field settings that feature mixed-gender team production and between-
teams competition, we might observe that women are more “responsible,” and
therefore less likely to lean back on other members’ contributions, especially when
their teams are in an advantaged position to win the entire competition, while
men tend to be “opportunists” or “strategic free-riders” when they are in similar
situations.
4.6 Appendix: Additional Tables for the Field
Study
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Table 4.10: Linear Probability Regressions of Third Component Match Outcomes
in the Field Data
Dep. Var.: Higher-ranked
third mover won
Coefficient Estimates (std. err.)
(1) (2) (3)
Leading 0.008 0.026 0.033
(0.067) (0.069) (0.083)
RatioRank3 −0.463∗∗∗ −0.375∗∗
(0.129) (0.160)
Home 0.151
(0.219)
Neutral 0.061
(0.154)
Constant 0.706∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.087) (0.192)
Fixed effects for each tournament No No Yes
R2 0.001 0.071 0.210
N(matches) 183 183 183
Note: Clustered standard errors in parentheses. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.11: Fixed Effects Panel Data Regressions for Second Component Match
Outcomes in the Field Data
Dep. Var.: Higher-ranked
second mover won
Coefficient Estimates (std. err.)
(1) (2) (3)
Leading 0.103∗∗∗ 0.017 0.006
(0.033) (0.035) (0.054)
RatioRank2 −0.579∗∗∗ −0.580∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.102)
RatioRank3 −0.038
(0.024)
Home 0.133
(0.125)
Neutral −0.039
(0.081)
Constant 0.717∗∗∗ 1.022∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.043) (0.196)
Fixed effects for each tournament No No Yes
σω 0.348 0.332 0.380
σu 0.379 0.357 0.350
N(matches) 820 820 453
Subject 228 228 161
Note: *** p < 0.01
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4.7 Appendix: Additional Tables and Discus-
sions for the Laboratory Experiment
Table 4.13: Descriptive Statistics for Second Movers by Experience in the Lab
Data
Exp. Obs.
Clicks Catches
Avg. SD Min. Max. Avg. SD Min. Max.
1 68 26.30 14.11 0 64 32.31 5.69 9 42
2 68 25.93 16.40 0 68 31.24 7.83 8 43
3 82 26.87 15.55 0 60 31.32 7.89 7 42
4 74 27.62 16.95 0 74 31.46 7.93 9 47
5 66 26.11 17.84 0 72 29.85 8.21 11 45
6 76 25.29 17.66 0 63 29.36 9.58 8 45
7 67 24.33 17.81 0 59 28.90 9.47 7 42
8 68 23.75 16.09 0 56 29.31 9.80 8 46
9 64 25.52 19.99 0 75 29.25 9.38 10 47
10 55 27.62 20.44 0 65 29.82 9.15 8 49
11 22 27.77 14.67 0 44 29.59 10.54 10 42
12 10 25.00 19.78 0 76 31.80 9.58 8 41
Table 4.14: Descriptive Statistics for All Subjects in the Lab Data
N Clicks Catches
First movers 720 25.67(17.02) 29.73(8.09)
Second movers 720 25.80(17.15) 30.31(8.64)
Third movers 342 33.81(15.66) 35.18(5.27)
Note: Standard deviations are in the parentheses.
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Table 4.15: Descriptive Statistics for Second Movers by Gender in the Lab Data
Obs.
Clicks Catches
Avg. SD Min. Max. Avg. SD Min. Max.
(1) Men
Leading 162 26.45 18.39 0 74 29.68 9.34 7 45
Lagging 149 24.66 19.14 0 75 28.94 9.62 7 42
(2) Women
Leading 198 27.36 16.11 0 76 31.83 7.35 9 49
Lagging 211 24.64 15.52 0 68 30.32 8.29 8 47
(3) Men (no drop-out)
Leading 133 32.22 15.01 1 74 33.44 4.99 11 45
Lagging 117 31.40 15.93 1 75 33.35 4.97 14 42
(4) Women (no drop-out)
Leading 185 29.29 14.87 1 76 33.19 5.40 11 49
Lagging 182 28.57 12.92 1 68 32.96 5.14 12 47
Table 4.16: Random Effects Panel Data Regressions for Second Mover Dropping-
out in the Lab Data
Dep. Var.: Dropout (1) (2)
Leading −0.066∗∗∗ −0.044
(0.022) (0.032)
Female −0.065
(0.047)
Leading × Female −0.041
(0.043)
Constant 0.078∗∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.039) (0.048)
σω 0.235 0.233
σu 0.259 0.259
N(matches) 720 720
Subject 178 178
Note: Both equations are estimated using linear random effects re-
gressions. All experience dummies are included. Experience dum-
mies 3 and 5-11 are significantly different from zero at conventional
levels and their estimates range from 0.05 to 0.16 with an ascending
trend. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.17: Fixed Effects Panel Data Regressions for Third Component Match
Outcomes in the Lab Data
Dep. Var.: Stronger third
mover won
Full
(1) (2)
Leading 0.014 0.012
(0.122) (0.120)
AbilityRival3 −0.032∗
(0.018)
Constant 0.590∗∗∗ 1.539∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.576)
σω 0.448 0.417
σu 0.438 0.435
N(matches) 181 181
Subject 111 111
Note: AbilityRival3 is measured by the rival’s average catches in
the first part of the experiment. All experience dummies are in-
cluded and statistically insignificant. * p < 0.1, *** p < 0.01
Table 4.18: Fixed Effects Panel Data Regressions for Third Mover Clicks in the
Lab Data
Dep. Var.: Third mover
clicks
Full
(1) (2)
Leading 0.927 1.939
(1.712) (2.474)
Leading × Female −1.987
(3.502)
Constant 32.528∗∗∗ 32.722∗∗∗
(2.439) (2.467)
σω 15.321 15.314
σu 11.408 11.429
N(matches) 362 362
Subject 162 162
Note: All experience dummies are included and statistically in-
significant. *** p < 0.01
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In the main text, we discuss that gender differences in dropping out seems
novel. Here we present detailed arguments.
First, can we explain the gender difference in dropping-out by a general ten-
dency for men to drop out more often than women? The answer is partly. For
the first movers, men dropped out in 16.6% (=46/277) cases and women in 11.3%
(=50/443) cases and the difference in drop-out rates is statistically significant
(p = 0.041, two-tailed proportion test). For the third movers, men dropped out
in 7.6% (=12/158) cases and women in 3.9% (=8/204) cases but the difference in
drop-out rates is statistically insignificant (p = 0.129, two-tailed proportion test).
Therefore, the general tendency for women to drop out less often than men appears
to provide a partial explanation for the across-gender difference in dropping-out.
But it cannot explain the within-gender difference in dropping-out, i.e., the gender
difference in leading effects (women were less likely to drop out in leading cases
than in lagging cases).
Second, can we attribute the gender difference in dropping-out to gender dif-
ferences in risk-lovingness or competitiveness? The answer is no. A collection
of experimental papers (see a survey in Croson and Gneezy (2009)) has shown
that men are on average less risk averse than women. When it comes to compet-
itiveness in the team environment, women seem more cooperative and willing to
choose team-based compensation (Kuhn and Villeval, 2015). Then perhaps the
higher tendency of dropping out for men simply reflects their higher willingness
to take a chance to rely on their unfamiliar teammates or their lower cooperative
disposition. In Table 4.19 and Table 4.20, we re-estimate the models for explaining
second mover’s clicks and dropping-out with additional controls for risk-lovingness
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and competitiveness elicited from the post-experimental questionnaire.29 First, in
explaining second mover’s clicks, the results show that although more risk-loving
second movers on average exerted less effort, there is no strong evidence of gender
differences in this respect (Female×Risk-lovingness : p = 0.106).30 Moreover, the
gender difference in leading effects remains statistically significant even after con-
trolling for risk-lovingness and competitiveness as well as their interactions with
Leading (Female×Leading : p = 0.068). Second, in explaining the probability of
dropping-out, risk-lovingness and competitiveness essentially play no role.
29Because risk and competitiveness measures are the same for individuals, we are forced to
estimate random effects models.
30As discussed in footnote 9, second movers’ risk attitudes may still affect the second com-
ponent match outcome even when the third movers are ex-ante completely symmetric and the
effective prize spread is fixed in the experiment. The estimate of Leading×Risk-lovingness is
statistically insignificant, and thereby rejects this conjecture.
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Table 4.19: Random Effects Panel Data Regressions for Second Mover Clicks with
More Controls in the Lab Data
Dep. Var.: Second mover
clicks
Full
(1) (2) (3)
Leading 2.371∗∗∗ 0.396 2.993
(0.922) (1.371) (3.534)
Risk-lovingness −0.393 −1.735∗ −1.361
(0.572) (1.013) (1.046)
Competitivness −0.163 0.266 0.122
(0.453) (0.784) (0.806)
Female −11.190 −11.281
(8.066) (8.091)
Female× Leading 3.580∗ 3.386∗
(1.847) (1.858)
Female×Risk-lovingness 2.009 2.014
(1.241) (1.245)
Female× Competitiveness −0.434 −0.404
(0.969) (0.972)
Leading×Risk-lovingness −0.720
(0.479)
Leading × Competitiveness 0.265
(0.371)
Constant 27.479∗∗∗ 34.171∗∗∗ 32.715∗∗∗
(4.144) (6.306) (6.527)
σω 13.631 13.627 13.696
σu 10.896 10.853 10.852
N(matches) 720 720 720
Subject 178 178 178
Note: Risk-lovingness is measured on a 0 10 scale with 0 meaning not risk loving
at all and 10 very risk loving. Similarly, Competitiveness index is also on a 0 10
scale with 0 meaning cooperative and 10 competitive. All experience dummies are
included and none of them is statistically significant. * p < 0.1, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.20: Random Effects Panel Data Regressions for Second Mover Dropping-
out with More Controls in the Lab Data
Dep. Var.: Dropping-out
Full
(1) (2) (3)
Leading −0.067∗∗∗ −0.045 −0.089
(0.022) (0.032) (0.084)
Risk-lovingness −0.007 −0.001 −0.007
(0.011) (0.019) (0.019)
Competitivness 0.010 0.004 0.006
(0.008) (0.014) (0.015)
Female −0.043 −0.041
(0.149) (0.149)
Female× Leading −0.040 −0.037
(0.044) (0.044)
Female×Risk-lovingness −0.012 −0.012
(0.023) (0.023)
Female× Competitiveness 0.007 0.007
(0.018) (0.018)
Leading×Risk-lovingness 0.012
(0.011)
Leading × Competitiveness −0.004
(0.009)
Constant 0.055 0.099 0.123
(0.079) (0.118) (0.124)
σω 0.235 0.235 0.236
σu 0.259 0.259 0.260
N(matches) 720 720 720
Subject 178 178 178
Note: Risk-lovingness is measured on a 0 10 scale with 0 meaning not risk loving at
all and 10 very risk loving. Similarly, Competitiveness index is also on a 0 10 scale
with 0 meaning cooperative and 10 competitive. All equations are estimated using
linear random effects regressions. All experience dummies are included. Experience
dummies 3 and 5 11 are significantly different from zero at conventional levels and
their estimates range from 0.04 to 0.17 with an ascending trend. *** p < 0.01
5 Conclusion
This thesis has made a number of contributions to our knowledge of how players
behave in contests, as well as contributions to experimental methods for studying
contests.
Chapter 2 makes a methodological contribution by introducing the ball-
catching task, which combines “real effort” with induced financial costs of effort.
In a series of lab and online experiments, we demonstrate its usefulness for theory-
testing purposes and versatility in various applications of economic experiments.
This task also sets the stage for studying contests in “real effort” experimental
environments in the next two chapters.
Chapters 3 and 4 present two dynamic contests, one between individuals and
the other between teams.
Chapter 3 investigates the source of disappointment aversion in a sequential-
move individual contest in an experiment using the ball-catching task. Gill and
Prowse (2012) showed in an experiment that a discouragement effect stems from
second movers’ disappointment aversion. We notice that their experimental find-
ings might be influenced by the presence of interpersonal comparisons in their
experiment: empirical underpinnings of disappointment aversion, despite being a
purely asocial concept in the literature, may have social origins in contests, and
one of them may be attributed to interpersonal comparisons. As a first step, we
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conduct a series of careful replications of GP using their slider task, but find that
behaviour is unresponsive to incentives. We then turn to the ball-catching task
and find evidence of encouragement effects both when interpersonal comparisons
are possible and when they are not. This result contradicts the prediction of
the disappointment aversion model but is consistent with an alternative model of
reference-dependent preferences which treats first mover effort as an exogenous
reference point.
Chapter 4 examines a dynamic team contest—the best-of-three team contest,
in which the strategic incentives imply a neutral dynamic effect in the sense that
the outcomes of the second and third component matches are independent of the
realised outcome of the first component match. However, a psychological motiva-
tion, which might be attributed to high levels of pressure for norm compliance,
also predicts the same neutrality result. The main purpose of this chapter is to
test for “strategic neutrality” and distinguish it from psychological motivations in
best-of-three team contests.
I adopt a two-step approach which combines the advantages of naturally oc-
curring field data and laboratory experiments. First, I use a field dataset from
professional squash team tournaments. By comparing team matches (best-of-
three team contests) and individual component matches (best-of-five individual
contests), we are able to tell whether individual players have strategic considera-
tions because in individual contests the strategic incentives and the psychological
incentives have differential predictions of dynamic effects. I find evidence for pre-
dictions of strategically-based models in both contests, thereby supporting the
strategic incentives as the main behavioural motivation in team contests.
Second, in order to provide a cleaner and more direct test of strategic neutrality
in team contests, I subsequently conduct a lab experiment using the ball-catching
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task, in which the lab contest closely resembles the field contest and the theory,
in a highly abstract and anonymous environment. In such an environment, psy-
chological motivations are muted because the participants have to engage in an
explicit trade-off between the benefits of higher probability of winning and the
costs of higher effort level when working on the ball-catching task, and also be-
cause the scrutiny and pressure for norm compliance are practically absent in the
lab. In short, I again find evidence of strategic neutrality at the level of team
matches. At the level of individual efforts, however, the lab data reveals non-
neutral effects on efforts that appear to reflect gender differences in dropping-out
behaviour, inconsistent with the theoretical prediction.
The thesis presents the major output of my four-year research in economics.
What I have learned is fourfold. First, combining the advantages of “real effort”
and induced values enables theory testing, particularly for point predictions, in
“real effort” environments. Second, contestants’ behaviours in contests are af-
fected by reference-dependent preferences, but not necessarily by disappointment
aversion. Third, contest structure, whether it is team-based or individual-based,
can make a great difference to dynamic effects in contests, and the source of differ-
ence can be largely captured by strategic incentives. Fourth, lab experimentation
is a great tool to study many research questions that may be hard to answer with
only naturally occurring data!
A Summary of Real Effort Tasks
Table A.1: Summary of Real Effort Tasks
Task Types Tasks Studies
Mathematical
skills
solve mathematical equa-
tions
Sutter and Weck-
Hannemann (2003)
multiply one-digit numbers
by two-digit numbers
Dohmen and Falk (2011)
Kuhnen and Tymula (2012)
multiply two-digit numbers Bru¨ggen and Strobel (2007)
add up two-digit numebrs Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007)
Healy and Pate (2011)
Eriksson et al. (2009)
Cason et al. (2010)
select a subset of the 12 num-
bers that added up to 100
Heyman and Ariely (2004)
decode numbers from letters Erkal et al. (2011)
Le´vy-Garboua et al. (2009)
Linguistic skills,
memory and
logic
anagrams Charness and Villeval (2009)
mazes Gneezy (2002)
Gneezy et al. (2003)
Freeman and Gelber (2010)
memory games Ivanova-Stenzel and Ku¨bler
(2011)
Sudoku Calsamiglia et al. (2013)
(Continued on next page)
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Table A.1: (continued)
Task Types Tasks Studies
IQ tests Gneezy and Rustichini
(2000)
Pokorny (2008)
Trial and error
two-variable optimization
task
van Dijk et al. (2001)
search the height of a curve Montmarquette et al. (2004)
Dickinson and Villeval
(2008)
Clerical Tasks
type paragraphs Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2010)
Dickinson (1999)
log library books into
database
Gneezy and List (2006)
Kube et al. (2012)
stuff letters into envelopes Konow (2000)
Falk and Ichino (2006)
Carpenter et al. (2010)
Manual Tasks
count zeros in a table Abeler et al. (2011)
count numbers in a table Pokorny (2008)
drag a computerized ball to
a specific location
Heyman and Ariely (2004)
slider-moving Gill and Prowse (2012)
sort and count coins Bortolotti (2010)
B Experiment Instructions
B.1 Instructions from Chapter 2
B.1.1 Instructions from Study 1
Welcome to the experiment. You are about to participate in an experiment on
decision making. Throughout the experiment you must not communicate with
other participants. If you follow these instructions carefully, you could earn a
considerable amount of money.
For participating in this experiment you will receive a 3 show-up fee. In addi-
tion you can earn money by completing a task. Your earnings from the task will
depend only on your own performance.
You will be asked to work on a computerized ball-catching task for 36 periods.
Each period lasts one minute. In each period, there will be a task box in the
middle of the task screen like the one shown below:
Once you click on the Start the Task button, the timer will start and balls
will fall randomly from the top of the task box. You can move the tray at the
bottom of the task box to catch the balls by using the mouse to click on the LEFT
or RIGHT buttons. To catch a ball, your tray must be below the ball before it
touches the bottom of the tray. When the ball touches the tray your catches
increase by one.
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You will receive a prize (in tokens) for each ball you catch and incur a cost
(in tokens) for each mouse click you make. At the beginning of each period you
will be informed of your prize for each ball caught, which will be either 10 or
20, and your cost for each click, which will be either 0, 5 or 10. In each period,
the number of balls you caught so far (displayed as CATCHES), the number of
clicks you made so far (CLICKS), your accumulated prizes so far (SCORE) and
your accumulated costs so far (EXPENSE) are shown right above the task box.
SCORE will be CATCH multiplied by your prize per catch for the period and
EXPENSE will be CLICK multiplied by your cost per click for the period. At
the end of the period your earnings in tokens for the period will be your SCORE
minus your EXPENSE. Please note that catching more balls by moving the tray
more often does not necessarily lead to higher earnings because both SCORE and
EXPENSE matter for your earnings.
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The first six periods will be practice periods which will not affect your earnings
in the experiment in any way. At the end of the experiment, the tokens you earned
from periods 7 to 36 will be converted to cash at the rate of 1200 tokens = 1 pound.
You will be paid this amount in addition to your 3 show-up fee.
B.1.2 Instructions from Study 2
Study 2 was run in five two-part sessions. Part One of sessions 1-5 implemented
the Gift Exchange (Stranger), Gift Exchange (Partner), PR20, PR5 and Team
Production treatments respectively. The Tournament treatment was conducted in
Part Two of the fourth session. A pilot design that is not reported in this chapter
was conducted in the remaining parts.
General Information
[All Treatments]
Welcome to the experiment. There will be two unrelated experiments for this
session and there will be two separate instructions. The instructions for the second
experiment will be distributed after the first experiment is ended. Throughout
the session you must not communicate with other participants. If you follow these
instructions carefully, you could earn a considerable amount of money. During the
session your payment will be calculated in tokens.
At the end of each experiment tokens will be converted to cash at a rate of
1000 tokens = 1 pound. Your total payment for participating in this session will
be the sum of your earnings in each experiment plus a 3 show-up fee. You will be
paid this amount in cash at the end of the session.
If there is any question during the experiment, please raise your hand and
someone will come to your desk to answer it.
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[Team Production]
The first experiment has 10 periods. Before the first period, you will be ran-
domly assigned to a group of four participants. You will be in this group for the
entire experiment.
In each period, you and each of the other three participants in your group will
be asked to work on a computerised ball-catching task. Your earnings in each
period will depend on the number of balls caught by you and the rest of your
group as well as some personal expenses as detailed below.
Your Task in a Period
Each period lasts one minute. In each period, there will be a task box in the
middle of the task screen like the one shown below:
[Same Figure in Study 1 B.1.1]
Once you click on the Start the Task button, the timer will start and balls
will fall randomly from the top of the task box. You can move the tray at the
bottom of the task box to catch the balls by using the mouse to click on the LEFT
or RIGHT buttons. To catch a ball, your tray must be below the ball before it
touches the tray. When the ball touches the tray your catches increase by one.
For each mouse click you make you will incur a cost of 5 tokens.
For each ball you catch, you and the rest of your group will in total receive a
prize of 20 tokens. Similarly, for each ball each of your group members catches,
you and the rest of your group will in total receive a prize of 20 tokens.
In each period, the number of balls you have caught so far (displayed as
CATCHES) and the number of clicks you have made so far (CLICKS) will be
shown right above the task box. Also shown above the task box will be SCORE,
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which is CATCHES multiplied by the prize per catch, and EXPENSE, which is
CLICKS multiplied by the cost per click.
How Your Earnings In Each Period Are Determined
When you and the other members of your group have finished the task, the
computer will calculate the TOTAL SCORE of your group by adding up the four
individual SCOREs in your group. Your earnings in tokens will be one-fourth of
your group TOTAL SCORE minus your EXPENSE:
Your Earnings = (your groups TOTAL SCORE)/4 EXPENSE.
Your SCORE and EXPENSE, your groups TOTAL SCORE, and your earnings
for the period will be displayed on the screen at the end of each period.
[Gift Exchange]
The first experiment has 10 paying periods. Before the first paying period,
each participant will be randomly assigned to one of two groups: half will be
workers and half firms. You will remain either a worker or a firm throughout
this experiment. In each paying period a firm will be randomly matched with
a worker. (Stranger treatment : Thus, you will be matched at random with
another participant from period to period. Partner treatment : You will be
matched with the same participant for the entire experiment.) All firms
and workers and the information on pairings will remain anonymous throughout
the experiment.
Each paying period consists of two stages:
Stage 1: A firm will make a wage offer to the worker.
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Stage 2: The worker will work on a task. The exact procedure is described
below.
How do you calculate the firms and workers earnings in each paying
period?
1. In each paying period, every firm and worker will receive 300 tokens.
2. Each firm may choose any integer number between 0 and 1000 as the wage
in tokens that the firm offers to her paired worker.
3. After the firm has made a wage offer to her matched worker, the worker will
be asked to work on a computerized ball-catching task. In each period, there will
be a task box in the middle of the workers task screen like the one shown below:
4. Each task lasts one minute. Once the worker clicks on the Start the Task
button, the timer will start and balls will fall randomly from the top of the task
box. The worker can move the tray at the bottom of the task box to catch the
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balls by using the mouse to click on the LEFT or RIGHT buttons. To catch a
ball, her tray must be below the ball before it touches the tray. When the ball
touches the tray the workers catches increase by one.
5. For each ball the worker catches, her matched firm will receive a prize of 50
tokens.
6. The worker will incur a specific cost for each mouse click she makes. The
cost for each mouse click is shown below.
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Cost 5 5 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 9
No. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30+
Cost 9 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 12
For example, the column with No.6 means that the 6th click costs 6 tokens, the
column with No.21 means that the 21st click costs 10 tokens, and finally the last
column with No.30+ means that the 30th and any further click costs 12 tokens.
Notice that if, for example, the worker makes a total of three clicks she will incur
a total cost of 5 + 5 + 6 = 16 tokens.
7. The more clicks the worker makes, the more balls she may catch. Typically,
if the worker decides to incur no cost by not moving the tray at all, she may
still catch 4∼6 balls. If the worker decides to catch every ball that she can, she
may be able to catch 20 balls but she may need to click 20∼30 times and incur a
corresponding EXPENSE.
8. In each period, the number of balls the worker has caught so far (displayed
as CATCHES), the number of clicks she has made so far (CLICKS) will be shown
right above the workers task box. Also shown above the task box will be SCORE,
which is CATCHES multiplied by the prize per catch, and EXPENSE, which is
the total cost of CLICKS.
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9. After the worker has completed the task, her earnings in tokens for the
period will be determined by the following formula:
Workers Earnings = 300 + Wage EXPENSE.
10. The firms earnings in tokens for the period will be determined by the
following formula:
Firms Earnings = 300 Wage + SCORE.
Practice periods
Before starting the paying periods, there will be three practice periods in which
every participant will play the role of the worker. These practice periods are meant
to familiarise yourselves with the task, and to see how CLICKS are translated
into CATCHES. The earnings in these practice periods will not affect your total
payment for the experiment.
In each practice period, you will receive a wage, which is either 100, 500, or
900 tokens. You will then be asked to work on the ball-catching task as described
above. Your earnings in each practice period will be calculated following the same
rule above.
You will discover whether you will be a firm or a worker in paying periods after
these practice periods.
[Tournament]
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The second experiment has 10 periods. Before the first period, you will be
randomly paired with another participant. You will be in this pair for the entire
experiment.
Your Task in This Experiment
In each period, you and your paired participant will complete the same ball-
catching task as in the first experiment.
You will receive a score of 10 tokens for each ball you catch and incur a cost of
5 tokens for each mouse click you make. That means SCORE = 10×CATCHES
and EXPENSE = 5×CLICKS.
How Your Earnings In Each Period Are Determined
In each period, the person with higher SCORE in each pair will have a higher
probability of being the winner. If you are the winner, you will earn 1200 tokens
minus your EXPENSE for the period. If you are the loser, you will earn 200 tokens
minus your EXPENSE for the period.
Your probability of winning will depend on the difference between your SCORE
and that of your paired participant and some element of chance.
Specifically, say that the SCOREs of you and your paired participant are S1
and S2 respectively. Then your probability of winning the award is calculated as
(S1 - S2 + 500)/1000 and the probability of winning of your paired participant is
correspondingly calculated as (S2 - S1 + 500)/1000. That means, if the SCOREs
are the same, both of you will have a 50% chance of being the winner. If the
SCOREs are not the same, the chance of winning for the pair member with the
higher SCORE increases by 1 percentage point for every increase of 10 in the
difference between the SCOREs, while the chance of winning for the pair member
with the lower SCORE correspondingly decreases by 1 percentage point.
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Your SCORE, the SCORE of your paired participant, your EXPENSE, the
EXPENSE of your paired participant, your probability of winning, whether you
were the winner or the loser of the period and your earnings will be displayed on
the screen at the end of each period.
B.2 Instructions from Chapter 3
B.2.1 Instructions (slider task)
[SOCIAL treatment (reproduced from Gill and
Prowse (2012))]
Please open the brown envelope you have just collected. I am reading from the
four page instructions sheet which you will find in your brown envelope. [Open
brown envelope]
Thank you for participating in this session. There will be a number of pauses
for you to ask questions. During such a pause, please raise your hand if you
want to ask a question. Apart from asking questions in this way, you must not
communicate with anybody in this room. Please now turn off mobile phones and
any other electronic devices. These must remain turned off for the duration of
this session. Are there any questions?
You have been allocated to a computer booth according to the number on the
card you selected as you came in. You must not look into any of the other computer
booths at any time during this session. As you came in you also selected a white
sealed envelope. Please now open your white envelope. [Open white envelope]
Each white envelope contains a different four digit Participant ID number. To
ensure anonymity, your actions in this session are linked to this Participant ID
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number and at the end of this session you will be paid by Participant ID number.
You will be paid a show up fee of £4 together with any money you accumulate
during this session. The amount of money you accumulate will depend partly on
your actions, partly on the actions of others and partly on chance. All payments
will be made in cash in another room. Neither I nor any of the other participants
will see how much you have been paid. Please follow the instructions that will
appear shortly on your computer screen to enter your four digit Participant ID
number. [Enter four digit Participant ID number] Please now return your
Participant ID number to its envelope, and keep this safe as your Participant ID
number will be required for payment at the end.
This session consists of 2 practice rounds, for which you will not be paid,
followed by 10 paying rounds with money prizes. In each round you will undertake
an identical task lasting 120 seconds. The task will consist of a screen with 48
sliders. Each slider is initially positioned at 0 and can be moved as far as 100.
Each slider has a number to its right showing its current position. You can use
the mouse in any way you like to move each slider. You can readjust the position
of each slider as many times as you wish. Your “points score” in the task will be
the number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 at the end of the 120 seconds. Are
there any questions?
Before the first practice round, you will discover whether you are a “First
Mover” or a “Second Mover”. You will remain either a First Mover or a Second
Mover for the entirety of this session.
In each round, you will be paired. One pair member will be a First Mover and
the other will be a Second Mover. The First Mover will undertake the task first,
and then the Second Mover will undertake the task. The Second Mover will see
the First Mover’s points score before starting the task.
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In each paying round, there will be a prize which one pair member will win.
Each pair’s prize will be chosen randomly at the beginning of the round and will
be between £0.10 and £3.90. The winner of the prize will depend on the difference
between the First Mover’s and the Second Mover’s points scores and some element
of chance. If the points scores are the same, each pair member will have a 50%
chance of winning the prize. If the points scores are not the same, the chance of
winning for the pair member with the higher points score increases by 1 percentage
point for every increase of 1 in the difference between the points scores, while the
chance of winning for the pair member with the lower points score correspondingly
decreases by 1 percentage point. The table at the end of these instructions gives
the chance of winning for any points score difference. Please look at this table
now. [Look at table] Are there any questions?
During each task, a number of pieces of information will appear at the top of
your screen, including the time remaining, the round number, whether you are a
First Mover or a Second Mover, the prize for the round and your points score in
the task so far. If you are a Second Mover, you will also see the points score of
the First Mover you are paired with.
After both pair members have completed the task, each pair member will see
a summary screen showing their own points score, the other pair member’s points
score, their probability of winning, the prize for the round and whether they were
the winner or the loser of the round.
We will now start the first of the two practice rounds. In the practice rounds,
you will be paired with an automaton who behaves randomly. Before we start,
are there any questions?
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Please look at your screen now. [First practice round] Before we start the
second practice round, are there any questions? Please look at your screen now.
[Second practice round] Are there any questions?
The practice rounds are finished. We will now move on to the 10 paying rounds.
In every paying round, each First Mover will be paired with a Second Mover. The
pairings will be changed after every round and pairings will not depend on your
previous actions. You will not be paired with the same person twice. Furthermore,
the pairings are done in such a way that the actions you take in one round cannot
affect the actions of the people you will be paired with in later rounds. This also
means that the actions of the person you are paired with in a given round cannot
be affected by your actions in earlier rounds. (If you are interested, this is because
you will not be paired with a person who was paired with someone who had been
paired with you, and you will not be paired with a person who was paired with
someone who had been paired with someone who had been paired with you, and
so on.) Are there any questions?
We will now start the 10 paying rounds. There will be no pauses between the
rounds. Before we start the paying rounds, are there any remaining questions?
There will be no further opportunities to ask questions. Please look at your screen
now. [10 paying rounds]
The session is now complete. Your total cash payment, including the show up
fee, is displayed on your screen. Please leave the room one by one when asked to
do so to receive your payment. Remember to bring the envelope containing your
four digit Participant ID number with you but please leave all other materials on
your desk. Thank you for participating.
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Differences in
points score
Chance of winning prize for
Mover with higher score
Chance of winning prize for
Mover with lower score
0 50% 50%
1 51% 49%
2 52% 48%
3 53% 47%
4 54% 46%
5 55% 45%
6 56% 44%
7 57% 43%
8 58% 42%
9 59% 41%
10 60% 40%
11 61% 39%
12 62% 38%
13 63% 37%
14 64% 36%
15 65% 35%
16 66% 34%
17 67% 33%
18 68% 32%
19 69% 31%
20 70% 30%
21 71% 29%
22 72% 28%
23 73% 27%
24 74% 26%
25 75% 25%
26 76% 24%
27 77% 23%
28 78% 22%
29 79% 21%
30 80% 20%
31 81% 19%
32 82% 18%
33 83% 17%
34 84% 16%
35 85% 15%
36 86% 14%
37 87% 13%
38 88% 12%
39 89% 11%
40 90% 10%
41 91% 9%
42 92% 8%
43 93% 7%
44 94% 6%
45 95% 5%
46 96% 4%
47 97% 3%
48 98% 2%
49 Not Possible as there are only 48 sliders
50 Not Possible as there are only 48 sliders
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[ASOCIAL treatment]
Please open the brown envelope you have just collected. I am reading from the
four page instructions sheet which you will find in your brown envelope. [Open
brown envelope]
Thank you for participating in this session. There will be a number of pauses
for you to ask questions. During such a pause, please raise your hand if you
want to ask a question. Apart from asking questions in this way, you must not
communicate with anybody in this room. Please now turn off mobile phones and
any other electronic devices. These must remain turned off for the duration of
this session. Are there any questions?
You have been allocated to a computer booth according to the number on the
card you selected as you came in. You must not look into any of the other computer
booths at any time during this session. As you came in you also selected a white
sealed envelope. Please now open your white envelope. [Open white envelope]
Each white envelope contains a different four digit Participant ID number. To
ensure anonymity, your actions in this session are linked to this Participant ID
number and at the end of this session you will be paid by Participant ID number.
You will be paid a show up fee of £4 together with any money you accumulate
during this session. The amount of money you accumulate will depend partly on
your actions and partly on chance. All payments will be made in cash at the front
desk by my experimental assistant. Neither I nor any of the other participants
will see how much you have been paid. Please follow the instructions that will
appear shortly on your computer screen to enter your four digit Participant ID
number. [Enter four digit Participant ID number] Please now return your
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Participant ID number to its envelope, and keep this safe as your Participant ID
number will be required for payment at the end.
This session consists of 2 practice rounds, for which you will not be paid,
followed by 10 paying rounds with money prizes. In each round you will undertake
an identical task lasting 120 seconds. The task will consist of a screen with 48
sliders. Each slider is initially positioned at 0 and can be moved as far as 100.
Each slider has a number to its right showing its current position. You can use
the mouse in any way you like to move each slider. You can readjust the position
of each slider as many times as you wish. Your “points score” in the task will be
the number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 at the end of the 120 seconds. Are
there any questions?
In each paying round, there will be a prize which you may win. Each prize will
be chosen randomly at the beginning of the round and will be between £0.10 and
£3.90. Whether you will win the prize depends on the difference between your
points score and a given number, and some element of chance. The given number
will change each round. If your points score is equal to this given number, you
will have a 50% chance of winning the prize. If your points score differs from this
given number, your chance of winning increases by 1 percentage point for every
increase of 1 in the difference between your points scores and the given number,
while your chance of winning correspondingly decreases by 1 percentage point for
every decrease of 1 between your points score and the given number. The table at
the end of these instructions gives the chance of winning for any difference between
your points score and a given number. Please look at this table now. [Look at
table] Are there any questions?
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During each task, a number of pieces of information will appear at the top of
your screen, including the time remaining, the round number, the prize for the
round, the given number and your points score in the task so far.
After you have completed the task, you will see a summary screen showing
your points score, the given number, your probability of winning, the prize for the
round and whether you won the prize or not in the round.
We will now start the first of the two practice rounds. Before we start, are
there any questions?
Please look at your screen now. [First practice round] Before we start the
second practice round, are there any questions? Please look at your screen now.
[Second practice round] Are there any questions?
The practice rounds are finished. We will now start the 10 paying rounds.
There will be no pauses between the rounds. Before we start the paying rounds,
are there any remaining questions? There will be no further opportunities to ask
questions. Please look at your screen now. [10 paying rounds]
The session is now complete. Your total cash payment, including the show up
fee, is displayed on your screen. Please leave the room one by one when asked to
do so to receive your payment. Remember to bring the envelope containing your
four digit Participant ID number with you but please leave all other materials on
your desk. Thank you for participating.
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Differences in
your points
score and the
given number
Chance of winning prize if your
points score is higher than the
given number
Chance of winning prize if your
points score is lower than the
given number
0 50% 50%
1 51% 49%
2 52% 48%
3 53% 47%
4 54% 46%
5 55% 45%
6 56% 44%
7 57% 43%
8 58% 42%
9 59% 41%
10 60% 40%
11 61% 39%
12 62% 38%
13 63% 37%
14 64% 36%
15 65% 35%
16 66% 34%
17 67% 33%
18 68% 32%
19 69% 31%
20 70% 30%
21 71% 29%
22 72% 28%
23 73% 27%
24 74% 26%
25 75% 25%
26 76% 24%
27 77% 23%
28 78% 22%
29 79% 21%
30 80% 20%
31 81% 19%
32 82% 18%
33 83% 17%
34 84% 16%
35 85% 15%
36 86% 14%
37 87% 13%
38 88% 12%
39 89% 11%
40 90% 10%
41 91% 9%
42 92% 8%
43 93% 7%
44 94% 6%
45 95% 5%
46 96% 4%
47 97% 3%
48 98% 2%
49 Not Possible as there are only 48 sliders
50 Not Possible as there are only 48 sliders
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B.2.2 Instructions (ball-catching task)
[SOCIAL treatments]
Thank you for participating in this session. There will be a number of pauses
for you to ask questions. During such a pause, please raise your hand if you
want to ask a question. Apart from asking questions in this way, you must not
communicate with anybody in this room. Please now turn off mobile phones and
any other electronic devices. These must remain turned off for the duration of
this session. Are there any questions?
You have been allocated to a computer booth according to the number on
the card you selected as you came in. You must not look into any of the other
computer booths at any time during this session. As you came in you also selected
a white sealed envelope. Please now open your white envelope.
Each white envelope contains a different four digit Participant ID number. To
ensure anonymity, your actions in this session are linked to this Participant ID
number and at the end of this session you will be paid by Participant ID number.
You will be paid a show up fee of 4 together with any money you accumulate
during this session. The amount of money you accumulate will depend partly on
your actions, partly on the actions of others and partly on chance. All payments
will be made in cash. Neither I nor any of the other participants will see how
much you have been paid. Please follow the instructions that will appear shortly
on your computer screen to enter your four digit Participant ID number. [Enter
four digit Participant ID number] Please now return your Participant ID
number to its envelope, and keep this safe as your Participant ID number will be
required for payment at the end.
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This session consists of 2 practice rounds, for which you will not be paid,
followed by 10 paying rounds with money prizes. In each round you will undertake
an identical task lasting 60 seconds. The task consists of a task box in the middle
of the task screen like the one shown below:
Once you click on the “Start the Task” button, the timer will start and balls
will fall randomly from the top of the task box. You can move the tray at the
bottom of the task box to catch the balls by using the mouse to click on the LEFT
or RIGHT buttons. To catch a ball, your tray must be below the ball before it
touches the tray. When the ball touches the tray your catches increase by one.
For each mouse click you make you will incur a cost of £0.02. Your EXPENSE
in the task will be the number of clicks made multiplied by the cost per click and
your SCORE in the task will be the number of balls caught at the end of the 60
seconds. Are there any questions?
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Before the first practice round, you will discover whether you are a “First
Mover” or a “Second Mover”. You will remain either a First Mover or a Second
Mover for the entirety of this session.
In each round, you will be paired. One pair member will be a First Mover and
the other will be a Second Mover. The First Mover will undertake the task first,
and then the Second Mover will undertake the task. The Second Mover will see
the First Mover’s SCORE before starting the task.
In each paying round, there will be a winner prize which one pair member will
win. The other pair member will receive a loser prize. Each pair’s winner prize will
be chosen randomly at the beginning of the round and will be between £0.50 and
£4.30. In every round the loser prize will be £0.40. The winner of the winner prize
will depend on the difference between the First Mover’s and the Second Mover’s
SCOREs and some element of chance. If the SCOREs are the same, each pair
member will have a 50% chance of winning the winner prize. If the SCOREs are
not the same, the chance of winning for the pair member with the higher SCORE
increases by 1 percentage point for every increase of 1 in the difference between
the SCOREs, while the chance of winning for the pair member with the lower
SCORE correspondingly decreases by 1 percentage point. The table at the end of
these instructions gives the chance of winning for any SCORE difference. Please
look at this table now. [Look at table]
Your earnings in each round are determined as follows.
If you are the winner for the round,
Your Earnings (£) = Winner Prize - EXPENSE.
If you are the loser for the round,
Your Earnings (£) = Loser Prize - EXPENSE.
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The winner prize is randomly chosen from between £0.50 and £4.30, while the
loser prize is always £0.40.
Are there any questions?
During each task, a number of pieces of information will appear at the top of
your screen, including the time remaining, the round number, whether you are a
First Mover or a Second Mover, the winner and loser prize for the round, your
SCORE in the task so far, the number of clicks you make so far (CLICKS), and
your EXPENSE, which is CLICKS multiplied by the cost per click, i.e., £0.02. If
you are a Second Mover, you will also see the SCORE of the First Mover you are
paired with.
After both pair members have completed the task, each pair member will
see a summary screen showing their own SCORE and EXPENSE, the other pair
member’s SCORE, their probability of winning, the winner prize for the round,
whether they were the winner or the loser of the round and their earnings for the
round.
We will now start the first of the two practice rounds. In the practice rounds,
you will be paired with an automaton who behaves randomly. Before we start,
are there any questions?
Please look at your screen now. [First practice round] Before we start the
second practice round, are there any questions? Please look at your screen now.
[Second practice round] Are there any questions?
The practice rounds are finished. We will now move on to the 10 paying rounds.
In every paying round, each First Mover will be paired with a Second Mover. The
pairings will be changed after every round and pairings will not depend on your
previous actions. You will not be paired with the same person twice. Furthermore,
the pairings are done in such a way that the actions you take in one round cannot
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affect the actions of the people you will be paired with in later rounds. This also
means that the actions of the person you are paired with in a given round cannot
be affected by your actions in earlier rounds. Are there any questions?
We will now start the 10 paying rounds. There will be no pauses between the
rounds. Before we start the paying rounds, are there any remaining questions?
There will be no further opportunities to ask questions. Please look at your screen
now. [10 paying rounds]
The session is now complete. Your total cash payment, including the show up
fee, is displayed on your screen. Please leave the room one by one when asked to
do so to receive your payment. Remember to bring the envelope containing your
four digit Participant ID number with you but please leave all other materials on
your desk. Thank you for participating.
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Differences in
SCOREs
Chance of winning winner prize
for Mover with higher SCORE
Chance of winning winner prize
for Mover with lower SCORE
0 50% 50%
1 51% 49%
2 52% 48%
3 53% 47%
4 54% 46%
5 55% 45%
6 56% 44%
7 57% 43%
8 58% 42%
9 59% 41%
10 60% 40%
11 61% 39%
12 62% 38%
13 63% 37%
14 64% 36%
15 65% 35%
16 66% 34%
17 67% 33%
18 68% 32%
19 69% 31%
20 70% 30%
21 71% 29%
22 72% 28%
23 73% 27%
24 74% 26%
25 75% 25%
26 76% 24%
27 77% 23%
28 78% 22%
29 79% 21%
30 80% 20%
31 81% 19%
32 82% 18%
33 83% 17%
34 84% 16%
35 85% 15%
36 86% 14%
37 87% 13%
38 88% 12%
39 89% 11%
40 90% 10%
41 91% 9%
42 92% 8%
43 93% 7%
44 94% 6%
45 95% 5%
46 96% 4%
47 97% 3%
48 98% 2%
49 99% 1%
50 100% 0%
Appendix B 190
[ASOCIAL treatment]
Thank you for participating in this session. There will be a number of pauses
for you to ask questions. During such a pause, please raise your hand if you
want to ask a question. Apart from asking questions in this way, you must not
communicate with anybody in this room. Please now turn off mobile phones and
any other electronic devices. These must remain turned off for the duration of
this session. Are there any questions?
You have been allocated to a computer booth according to the number on
the card you selected as you came in. You must not look into any of the other
computer booths at any time during this session. As you came in you also selected
a white sealed envelope. Please now open your white envelope.
Each white envelope contains a different four digit Participant ID number. To
ensure anonymity, your actions in this session are linked to this Participant ID
number and at the end of this session you will be paid by Participant ID number.
You will be paid a show up fee of 4 together with any money you accumulate during
this session. The amount of money you accumulate will depend partly on your
actions and partly on chance. All payments will be made in cash. Neither I nor
any of the other participants will see how much you have been paid. Please follow
the instructions that will appear shortly on your computer screen to enter your
four digit Participant ID number. [Enter four digit Participant ID number]
Please now return your Participant ID number to its envelope, and keep this safe
as your Participant ID number will be required for payment at the end.
This session consists of 2 practice rounds, for which you will not be paid,
followed by 10 paying rounds with money prizes. In each round you will undertake
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an identical task lasting 60 seconds. The task consists of a task box in the middle
of the task screen like the one shown below:
Once you click on the “Start the Task” button, the timer will start and balls
will fall randomly from the top of the task box. You can move the tray at the
bottom of the task box to catch the balls by using the mouse to click on the LEFT
or RIGHT buttons. To catch a ball, your tray must be below the ball before it
touches the tray. When the ball touches the tray your catches increase by one.
For each mouse click you make you will incur a cost of £0.02. Your EXPENSE
in the task will be the number of clicks made multiplied by the cost per click and
your SCORE in the task will be the number of balls caught at the end of the 60
seconds. Are there any questions?
In each paying round, you will receive either a winner prize or a loser prize.
Each winner prize will be chosen randomly at the beginning of the round and
will be between £0.50 and £4.30. In every round the loser prize will be £0.40.
Whether you will win the winner prize will depend on the difference between the
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your SCORE and a given number, and some element of chance. The given number
will change in each round. If your SCORE is the same as the given number, you
will have a 50% chance of winning the winner prize. If your SCORE are not
the same as the given number, your chance of winning increases by 1 percentage
point for every increase of 1 in the difference between your SCORE and the given
number, while your chance of winning correspondingly decreases by 1 percentage
point for every decrease of 1 between your SCORE and the given number. The
table at the end of these instructions gives the chance of winning for any difference
between your SCORE and a given number. Please look at this table now. [Look
at table]
Your earnings in each round are determined as follows.
If you win in the round,
Your Earnings (£) = Winner Prize - EXPENSE.
If you lose in the round,
Your Earnings (£) = Loser Prize - EXPENSE.
The winner prize is randomly chosen from between £0.50 and £4.30, while the
loser prize is always £0.40.
Are there any questions?
During each task, a number of pieces of information will appear at the top
of your screen, including the time remaining, the round number, the winner and
loser prize for the round, the given number, your SCORE in the task so far,
the number of clicks you make so far (CLICKS), and your EXPENSE, which is
CLICKS multiplied by the cost per click, i.e., £0.02.
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After you have completed the task, you will see a summary screen showing
your SCORE and EXPENSE, the given number, your probability of winning, the
winner prize for the round, whether you won the winner prize or not in the round
and your earnings for the round.
We will now start the first of the two practice rounds. Before we start, are
there any questions?
Please look at your screen now. [First practice round] Before we start the
second practice round, are there any questions? Please look at your screen now.
[Second practice round] Are there any questions?
The practice rounds are finished. We will now start the 10 paying rounds.
There will be no pauses between the rounds. Before we start the paying rounds,
are there any remaining questions? There will be no further opportunities to ask
questions. Please look at your screen now. [10 paying rounds]
The session is now complete. Your total cash payment, including the show up
fee, is displayed on your screen. Please leave the room one by one when asked to
do so to receive your payment. Remember to bring the envelope containing your
four digit Participant ID number with you but please leave all other materials on
your desk. Thank you for participating.
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Differences in
your SCORE
and the given
number
Chance of winning winner prize if
your SCORE is higher than the
given number
Chance of winning winner prize
if your SCORE is lower than the
given number
0 50% 50%
1 51% 49%
2 52% 48%
3 53% 47%
4 54% 46%
5 55% 45%
6 56% 44%
7 57% 43%
8 58% 42%
9 59% 41%
10 60% 40%
11 61% 39%
12 62% 38%
13 63% 37%
14 64% 36%
15 65% 35%
16 66% 34%
17 67% 33%
18 68% 32%
19 69% 31%
20 70% 30%
21 71% 29%
22 72% 28%
23 73% 27%
24 74% 26%
25 75% 25%
26 76% 24%
27 77% 23%
28 78% 22%
29 79% 21%
30 80% 20%
31 81% 19%
32 82% 18%
33 83% 17%
34 84% 16%
35 85% 15%
36 86% 14%
37 87% 13%
38 88% 12%
39 89% 11%
40 90% 10%
41 91% 9%
42 92% 8%
43 93% 7%
44 94% 6%
45 95% 5%
46 96% 4%
47 97% 3%
48 98% 2%
49 99% 1%
50 100% 0%
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B.3 Instructions from Chapter 4
General Instructions
Welcome to the experiment. Please read these instructions carefully. For
participating in this experiment you will receive a 3 show-up fee. In addition you
can earn money by completing tasks in two parts of the experiment. You will
receive separate instructions before the start of each part. During the experiment,
your earnings are calculated in tokens.
At the end of the experiment, every 1000 tokens will be converted to 1 in
cash and your cash payment will be the sum of your earnings from both parts, in
addition to the show-up fee.
If you have a question, please raise your hand and someone will come to your
desk to answer it.
Instructions for Part 1
In this part, you will be asked to work on a computerized ball-catching task
for 4 periods. The first period serves as a practice period for you to familiarize
yourself with the ball-catching task. The next three periods will be for real and
your earnings in this part will be the sum of your earnings in these three paying
periods.
Each period lasts one minute. In each period, there will a task box in the
middle of the task screen like the one shown below:
Once you click on the Start the Task button, the timer will start and balls
will fall randomly from the top of the task box. You can move the tray at the
bottom of the task box to catch the balls by using the mouse to click on the LEFT
or RIGHT buttons. To catch a ball, your tray must be below the ball before it
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touches the bottom of the tray. When the ball touches the tray your catches
increase by one.
You will receive a prize of 20 tokens for each ball you catch and incur a cost of
10 tokens for each mouse click you make. In each period, the number of balls you
have caught so far (displayed as CATCHES) and the number of clicks you have
made so far (CLICKS) are shown right above the task box. Also shown above the
task box are SCORE, which is CATCHES multiplied by the prize per catch, and
EXPENSE, which is CLICKS multiplied by the cost per click.
At the end of the period your earnings in tokens for the period will be your
SCORE minus your EXPENSE.
When you are ready, please press the Start the Task button at the lower right
corner on the task screen.
Instructions for Part 2
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In this part, there are 12 periods. In each period, you will be randomly matched
with two other participants in this room to form a team. The random matching is
completed by the computer and has nothing to do with your decisions in previous
parts of the experiment.
Your team will be randomly matched with another team consisting of three
other participants in the room. The random matching of two teams is also com-
pleted by the computer and has nothing to do with any of the decisions in previous
parts of the experiment.
The whole matching process will remain anonymous throughout the entire
experiment. You will not be told the identities of either your team members or
the members of the other matched team. Also note that both the matching with
two other team members and the matching between two teams will be re-done
randomly in each period. It is very unlikely that you will be matched with the
same team members and the same other team members twice.
Your Task in Each Period
In each period, your team will compete in a best-of-three contest with the other
team for a winner prize of 1200 tokens for each member of the winning team and
a loser prize of 400 tokens for each member of the losing team.
The competition consists of up to three stages. You will participate only in one
of three stages. The computer will randomly determine your participation order
in the competition. You will be told whether you are the First Mover, the Second
Mover, or the Third Mover before the start of each period. In the first stage two
First Movers, one from each team, will compete. In the second stage two Second
Movers will compete and in the third stage, if necessary, two Third Movers will
compete. The winning team in each period will be the one that wins two out of
three stages. The rule for winning each stage is as follows.
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During the first stage, two First Movers will simultaneously work on the ball-
catching task. The team whose First Mover catches more balls at the end of the
task will win the first stage. If the two First Movers catch the same number of
balls, the computer will randomly select the winner of the stage. Each mouse click
on the LEFT or RIGHT buttons incurs a cost of 10 tokens to the First Mover who
makes the click. For each First Mover, the number of balls caught so far (displayed
as CATCHES) and the number of clicks made so far (CLICKS) are shown right
above the task box on the First Movers screen. Also shown above the task box
is EXPENSE, which is CLICKS multiplied by the cost per click. While the First
Movers are working on the task, the other team members should wait quietly and
patiently.
At the end of the first stage, all team members of both teams will be informed
of which team won the first stage.
The second stage proceeds in the same fashion as the first stage. The Second
Movers will participate in this stage while the other team members should wait
quietly and patiently. The team whose Second Mover catches more balls at the
end of the task will win the second stage. Each Second Mover will also incur an
EXPENSE herself by clicking. At the end of the second stage, a similar summary
screen will show which team won the second stage.
If one team has won both stages, the competition ends and each member from
the winning team will receive the winner prize of 1200 tokens and each member
from the losing team will receive the loser prize of 400 tokens. If each team has won
one of the two stages, the Third Movers will compete in the third stage following
the same competition rule for the first two stages. The team whose Third Mover
catches more balls at the end of the task will be the winning team. At the end of
the third stage, a similar summary screen as in the first two stages will be shown.
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Your earnings in each period will be (winner or loser) prize minus your EX-
PENSE. If the third stage is not necessary, the Third Mover earnings will be
simply the (winner or loser) prize.
Your Earnings in Part 2
Your earnings in this part will be the sum of your earnings from all 12 periods.
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